Knowing, doing and the moral mind : development of a non-realist and non-rationalist interpretation of the meaning of moral knowing and its implications for moral education by Joh, Moo Nam.
KNOWING, DOING AND 
THE MORAL MIND: 
Development of a Non-Realist 
and Non-Rationalist Interpretation 
of the Meaning of Moral Knowing 
and Its Implications for Moral Education 
Moo Nam Joh 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D. 
in philosophy of education 
University of London Institute of Education 
2000 
Abstract 
Modern theories of moral education question the truth of Socrates's 
belief which involves an idea of positive relationship between 'moral 
knowing' and 'doing'. As a result, such theories divide moral 
education between development of moral judgment and character 
training. However, the division of moral education invites a more 
puzzling philosophical perplexity such as the denial of a relationship 
between 'knowing' and 'doing'. 
The study proposes a theory of moral education which dissolves 
the philosophical perplexity, through a linguistic analysis of the words 
which constitute moral statements and relying on an educational 
examination of the meaning of 'moral knowing' which is seriously 
distorted by Socrates's inadequate definitions of the terms 'virtue' and 
`knowledge' in his proposition, 'Virtue is knowledge'. 
The meaning of the word 'X' in the form of moral statement such 
as 'X is good', which is primarily fact-denoting, extends for its 
accompanying meaning beyond that as delimited by Socrates and the 
realists. Accompanying meanings are moral notions but non-
descriptive, though they may be in some cases symbolised roughly by 
such 'notional words' as 'benevolence' and 'justice'. Contrasting with 
the statement such as 'Benevolence is good', which constitutes itself 
with a notional word, the form of 'X is good' will be meaningless 
unless it is understood with moral notions. 
`Knowing' in moral education is not theoretical, having regard to 
the nature of moral notions. 'Moral notions' embrace both 'knowing' 
and 'doing'. Therefore, education for the development of 'moral 
mind' must not be confined to clarification of meanings of words and 
ratiocination of judgments; it should help pupils to perceive moral 
qualities in situations where such qualities are deeply embedded and to 
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and the Philosophical Perplexities 
in Theories of Moral Education 
Socrates's proposition 'Virtue is knowledge' lightened the darkness at 
the beginning of education in ancient Greece but bestowed upon the 
education many complex views: the negative and the positive. 
Scepticism about the effects of moral education in fact abounds in 
analyses of contemporary theories moral education and practices. 
Amongst the most current commonplaces of the sceptics might be the 
query raised about the relationship between moral knowing 
(understanding moral principles) and moral doing. Most obviously, 
this query seriously challenges many educators' views on the positive 
relationship between moral knowing and doing; this is so especially 
for the educators whose beliefs base on 'the intellectualist legend' 
inherited from the Socrates's proposition. These educators believe that 
intelligent human performance involves the observance of rules or the 
rational application of criteria and maintain that the pupil must first go 
through the internal process of avowing to himself certain moral 
principles about what is to be done and only then can he execute his 
performance in accordance with the principles.' 
For the intellectualist legend, see Gilbert Ryle (1949) The Concept of Mind, 
ch. ii (New York: Barnes & Noble). 
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Many debates on the relationship between moral knowing and 
doing have appeared widely and repeatedly, both in the philosophy of 
education and in ethics where radically different philosophical views 
on the meaning of 'moral knowing' clash and yield disagreements on 
the nature of the relationship. Thus some philosophers negate even the 
possibility of moral knowledge, while others affirm it. Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and A.J. Ayer, in particular, belong to the former 
category. Most proponents of this claim are usually classed as 'moral 
emotivists'. For the moral emotivist, the use of the phrase 'moral 
propositions' or 'moral knowing' is quite improper in his logic. This 
account of the language of morals basically sides with the 
philosophical line which holds the verificationist principle of knowing. 
`There can be no ethical propositions'; thus writes Wittgenstein in 
the Tractatus. Furthermore, in A Lecture on Ethics which was probably 
read to the students' society known as 'The Heretics' in Cambridge in 
1929, he concludes; 
Ethics, so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate 
meaning of life, the absolute good, ... can be no science. What it says does not add to 
our knowledge in any science. 
The same contention reappears, in a more intensified form, in 
Waismann's Notes on Taft with Wittgenstein; `I regard it as very 
important to put an end to all the chatter about ethics - whether there 
is knowledge in ethics, whether there are values, whether the Good 
can be defined, etc'. A similar position, but different in its 
philosophical grounds and developments, for which the use of the 
phrase 'moral propositions' is improper, can be seen in moral 
emotivism. Though A.J. Ayer partly admits in his later work Freedom 
and Morality and Other 'Essays that certain theories of ethics can be 
defended, he still excludes such a view as refuted by epistemological 
and logical analysis, as in the influential chapter 'Critique of Ethics 
and Theology' in his Language, Truth and Logic. He thus asserts that 
moral judgments are not propositions at all, but ejaculations of feeling 
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or commands which attempt to provoke the hearer to act in a certain 
way. According to him, no such thing as ethical science exists, if by 
ethical science one means the elaboration of a 'true' system of morals. 
Ayer argues further that, as moral judgments are mere expressions of 
feeling, there can be no way of determining the validity of such 
judgments, and, indeed, no sense in asking whether or not such 
judgments are true. For the moral emotivist nothing can justify the 
view that moral judgments are a 'form of knowledge'. 
In complete contrast the moral realist claims the existence of a 
distinctive range of moral facts, ie. moral realities which are presented 
to us as something independent of our 'feelings' about them. Hence 
there is a possibility of awareness of the realist's moral facts. In the 
realists' view, moral beliefs, like other beliefs, 'are determined true or 
false by the way things are in the world'. Thus the moral realist thinks 
of moral beliefs as being cognitive. Moral intellectualism, amongst 
other theories, is closely related to this position. 
A claim similar to that of the realist view can be found in the 
sphere of education. The 'forms of knowledge' theory which Paul H. 
Hirst has established includes moral judgments as a unique form of 
knowledge. And Hirst dares to use here the phrase 'moral knowledge', 
though he makes a modest modification of the phrase in his later 
writing, and adopts instead the phrase 'moral awareness'. The theory 
accepts moral judgments as having equal status with other forms of 
knowledge, for instance, logic, physical science, and social sciences, 
and therefore suggests, in its whole context, that moral judgments 
satisfy the 'three distinguishing features' which can be apprehended as 
the 'conditions of knowledge' in an epistemological analysis.2 The 
same point emerges in his The Logic of Education (written in 
collaboration with Richard S. Peters) thus: 
The claim of objectivity in the case of moral judgments is a matter of long-standing 
Paul H. Hirst (1965) Liberal education and the nature of knowledge, in 
R.D. Archambault (ed.) Philosophical Analysis and Education, pp.128-31 (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
Moral" inconsistency and the philosophical perplexities 8 
dispute, but the sustained attempts there have been to show the objectivity of morals 
and its irreducibility to other forms of knowledge, make this domain one which must 
be recognised as having serious claims to independent status.3  
Insofar as he maintains the possibility of moral knowledge Hirst's 
theory accepts the moral realist's view, though no philosophical 
demonstration of the possibility of moral knowledge can be found in 
his account. 
However, moral realism can be divided into two different positions 
when we investigate it in terms of moral motivation. One of the moral 
realist positions, designated by the term `internalism' or `internalist 
(moral) realism', holds that having moral beliefs (cognitive morality) 
itself can be the sufficient condition for providing the moral agents 
with reasons to act morally.4 This internalist moral realist's type of 
argument is implicative, because the two elements - moral knowing 
and moral doing - in the internalist's conditional statement - 'if one has 
a moral belief (moral knowing), then one will behave in accordance 
with the belief (moral doing)' - have a positive relationship; hence a 
type of argument p: if the antecedent occurs, then the consequent 
would follow; thus moral knowing implies moral doing; they are 
harnessed together in this type of argument.5 Therefore, if the 
teacher follows internalist moral realism, the teacher will necessarily 
take a cognitive approach in moral education and expect the pupil to 
behave in accordance with the principle which is taught. This 
internalist argument exactly corresponds to what the intellectualist 
presumes. 
The other realist position, designated by the term 'externalism' or 
3 Paul H. Hirst and R.S. Peters (1970) The Logic of Education, pp. 63-4 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). (Italics mine) 
4 See D. McNaughton (1988) Moral 'Vision, esp. pp. 46-50 (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell). 
5 The official doctrine of the relationship between human mind and body, 
which hails chiefly from Descartes, shows most clearly this argument. The doctrine 
assumes that minds influence bodies and vice versa. See Gilbert Ryle (1949) 
Descartes' myth, in idem, op. cit. (London: Hutchinson & Co.). 
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`externalist (moral) realism', is quite opposed to the internalist 
position. The externalist realist holds that having moral beliefs does 
not correspond with behaving morally; he views having moral beliefs 
as involving awareness of moral facts, but this view does not 
necessarily provide moral agents with reason to act. This externalist 
realist's type of argument is non-implicative, because the two elements 
- moral knowing and moral doing - are here independent. Thus if we 
follow the externalist realist claim, then we have a type of argument q 
- even if the antecedent occurs, the consequent does not necessarily 
follow. Moral knowing and moral doing in this type of argument are 
not harnessed together; though they sometimes happen together in 
contingency. In this position moral knowing does not necessarily 
imply moral doing. 
These two different realist positions stand on the same ground, at 
least in the point that both claim a positive view of the possibility of 
moral knowing, as we generally understand moral realism. But the 
two positions are quite contrary to each other in their different views 
about the effect of moral knowing upon doing, as aforementioned. 
From this fact it follows that in the two types of argument p and q, 
the meaning of moral knowing must be construed in a rather different 
way; in their theoretical contexts these two contrary positions open 
two alternative ways. Thus a moral realist educator may follow the 
internalist line that affirms the positive relationship between moral 
knowing and doing, and conceive the meaning of moral knowing as in 
association with moral doing, while the other kind of realist educator 
may follow the externalist line that denies the relationship, and 
conceive the meaning of moral knowing in a state of dissociation from 
moral doing. 
However, the internalist educator frequently sees his pupils' 
actions that are inconsistent with their own principles and therefore 
confronts the scepticism provoked by this inconsistency. In fact such 
scepticism is much heightened through Gilbert Ryle's investigation of 
the logic of mental-conduct concept:, and especially the seemingly 
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absurd assumption - if one has a moral belief, then one would behave 
accordingly - on which both internalism and intellectualism are 
based.6 Intellectualism has hailed chiefly from the rationalist view, 
like Descartes's, that a performance of any sort depends on some 
anterior intellectual operation of planning what to do. To avoid the 
sceptic's criticism of internalism, many educators who are in line with 
externalism compartmentalise morality into two parts - the cognitive 
and the behavioural - and accordingly suggest two different sorts of 
moral education. This is clearly illustrated, for example, in Hirst's 
theory of liberal education and his most recent view on moral 
education, in R.F. Dearden's theory of primary education, in the 
philosophy of moral education of W.K. Frankena and in many other 
claims.' The externalist sees the internalist view as a philosophical 
myth and instead he proposes a dictum which is contrary to the 
internalist view; ie. moral knowing is one thing and moral doing quite 
another.. Hence the bifurcation of morality: the cognitive and the 
behavioural. And the bifurcation has not only dichotomised the aim of 
moral education but also split up the practice of moral education into 
two parts; education for knowledge about morality and that for moral 
behaviour. 
However, the modern educational theory of cognitive morality has 
left inescapably perplexing philosophical problems. John Wilson and 
The absurdity originates from the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine. "It 
maintains that there exist both bodies and minds; that there occur physical processes 
and mental processes; that there mechanical causes of corporeal movements and 
mental causes of corporeal movements. But the phrase", Gilbert Ryle says further, 
'there occur mental processes' does not mean the same sort of thing as 'there occur 
physical processes', and, therefore, that it makes no sense to conjoin or disjoin the 
two." According to Ryle, the dogma is the Cartesian category-mistake. Gilbert Ryle, 
op. cit., pp. 18-23. 
Paul H. Hirst (1965) ibid., pp. 113-38; Paul H. Hirst (1999) The demands 
of moral education: reasons, virtues, practices, in J. Mark Halstead and Terence 
McLaughlin (eds) Education in Morality, pp. 110-5 (London: Routledge); R.F. 
Dearden (1968) 'The Philosophy of Primary Education, ch. 8 (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul); William K. Frankena (1958) Toward a philosophy of moral education, 
Harvard Educational Review, 28, Fall. 
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his collaborators endeavour to identify certain cognitive components 
that constitute moral knowledge, as well as certain other components 
which should be introduced in moral education for the elevation of 
moral behaviour, though he puts much emphasis on the cognitive facet 
of morality, as is illustrated in his work Introduction to Moral Education 
and his new version of the work . New Introduction to Mora( 
Education.8 In this regard, Tasos Kazepides categorises John Wilson 
as an example of rationalist philosopher of moral education.9 Thus, 
they have built a theory of moral education which muddles together 
the things - the cognitive and the behavioural - that seem to belong to 
different categories. 
However, the most typical version on the dualist position of moral 
education appears in Hirst's theory.'° For example, Hirst's theory of 
8 John Wilson and others list the cognitive components of morality, along 
with the convenient labels for them; concern and respect for persons (including 
oneself) as being all of equal moral worth (phil), awareness of or insight into other 
people's feelings (emp), mastery of relevant factual knowledge (gig 1), knowledge of 
social conventions, knowledge of what helps or harms people, mastery of relevant 
practical knowledge (gig 2), knowledge of social skills, adoption of a set of moral 
principles that incorporate 1 to 4 above (dik), ability and power to translate one's 
moral principles into moral judgments and resolutions (krat 1), ability and power to 
translate one's moral judgments and resolutions into moral action (krat 2). See J. 
Wilson, N. William and B. Sugarman (1967) Introduction to Moral Education, pp. 
192-7 (Penguin); John Wilson (1990) i New Introduction to Mora( Education 
(London: Cassell). 
Tasos Kazepides (1991) On the prerequisites of moral education: a 
Wittgensteinean perspective, Puma! of Philosophy of Education, vol. 25, no. 2, p. 
269; John Wilson (1979) Moral components and moral education: a reply to Francis 
Dunlop, in D.B. Cochrane, C.M. Hamm and A.C. Kazepides (eds) 'The Domain of 
Moral Education, p. 181 (New York: Paulist Press). 
" The moral elements in Hirst's theory, are as follows: procedural 
knowledge or 'know-how' of the logic of rational moral judgments, procedural 
knowledge of social skills and roles; propositional knowledge or `know-that' of the 
fundamental moral principles; propositional knowledge of the physical world; 
propositional knowledge of persons, both self and others; propositional knowledge 
of social institutions and roles; dispositions, conscious and unconscious, to think and 
judge morally; dispositions, conscious and unconscious, to act in accordance with 
moral judgments; emotional experiences in keeping with rational moral judgments 
which facilitate moral action. See Paul H. Hirst (1974) Moral Education in a Secular 
Society, p. 91 (University of London Press). 
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liberal education manifests two distinctive moralities, similar to the 
Humean doctrine of a distinction between the faculty of understanding 
and the active or conative faculty. The aim of moral education in 
Hirst's theory of liberal education is strictly confined to the education 
of moral judgments; thus character education, or 'character training', 
to adopt his own phrase, is entirely excluded from his definition of 
liberal education and put into the category of 'general education' 
which is significantly distinct in this theory from liberal education." 
Frankena's two-fold moral education - MEX and MEY - also 
exemplifies a dualistic point of view on moral education; there is 
handing on a 'knowledge of good and evil' or 'knowing how' to act 
and there is ensuring that the pupil's conduct will conform to this 
knowledge.'' 
Dichotomising the aim of moral education, Hirst and other 
educational theorists of cognitive morality leave the educators to 
resolve the problem of moral inconsistency; these theorists 
consequently make the educational and philosophical perplexities 
awkward, the perplexities of splitting moral education into two 
differing jobs and two collateral approaches. The philosophical 
perplexities seem to have their origins in the ambiguity and vagueness 
of the meaning of phrases such as 'moral knowing', and the different 
views of internalism and externalism on the nature of moral knowing 
and on the effect of moral knowing upon moral doing as well. If this 
is so, the dissolution of these perplexities might follow from the work 
Paul H. Hirst (1965) op. cit., pp. 114 & 134 where he states: "...though 
moral understanding has to be pursued in contexts where it is not the only dominant 
interest, the aim of its pursuit is precisely the same as for all other elements in a liberal 
education, ...What is wanted (just as in the study of the disciplines per se) is, 
basically, the use of the appropriate concepts, logic and criteria, and the appreciation 
of the range of understanding in this form." Hirst also clearly distinguishes, on p. 
136, liberal education from general education to which 'character training' and 
`physical education' are allocated, but other theorists do not clearly distinguish them. 
' 2 William K. Frankena (1958) op. cit. Frankena divides moral education into 
two parts; MEX (moral education of judgment) and MEY (moral education of 
behaviour or character training). 
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of clarification of the meaning of moral knowing, particularly in 
relation to the meaning of moral doing. This is because the ultimate 
aim of moral education is not restricted to the development of moral 
judgments. For this purpose much serious attention in this research 
will first be paid to the critical examination of moral realism, 
particularly in relation to its positive claim for the possibility of moral 
knowledge, on which the internalist and the externalist both stand. At 
the same time, the research will re-establish our conception of the 
nature of moral knowing in terms of moral education. However, some 
examination, criticism and adoption of strengths and weakness of 
moral emotivism and quasi-realism will be paralleled with the re-
establishment of our conception of the nature of moral knowing. 3  
Even though both the internalist and the externalist share the 
positive claim of the possibility of moral knowledge, their views on 
the nature of moral knowing are extremely different since they 
characterise differently the effect of moral knowing upon moral 
doing. The internalist realist's claim is very hazy in its justification, as 
with classical theory such as intellectualism; the internalist, it seems, 
relies entirely on metaphysical speculations on the relationship 
between moral knowing and moral doing, whereas the externalist 
merely relies on empirical observation of the relationship. The 
presumption implied by moral internalism remains as a purely 
metaphysical doctrine which thickly veils itself through the use of an 
unclarified meaning of moral knowing. Relying not on metaphysical 
doctrine but on logical and linguistic analysis, the research will put 
much emphasis on the rectification of the assumption implied by the 
internalist's metaphysical doctrine. However, with the purpose of 
rectifying the muddled cognitive theory of moral education this 
research will take a great interest in a critical examination of the 
externalist's dichotomisation of the aim of moral education. Re-
establishment of our conception of the nature of moral knowing, 
13 For quasi-realism, see Simon Blackburn (1984) Spreading the Word, ch. 6 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press); D. McNaughton (1988) op. cit. ch. 12 & passim. 
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aforementioned, seems to open up new vistas for the resolution of the 
unpromising dichotomisation of the aim of moral education and the 
bifurcation of the practice of moral education, because the 
dichotomisation and the bifurcation are thought to have resulted from 
our misconception of the meaning of moral knowing. Based on a new 
interpretation of the nature of moral knowing, the research will 
endeavor to reconcile the dichotomised aim of moral education and the 
bifurcated practice of moral education. 
Different views on the meanings of 'moral knowing' and 'moral 
doing' yield different claims on the theory and practice of moral 
education. In Meno Socrates argues that it is wrong to try to discuss 
whether virtue can be taught before discovering first what virtue itself 
is. Before considering the philosophical and educational perplexities 
mooted by our different ideas of the relationship between moral 
knowing and moral doing we must first clarify their meanings. The 
clarification is necessary to unravel the perplexities caused both by the 
absurdity of the modern educational theory of cognitive morality 
based on moral externalism and by the myth that moral internalism 
implies, since the absurdity and the myth originate chiefly from 
misconceptions of the meanings of 'moral knowing' and 'moral doing'. 
Part I 
Ethics, Semantics and the Moral Notions 
Prologue of Part I 
Ethics, Semantics and the Moral Notions 
Words describe things. However, words in moral statements do not always describe 
things clearly and extensively. Moral attributes related to things elude factual 
descriptions of words, because of their distinct features — the elusiveness of value 
components in description and the specific way of their existence which seems to be 
not in the real facts but in the way of seeing things. Descriptivism and its paragon 
`scientism' accordingly fall short of grasping the moral attributes of things in a 
fuller sense. Based on descriptivism, ethical realism fails to reach the point. The 
forgotten part in ethics, semantics and [moral] education in particular are all left 
untouched in realism and therefore it makes a moot point. Words in moral 
statements do not simply describe things; they are accompanied by added meanings 
as they are used in a proper way and these added meanings tell us something that is 
going beyond the factual attributes of things. Accompanying meanings, entitled 
'moral notions', have to be conceived as something culturally and traditionally 
formulated and as something with which we see things. However, some parts of 
them are ineffable and vague and others even indefinable; thus they constitute 
`rough grounds' of the meanings of moral words or of the moral mind which are to 
be refined or developed through education. Misconceiving this point, the realist 
ethical theories erroneously postulate the possibility of the descriptivist 
objectivity; hence such theories, including contemporary ethics and modern 
theories of moral education, restrict the scope of moral knowing to the 
descriptivist limitations of moral awareness. Accepting the preposterous point that 
the mind simply mirrors the appearance of the world, those theories consequently 
bring forth the disconnection between the mind and the world out there. Things 
appear to be in our moral consciousness, when and only when they are seen and 
appreciated through moral notions. Without acquiring moral notions through 
education and through the cultural experiences in one's examined life, it seems, the 
pupil would see nothing but the factually describable, and therefore lose from his 
moral sight the moralities things are accompanied by and the meanings moral 
discussions carry in depth. 
Chapter 2 
Moral Realism, Moral Words 
and the Accompanying Meanings 
Realities are found, not generated by mental acts of awareness; moral 
realities exist independent of our mind in the way other things are in 
the world, therefore they are to be observed and described. This point 
of view is, speaking technically, a form of realism. The term 'reality' 
in realism is used to refer, for instance, to wood, brown, pleasure as 
such, to each particular 'piece' of wood, 'patch' of brown, 'pulse' of 
pleasure.' Moral realism is a kind of metaphysical thesis about the 
nature and status of morality and moral opinions. The realist view of 
morality asserts the existence of moral facts and true moral 
propositions.' Though clear introductory statements of contemporary 
moral realism are not easy to find and not popular, except for a few 
excellent defences of realism, the moral realist teacher fundamentally 
adopts the doctrine that there are mind-independent moral realities 
which are as much a part of the real world as any other realities and in 
A.H. Johnson (1973) Everientiaf Realism, pp. 44-50 (London: George 
Allen & Unwin) and D. McNaughton (1988) Moral- 'Vision, passim (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell) introduce realism briefly and clearly. 
2 D.O. Brink (1989) Moral- Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, p. 14 
(Cambridge University Press). 
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moral experience we are genuinely aware of such moral realities.3  
If moral realities are assumed to be mind-independent, as is stated 
above, then it might be supposed that moral realities are something 
which can be discovered; this means that we can observe and describe 
the goodness of things or actions in the same way as we see Russell 
Square and describe it. This realist descriptivism seems prima facie to 
be acceptable for us provided that there are such moral realities which 
are independent of us as other things are. However, much uncertainty 
appears when we pay serious attention to realist descriptivism which 
implies that moral words can depict moral realities in the same way as 
other words describe things which are factual, because moral realities 
are, it seems to me, different in their quality from factual things. Of 
course, the moral realist might object right away to this query of 
uncertainty by insisting that a moral word has a compound meaning 
which means a union of the descriptive and the evaluative, and that an 
evaluative meaning has its own referent and, therefore, it must be real 
enough to be describable.4 If we accept ex hvpothesi this realist's 
response to the question of uncertainty, together with the 
descriptivism, we must first admit the realist presumption; However, 
the realist presumption bears some serious difficulties in the 
For introductory statements of contemporary moral realism, see following 
works; A.C. Ewing (1962) Ethics (London: English University Press); Iris Murdoch 
(1970) Sovereignty of the Good (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul); John McDowell 
(1978) Are moral requirements hypothetical imperatives?, Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 52, pp. 13-29; John McDowell (1979) Virtue and 
reason, Monist, 62; M. Platts (1979) Ways of Meaning (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul); J. Finnis (1983) Fundamentals of Ethics (Oxford University Press); S. 
Lovibond (1983) Realism and Imagination in Ethics (University of Minesota Press); T. 
Nagel (1986) The View from Nowhere (Oxford University Press); P. Railton (1986) 
Moral realism, 'The Phdosophked Review XCV, 2; R. Boyd (1988) How to be a moral 
realist, in Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (ed.) Essays on Moral Realism (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press); D.O. Brink (1989) Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics 
(Cambridge University Press); J. Dancy (1993) Moral Reasons (Oxford: Blackwell). 
For this view, revisit the moral realists' works as follows: John McDowell 
(1978) ibid; John McDowell (1985) Values and secondary qualities, in Ted Honderich 
(ed.) Morality and Objectivity (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul); S. Lovibond 
(1983) ibid. 
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perspectives of epistemology and educational practice. For the 
presumption some criticisms shall be given in this chapter and follows 
by the argument that no clear justification could be found for realism. 
Perhaps for many theorists the presumption may be taken as valid, but 
there are still more difficult problems which remain to be clarified in 
the light of linguistic and conceptual analysis and educational contexts 
in particular. Instead of accepting the claim that moral words have 
descriptive meaning, the chapter will pay much attention to the 
manifestation of the difficulties involved in this presumption and 
introduce one of my key concepts used throughout the thesis, ie. the 
`accompanying meaning' with which the meanings of words in moral 
statements can be characterised in the ensuing chapter. The final 
section clarifies more distinctively the meaning of the key concept 
`accompanying meaning', developed in the second section, and also 
introduce an idea of the 'moral notions' which is related, in its generic 
form, to the concept of accompanying meaning. 
2.1 Moral words 
and the inaptitude of realist descriptivism 
According to the realist's descriptivism, words are used to describe 
things; things are realities; words describe realities, though realities 
are various in their qualities and kinds. There are, of course, many 
words, amongst moral words, which are unexceptional from this 
descriptivist view of the function of words, and so it is especially for 
the moral realist. For the moral realist the word 'rescuing', for 
instance, in the statement 'Rescuing (a child's life from drowning) is 
good' is taken as describing a course of moral action.5 This is so for 
5 To interpret the nature of the innate sympathetic moral mind which human 
beings possess, Mencius initially uses the phrase 'rescuing a child's life from 
drowning' in his theory of human nature, but his own theory does not necessarily 
belong to moral realism. 
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other words or phrases which are morally relevant - positively or 
negatively, ie. the words `caring' in the statement `Caring (for aged 
people) is good', 'promise-keeping' in `Promise-keeping is good', 
`stealing' in 'Stealing money is wrong', etc. Though we usually use 
these words for evaluation of human conduct as such, these morally 
relevant words are primarily descriptive in their functions, because 
they are words which, before all else, denote certain factual events or 
the actual processes of human behaviours that come into view at 
certain times and places. This category of word shall be called 'X-
word(s)', henceforth. 
However, in this case, the things which X-words describe exist in 
the world, as other real things exist; the things remain as factual things 
even in the absence of the user of those words. Therefore, ostensive 
descriptions of facts are possible, as the realist claims, for X-words in 
the above sense, insofar as we admit both that X-words belong to the 
category of language which describes factual things and that moral 
realities truly exist in the way other things do, as the realist's first 
presumption implies. However, if the realist claims, as an alternative, 
that referents of evaluative meanings exist there in the same way that 
the referents of descriptive meanings exist, then the matter becomes 
worse than ever. This is because he would commit a fallacy of 
reduction; that is, the error of reduction of values to facts. It must be 
true to say that the objects of description are not entirely different 
from the objects of evaluation and, ipso facto, that the evaluative 
function of X-words necessitates their descriptive function. 
Descriptions of the utility or disutility of things also do not 
necessarily reveal moral qualities in relation to the things. This is one 
of the weak points of utilitarianism. G.E. Moore also ignores this 
point, as he argued that the wrongness of 'murder' is explained 
basically in terms of the fact of disutility or that murder's becoming a 
common practice would promote a general feeling of insecurity.`' 
" G.E. Moore (1959) Principia Ethica, p. 156 (Cambridge University Press), 
where he states: `...one action is generally better than another as a means, provided 
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This explanation does not clearly reveal what kind of value entity 
exists exactly in the fact of 'murder', except showing clearly how the 
fact influences the society badly. Evaluation requires something more 
than the objects of description; such as, for example, criteria of 
evaluation which are deemed, in a logical sense, not to be inside the 
category of purely descriptive meanings. And even if the evaluative 
function of X-words requires their descriptive function, there may yet 
be some possibility of making some exact distinctions between these 
two sorts of function; the evaluative meaning of an X-word is not 
descriptive, in its logic. R.M. Hare, too, makes a distinction between 
the descriptive and evaluative meaning, which a single term may have 
in a certain context, though he mentions that 'the descriptive and 
evaluative meaning of a term in a given context may be tied to it with 
varying degrees of tightness'.' 
Some descriptivists may object to this argument by insisting that 
descriptive and evaluative meanings are shared by X-words in their 
intrinsic sense, therefore not separately existent. However, the word 
`rescuing', in the literal sense of the word, primarily refers to a 
particular factual event which happened perhaps in one afternoon, as is 
shown by the fact that the word is used in a report of a particular 
incident and though it would still be true to say that a certain 
particular emotive response occurs when we see that incident. The 
word picks out a particular activity or process. Therefore, even if we 
admit that a certain particular emotive response occurs when we see a 
certain incident, asking what kind or amount of emotive response 
occurs when we see the incident or use an X-word which denotes that 
that certain other circumstances are given. We do, as a matter of fact, only observe its 
good effects under certain circumstances; and it may be easily seen that a sufficient 
change in these would render doubtful what seem the most universally certain of 
general rules. Thus, the general disutility of murder can only be proved, provided the 
majority of the human race will certainly persist in existing'. (Italics mine). See, also, 
R.E. Ewin (1981) Co-operation and Human 'Values: A Study of Moral Reasoning, p. 100 
(Sussex: The Harvester Press). 
R.M. Hare (1969) Descriptivism, in W.D. Hudson (ed.) 911e Is-Ought 
Question, pp. 240-1 (London: Macmillan). 
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incident is in a logical sense one thing and asking whether or not the 
referents of evaluation of the fact exist in a factual sense is quite 
another. Description logically requires factual things and in this case 
there might be nothing else in a strict sense than just describing or 
reporting a certain event that happened this afternoon. If this is the 
case, it would be valid to ask which is the referent of descriptive 
meaning of the word 'rescuing', because the word has its own stark 
factual denotation; but it would be quite absurd to ask the same 
question of the referent of evaluative meaning of the same word, 
because evaluation is not of description in its essential sense. 
The moral emotivist and the quasi-realist both deny the realist's 
claim of the independency of moral realities.8 This is precisely 
because they both understand moral expressions as ejaculations of 
feelings or prescriptions of moral standards or projections of our 
moral attitudes onto the world. At the base of these claims exists a 
basic idea of emotivism: our values are not in the real world; an 
untendentious description of the world would not mention any values; 
our values are not the objects we see with our physical eyes, but are to 
be ejaculated or projected onto the world; they are something with 
which we feel something happening there in the factual world. 
According to the philosophers who propose such an idea, moral 
attitudes are not presented to us as something independent of our 
moral beliefs; they are not outside our mind, therefore they are not 
the thing of discovering, as they were. 
For the emotivist and the quasi-realist these attitudes and feelings 
are something we create in experiencing the world, not the properties 
of the world per se which are naturally appearing without bearings on 
our peculiar way of seeing.9 The realist descriptivism cannot stand 
See A.J. Ayer (1946) Language, Truth and Logic (Penguin); R.M. Hare 
(1964) The Language of Morals (Oxford University Press); Simon Blackburn (1984) 
Spreading the Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press); Simon Blackburn (1993) Essays in 
Quasi-Realism (Oxford University Press). 
9 Simon Blackburn (1984) ibid., ch. 6; Simon Blackburn (1993) ibid., 
introduction & ch. 6; N. McNaughton (1988) op. cit., p. 78. 
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on this sense of emotivism. Hence the difficulty of the independency 
claim of moral realities. This emotivist idea, as a result of linguistic 
analysis, is quite different from the realist's metaphysical speculation. 
To reiterate, the realist's descriptivism might be appropriate just 
for the factual world whose referents are clear enough and tangible. 
Nonetheless, if someone, perhaps the realist teacher, claims the 
describability of moral realities in education, this would hardly be 
acceptable for two reasons. First, it is not entirely possible to suppose 
that moral realities or values exist independent of the pupil. Secondly, 
even if we grant pro tempore the independence of moral realities, they 
would essentially elude the circumscription of moral words, as the 
moral emotivist properly understands. 
Description presupposes certain kinds of observation, and the 
moral realist claims that moral realities are observable. According to 
moral realism, our experience of the world involves experience of 
moral values and we see, for instance, 'the goodness of the rescue of a 
child's life from drowning' in the same way as we see the beauty of 
Oxford spires. For the moral realist, then, Hume's confident assertions 
about the unobservability of beauty may be taken as breathtakingly 
counter-intuitive. Observing necessitates objects, but objects of seeing 
are various in kind. Certain objects of seeing are factual things, as are 
those relevant to scientific observations and measurements, and certain 
others non-factual. The objects of the former class belong to 'the 
world as it is independent of our mind', ie. the impersonal cosmos, but 
those of the latter 'the world as it seems to us'. Therefore, seeing in 
the former class requires both our physical and conceptual eyes, even 
if the physical seeing, the seeing visual impressions of objects which 
are physically reflected on our retinae, is not always necessary for 
seeing such objects.' On the contrary, the seeing in the latter class 
requires only conceptual `eyes'; thus much incommensurability exists 
" A similar use of the phrase 'physical seeing' appears in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1958) Philosophical Investigations, part ii, xi, 212e (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell). 
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between these two classes of objects of seeing. 
The realist's definition of moral observation is very vague and 
uncertain, especially as he asserts that one observes moral realities as 
one sees other things in the world. Certainly, X-words are 
observational vocabulary, so we can describe properly our 
observations with these words, as is assumed by the realist. They pick 
out some specific type of activity; they have meaning on model of 
names, amongst others, which are associated with some typical 
referents. But it is quite uncertain that X-words delineates moral 
realities which are seemingly beyond their descriptive or typical 
referents; once we attempt to describe what we observe, then the 
moral realities, if any, will easily be elided from the description, just 
because they are different from the descriptive referents in their 
qualities as aforementioned. The realist ignores and depreciates more 
often than not the difference between the descriptive meanings and the 
supposed evaluative meanings of X-words. However, the thing which 
is so much the worse, related to this matter, is that many people 
confuse the difference between the two. For instance, the confusion 
arises in Yang-ming's theory. Yang-ming (the 16th century Chinese 
neo-Confucian) confuses the meaning of seeing moral realities with 
that of seeing other things in the world, especially as he explains the 
positive relationship between knowing and doing: one delights in 
(doing) simultaneously as one sees (knowing) a red flower; likewise if 
one knows a certain moral principle, one behaves morally in 
accordance with the principle. There is certainly no difference, in this 
case, between the meaning of seeing a red flower and that of seeing 
moral goodness. But, according to Toegeh (the 16th century Korean 
neo-Confucian), seeing moral goodness is fundamentally different 
from seeing a red flower." 
The meanings of seeing and delighting in the moral domain must 
be interpreted in a significantly different way from that of the world 
Toegeh (1954) The Collected Papers of Toegeh, p. 923 (Seoul: Daedong 
Institute for Cultural Studies Press). 
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of flowers and colours. There must be some people who cannot see 
moral goodness even when they see certain human behaviours in 
which moral goodness is explicitly or implicitly expressed. Certainly, 
every man who has normal sight would see such human behaviours 
and the red flowers in the flower bed. Colours and human behaviours 
are sensible by our physical eyes; they are simple and concrete objects 
of seeing. The seeing in this case takes place according to physical 
laws. However, moral goodness is invisible within the physical laws; 
value is not crudely 'there', according to the physical laws, because 
value is not a physical property; it must be seen in a fundamentally 
different way from the seeing of physical things. 'Though there is a 
certain givenness about the natural world, it is not simply there to see; 
for what we see depends not only on our interests but also on the 
concepts and theories which structure our perceptions.'12 Moral 
seeing is the seeing certain principles which guide human behaviours 
in certain direction, but these principles are not simple and concrete 
objects of seeing. The seeing happens with certain other specific 
epistemological devices. 
The moral realist may still insist that 'there is no difference in kind 
between the moral case and others', ie. between the moral properties 
and the non-moral properties. For the moral realist, in this sense, 
there might not be any difference between seeing non-moral 
properties and seeing moral properties. This is the very point that 
makes the realist eye opaque. It seems that the realist fails to see what 
is meant by 'moral seeing' and, as a result, the point that moral seeing 
and factual seeing are not one and the same thing. Moral seeing is not 
of a factual observation, though the former requires the latter for a 
perfect seeing; it is a kind of seeing which is, as it were, about the 
intuition of values or principles involved in or expressed by human 
behaviour morally relevant. But the point to make is that such values 
are not the same things which are describable in a factual sense. The 
12 Richard S. Peters (1973) Education and seeing what is there, in idem 
Authority, Responsibility and Education, pp. 114-5 (London: George Allen & Unwin). 
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realist descriptivism bypasses this point. For this reason, many 
difficulties over this realist matter lead us back again to the long-
standing debate on the value-fact problem. 
Non obstante, the moral realist denies the possibility of that sharp 
and significant distinction between fact and value which is the 
hallmark of his opponent's position, ie. the hallmark of the Humean 
declaration on the matter of fact and value. Hume famously held that 
`morality ... consists not in any matter of fact, which can be 
discovered by the understanding'.13 If the moral realist rejects the 
fact-value distinction and thereby claims a union of fact and value as 
he now suggests, then the realist's observation of the world would 
necessarily include both fact and value, as the cardinal presumption of 
moral realism suggests: there are moral realities to which one can be 
genuinely sensitive in the same way as to other things. And, from this 
realist's unjustified belief comes the realist's second presumption: 
evaluative meanings are conceptually shared by moral words. 
Some possibility of a union of fact and value is alleged by many 
philosophers, but the conceptual distinction between the thing which is 
moral and the thing which is non-moral is still both significant and 
meaningful.' A fortiori, the distinction between value and fact is 
logically possible, whereas the union of value and fact remains as 
having a much more difficult logical problem. Insofar as there is a 
logical difference between value and fact, the meaning of the 
observation of moral properties and that of observation of non-moral 
properties must be distinguished. Moral realities seem to be human 
constructions, not things which are to be discovered by human 
beings:5 If the realist's first presumption - moral realities exist in the 
13 David Hume (1888) A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 486 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press). 
" For the possibility of derivation of 'ought' from 'is', see, esp. John Searle 
(1967) How to derive 'ought' from 'is', in Philippa Foot (ed.) gheories of Ethics, pp. 
101-14 (Oxford University Press). 
15 A very similar point to this assertion can be found in J.L. Mackie (1977) 
Ethics: Inventing Uht and Wrong (Penguin). 
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way other things are - is tenable, then the describability of the moral 
realities might also be probable. But the first presumption meets with 
some logically crucial problems, as mentioned thus far, and, therefore, 
cannot be perfectly sustainable. 
The realist's descriptivism causes much confusion because of its 
referential opacity. Language describes the world, but once the world 
is described by language it loses much of its concreteness. For 
example, many other concrete attributes of a flower are not captured 
by the word 'flower'. By X-words we may describe more or less 
correctly someone else's morally relevant behaviour, but the 
description in the case is logically limited to the factual attributes of 
the behaviour and thus loses many other extended meanings of the 
words, the extended meanings, amongst others, which are to be used 
for moral expressions and to be attentive by the teacher, but unable to 
be described in such a way as the realist descriptivism puts forward. 
2.2 Moral words, accompanying meanings 
and the non-realist point of view 
Someone may be inclined to say that words are created to describe 
things as they are and in this sense the value of words may depend on 
their capacity to describe things. For some people this claim may 
appear to be a truism, especially for the teacher who is strongly 
influenced by the realist descriptivist's reference theory. However, it 
is not always the case; there are many states-of-affairs around the 
teacher which are unable to be described clearly by words, and so is 
this for moral realities, if we assume ex hypothesi that moral realities 
are in the same way that states-of-affairs are. But moral realities are 
likely to be elusive, in their essential nature, whenever the teacher 
tries to describe them with words. 
Many words carry factual or propositional information. A piece of 
information is factual if it purports to describe a certain state-of- 
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affairs; this is so for a word employed in that piece of information. 
However, this is but one of the characteristics of language. X-words 
are not always employed for the function of factual information; they 
also serve for the expression of their extended meanings, ie. human 
attitudes and feelings onto humanist moral prosperity. In fact, many 
words carry these non-factual qualities of human desires, if they are 
used properly in a particular way. For instance, the X-word 'rescue' is 
used to describe a human act of delivering someone else from a 
situation of danger, restraint, or violence, as is expressed in a 
reportage as the phrase 'three rescues from drowning in one 
afternoon'. The term 'rescue' in this description is used almost purely 
in a factual sense, and the meaning of which consists of factual 
properties. However, its meaning extends further, if we use the word 
in other ways; it goes beyond the pure description of the fact. The 
extensionality of the meaning of the word might be much more clearly 
apprehensible in the following four exemplary phrases: i) rescuing a 
man's name from oblivion, ii) rescuing a man from captivity, iii) 
rescuing a drunkard, iv) rescuing a child from drowning. One 
extreme use of the word 'rescuing' is morally neutral, as the example 
i) properly shows, but the other extreme like iv) is quite different; it 
not only describes a certain human affair, but also carries with it 
above all a certain particular meaning which is morally relevant, only 
if one sees the affair appropriately with moral perspectives. 
The same claim can immediately apply to other X-words. For 
instance, the word `kicks' in the statement 'S kicks a ball' (briefly 
`S-statement', henceforth) depicts a fact of S's behaviour. 'Kicking' is 
a factual behaviour; it is a purely behavioural term. However, once the 
same word is used in the statement, for example, `T kicks a boy' 
(briefly `T-statement') it simultaneously carries with it a distinctive 
evaluative or extended meaning and induces our emotional or moral 
responses to T's behaviour. T's kicking has much to do with moral 
deliberations, whereas S's kicking has nothing to do with them, 
because the meaning of S's kicking is nothing more than descriptive. 
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Therefore, 'kicking' is not always value-neutral; it, more often than 
not, carries a meaning which is morally relevant, especially when it is 
used in a whole context of the statement, to borrow Fodor's term, in a 
`meaning holism'.16  
However, the point to note here is that this conception of the 
extensionality of the meaning of the word is not what the realist 
means; it is beyond the realist description of morality, because the 
extended meanings are not altogether of descriptions of thing morally 
relevant. Thus the extended meaning does not advocate the realist's 
presumption. Referents of descriptive meanings of X-words might be 
clearly there in the way other things are in the real world, as the 
realist tenet pronounces solemnly. Thus the behaviour of, for instance, 
`kicking' can be seen palpably by both the pupil's physical and 
cognitive eyes. However, the same talk does not cogently and properly 
proceed without any epistemological hazard in the case of 'extended 
meaning'. This is precisely because it is absurd to suppose both that 
there are referents of extended meanings and that referents of 
extended meanings, if any, exist exactly in the same way as those of 
descriptive meanings. 
The nature of extended meanings is in principle not that of 
denotation; it would be safer to say that, following the emotivist 
account, the extended meaning of a word is to express the pupil's 
attitudes towards something encountered; it is not to describe things. 
Thus the nature of extended meaning is logically impossible to be 
explained in terms of referential properties. In this sense, at least, the 
emotivist account of the nature of evaluative meaning shares with this 
view of extended meanings of words in part; in part it is because the 
emotivist tends to explain the nature of evaluative meaning in terms of 
attitudinal projection. 
Extended meaning, at least as we use this phrase in a moral or an 
ethical context as is the case of T-statement, it seems, cannot be 
16 J. Fodor and E. Lepore (1992) Holism: A Shopper's Guide (Oxford: 
Blackwell). 
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explained validly in terms of referential properties; it would be much 
more properly be explained in the sense of having something 
additional or, more clearly, carrying some moral criteria with which 
the pupil sees certain human behaviours as morally relevant. Of 
course, the extended meaning defined thus presupposes descriptive 
elements involved in things, for which the pupil appraises as 'morally 
good or bad'; without such presupposed facts extended meanings 
human moral aspirations bestow are nothing else but fanciful 
drawings. But the most important point is that such criteria, carried 
with the pupil's seeing of certain human behaviours as morally 
relevant, are not at all the things per se which are descriptive. They 
are the pupil's moral beliefs with which the pupil sees things; ie. with 
which the pupil evaluates things (activities) in moral terms. 
Contrary to the realist's presumption, extended meanings are not 
conceptually shared by X-words. In fact, the most important thing to 
be noticed here is that the word 'kicking' is primarily a descriptive 
word whatever way it may be used, as is seen clearly in both S and 
T-statements. In this logical analysis of X-words, one can detect the 
echo of David Hume's famous rhetoric: 
But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, 
whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allow'd to be vicious: 
wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter 
of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In whichever way you take it, you find 
only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of 
fact in this case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. 
You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a 
sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action ... Vice and 
virtue ... are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind." 
Certainly 'kicks' in S-statement and also that in T-statement are used in 
different ways; the former can be used for a pure description of S's 
behaviour, but the latter cannot be used just for the same purpose; it of 
17 David Hume (1888) A Treatise of Human Nature, book iii, part i, sec. i, pp. 
468-9 (Oxford: Clarendon Press). (Italics mine) 
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course carries with it some extended meaning, and expresses the 
speaker's attitudes to T's behaviour. 'Kicking' is a word with many 
distinctive meanings, and this is so for other words. Regarding this 
point, it seems not too difficult to make a logical distinction between 
the two meanings of X-words, ie. the 'primary or descriptive 
meaning' and the 'extended meaning'. 
A very similar distinction between the meanings implied by 
morally relevant words can be seen if one pays a little attention to 
R.M. Hare's argument that the meanings of the words such as 'rude', 
`courageous', 'honest', 'industrious', 'humble',...are all primarily 
descriptive and secondarily evaluative.18 However, Hare's point in this 
description admits that evaluative meanings are inherent to such 
words; they are explained in his theory not as something carried 
whenever the words are used in moral terms, and consequently not as 
something which are varying according to its contextual use. This all 
means that in Hare's conception both the evaluative and descriptive 
meanings are conceptually shared by the morally relevant words; 
therefore, his conception of the nature of 'evaluative meanings', at 
least only in this concern, is not far away from the implication 
represented by the realist's presumption. And for this reason the idea 
of extended meanings disagrees with Hare's 'evaluative meanings'. 
Certainly, the X-word 'rude", for instance, carries some evaluative 
meanings in the emotivist sense and it induces the hearer to have 
certain attitudes of disapproval upon the denotatum of the word when 
it is spoken in a specific context; and, other things being equal, we 
would be inclined to avoid the behaviour the X-word 'rude' denotes. 
This view suggests that the word 'rude' carries some evaluative 
meaning which is distinct in its logic from the descriptive meaning of 
the word. But the important point is that the evaluative meaning is not 
18 R.M. Hare (1963) Freedom and Reason, pp. 24-7 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press); R.M. Hare (1969) `Descriptivise, in W.D. Hudson (ed.) The Is-Ought 
Question (London: Macmillan); R.M. Hare (1972) 'The Language of Morals, 7.5 
(Oxford University Press); R.M. Hare (1981) Moral 'Thinking, pp. 74-5 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press). 
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necessarily connected logically with the descriptive meaning of the 
w ord. 
The effect of the evaluative meaning is varied certainly by the 
context in which the word 'rude' is used. In a specific context the 
effect of evaluative meaning does not altogether happen, especially 
when the word is used in the 'inverted comma sense'. Indeed, the word 
`rude' is useful for a variety of contexts; the 'rudely' in the statement 
`it is a rudely fashioned craft' is used in an aesthetical way; the word 
`rude' in the statement 'it is rude to point at people' in a moral sense, 
and the same word in the sentence 'keep the yard in its rude state' in a 
natural or geographical sense. The word 'rude' shows different 
meanings according to its different contextual uses. Therefore, it must 
be said that the evaluative meaning the word 'rude' carries is not 
inherent to the very word. 
Nonetheless, some philosophers assert that 'the evaluative meaning' 
of 'rude' is inherent in the very word. R.M. Hare explains the nature 
of evaluative meanings as something inherent in the function of 
morally relevant words, though he is not a realist in categorisation. 
Bernard Williams made a claim which is very similar to that of Hare, 
but in a very limited concern. For him the fact-value distinction, or 
the 'descriptive-evaluative distinction', is illegitimate; the word 'rude' 
is a 'thick term', as he calls it, and it means that evaluative meaning is 
conjoined to the descriptive meaning of the word. No clear distinction 
of meaning is possible between the descriptive and the evaluative in the 
use of the word, according to Williams.'`' Philippa Foot's claim is 
also very close to the Harean argument, especially when she maintains 
that the meanings of 'rude' are essentially blended and that 'there is 
something else to be said about the word 'rude' besides the fact that it 
expresses, fairly mild, condemnation; it can only be used where 
19 Bernard Williams (1985) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, chs. 7 & 8 
(London: Fontana Press & Collins); Bernard Williams (1985) Ethics and the fabric of 
the world, in Ted Honderich (ed.) Morality and.  Objectivity (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul). 
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certain descriptions apply.''" 
Of course, we now no longer call into question of the immorality 
of slavery, for it has already moved away from a topic of debate to get 
the universal agreement. It stands as universal, regardless of what any 
particular person or specific people may happen to say in a slightly 
different way. This means that in the use of the word 'slavery' the 
descriptive and the evaluative are blended. The same is also the case 
for the X-word 'murder': if there is someone who is still discussing 
the morality of murder, he must be a man who was not born into any 
culture on this planet. Evaluative meaning is 'inherent', to adopt a 
Harean term, to the X-word 'murder'. 
However, even if we accept this supposition pro tempore, this 
insight does not necessarily lead us to negate the possibility of the 
logical distinction between the descriptive meanings and evaluative 
meanings of the words. What is more, there are many X-words in 
making and existing to which evaluative meanings are not always 
inherent, as we see it in the case of 'kicking': these words carry such 
meanings, it seems to me, if they are used in a specific contexts. 
Nevertheless, if one maintains that the word 'kicking' always carries 
evaluative meanings, his assertion would then be lead to a shallow 
argument in that his claim did not actually consider seriously the 
varying or contextual meanings of words. 'Inherent' implies some 
state of fact in which certain factors always exist and invariable. But 
evaluative meanings of words are not always apparent in the use of 
words and thereupon variable. 
One meaning is, I think, logically distinguishable from the other, 
as Foot puts it: 'Either thinking something rude is not to be described 
20 
 Philippa Foot (1978) Virtues and Vices, p.102 (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 
where she states: If 'attitudes' were solely a matter of reactions such as wrinkling the 
nose, and tendencies to such things as making ... scolding, then thinking something 
rude would not be describable solely in terms of attitudes. (Italics mine) The same 
argument can be found in the same author's (1967) Moral beliefs, in: Philippa Foot 
(ed.) Theories of Ethics (Oxford University Press). However, in this paper she takes 
the concept 'courage' for an exemplary word. 
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in terms of attitudes, or attitudes are not to be described in terms of 
such things'.'' It seems to me that the moral realist confuses this 
point; to evaluate something, the pupil needs to know first about the 
descriptive elements that construct the very nature of the thing. But 
the descriptive elements themselves say nothing about evaluation and 
vice versa. The word 'rude' is used, in general, for an evaluative 
function - variously identified as expressing feelings, inducing 
attitudes and even commending certain behaviours. However, the point 
is that the word with evaluative meaning must not be taken as a purely 
evaluative term and that the evaluative meaning is not inherent in the 
word. 
It can still be maintained that an evaluative meaning is not logically 
connected to the factual or descriptive meaning. 'Rude' can be used in 
a purely descriptive or 'inverted comma sense'; 'rude' is not always 
used for one and only purpose of evaluation of something. 
Wittgenstein's 'picture theory of meaning' well illustrates this point by 
revealing the dissimilarities between the descriptive meaning and the 
evaluative meaning of such words as 'rude'. Ostensive teaching of a 
word can be said 'to establish an association between the word and the 
thing'.22 In this case one very likely thinks first of all that a picture of 
the thing comes into the pupil's mind when the pupil hears the word. 
But the picture appearing in the pupil's mind might well be 
represented only in a factual or descriptive sense; it is therefore very 
difficult to suppose that the picture represents, immediately or at the 
same time, even value elements which are supposed by the moral 
realist to be involved in the meaning of the word. There may be some 
cases in which such evaluative meanings clearly appear, but this only 
happens when the word, for instance, 'rude' is used in a specific way 
and by the pupil who sees things with some specific mind. 
Bruce Brower clearly distinguishes evaluative meaning from 
21 16uf. p. 103 (1978). 
'2 For the Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning, see Ludwig Wittgenstein 
(1958) Philosophical InvestOations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 
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descriptive meaning when he says: 
Lying is usually of negative value; but the value is not included in the concept of 
lying. Similarly, kicking others is usually of negative value; but the concept of 
kicking others is not evaluative"." 
There are some significant differences between the meaning of 'lying' 
when the word is used emotively and its meaning when used 
descriptively. In the same way the meanings of 'rude' and that of 
`kicking' in one sense are not identical with those of 'rude' and 
`kicking' in the other sense. In one sense they are primarily and purely 
descriptive, in the other sense they are evaluative, but not primary. 
Evaluative meanings are not logically inherent in the concepts of 
words morally relevant; they would be rather something which is 
accompanying when the pupil uses the words in moral terms or sees 
things with a moral eye. In this sense they might be said to be 
`additional' to the concepts of words. For this reason, I shall prefer 
henceforth the phrase 'accompanying meaning(s)' to 'evaluative 
meaning(s)' for the denomination of that meaning more distinctively. 
And this idea is clearly opposed to the realist's presumption. 
In T-statement, as it were, the word 'kicks' is accompanied by 
some logically distinctive meaning which is added to the descriptive; 
this is so particularly as we see the meaning of the word in a given 
specific context of the statement. Certainly many other words or 
phrases belonging to the category of X-word can be characterised in 
the same way as the word 'kicks'. The pupil sees racial discrimination 
with a negative attitude; thus the pupil believes that racist sentiments 
will be unequivocally condemned, that racist actions should be 
outlawed, and that racism must never become respectable. However, 
these attitudes should not be confused with descriptive meanings of the 
phrase 'racial discrimination'; they might be some moral standards 
with which the pupil sees things and evaluates them in moral terms. 
23 Bruce W. Brower (1988) Virtue concepts and ethical realism, The journal-
of Philosophy, vol. LXXXV, no. 12, p. 676. 
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The pupil can, of course, give a clear descriptive meaning to the 
phrase without any reference to such beliefs. But this does not 
necessarily mean again that these beliefs are nothing to do with the 
inverted comma sense of the phrase 'racial discrimination'. On the 
contrary, wherever the pupil uses the phrase in moral terms such 
beliefs or evaluations are always involved. If it were not for such a 
function of expression of the phrase, the meaning of the phrase would 
be too barren. 
The idea of the accompanying meanings of X-words which is 
introduced thus far shows a specific logic of moral language and opens 
a new vista for the conceptualisation of moral knowing in a way which 
is quite different from the realist's and accordingly from both the 
internalist and the externalist moral theorists. Thus the idea is 
fundamentally different from the realist's presumption in that it is not 
in agreement with the realist descriptivism of moral realities and in 
that moral values are by no means shared logically, with the purely 
descriptive meanings, by X-words. Moral values do not exist in the 
world outside our minds, independently of our experience of them; 
they are not to be described factually and discovered in that way; they 
are things, to recapitulate, which accompany the words when we use 
them properly in terms of morals. 
2.3 Accompanying meanings and the moral notions 
Moral words carry in themselves some emotive meanings, according 
to one line of moral emotivism, which are to be thought of as sheer 
ejaculations of our feelings, as in A.J. Ayer's first account.24 
According to another line of emotivism, the emotive meanings refer to 
the moral realities which are assumed to be cognizant, as is claimed in 
2-4 A.J. Ayer (1946) Mc. cit. 
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part by Hare and Charles Stevenson.' Both of these lines are the roots 
of quasi-realism. Quasi-realism, the most recently developed theory of 
value, seems to be partly opposed in its arguments to the realist view 
of the mind-independent existence of moral realities.26 In this respect, 
the idea of accompanying meanings can be taken as something which is 
akin to quasi-realism. 
Quasi-realism is an attempt to escape the weakness of classical 
emotivism which fundamentally denies the objectivity of moral 
realities, as we find the claim in emotivism as a point d'appui. Thus 
for quasi-realism moral realities are something which exist at a time 
when we project our moral attitudes onto the human affairs concerned 
and are interwoven into the fabric of our experience of the world.'' 
Thus moral realities in quasi-realism are to be thought of as something 
we create, not discover, in perceiving the world; they are something 
appearing in the process of our awareness of the world, but are not 
intrinsic properties of the world per se. For the quasi-realist, moral 
realities are not genuine properties of the world; they are certain 
specific aspects of our experiences: thus not mind-independent. In this 
25 For the interpretation of cognitive elements in moral emotivism, see 
Charles L. Stevenson (1944) Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University 
Press). There he says: 'The growth of emotive and descriptive dispositions in 
language does not represent two isolated processes. There is a continual interplay'. 
p. 71) It may happen that ...a word acquires a laudatory emotive meaning 
partly because it refers, via its descriptive meaning, to something which people 
favour. And in other place he also says: 'a sign's descriptive meaning is its 
disposition to produce cognitive mental processes, where 'cognitive' is to be taken as 
a general term designating such specific kinds of mental activity as believing, 
thinking, supposing, presuming and so on'. (ibid., p. 62) This means that emotive 
meaning is not altogether the will-o'-the-wisp, as someone may think, as far as it is 
not separated from descriptive meaning. His claim goes further: 'But this answer is 
far from a full solution; it is merely a step toward envisaging the broader problem 
with which meaning-theory must inevitably deal the nature of cognition'.(ibid) 
Quasi-realism is a newly developed form of moral emotivism. Actually 
there have been many transmutations of moral emotivism, from A.J. Ayer to Simon 
Blackburn, the most recent emotivist in categorisation of the schools of ethics. See, 
Simon Blackburn (1993) op. cit. 
27 Simon Blackburn (1984) op. cit., ch. 6; idem (1993) op. cit. 
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respect, Simon Blackburn denies, as his primordial form of quasi-
realism interprets, the realist claim of the existence of mind-independent 
moral realities.28 
What is more, quasi-realism significantly distinguishes the attitudes 
assumed to be projected, as words are in use, onto human affairs from 
the realist's referential meanings of words which involve, as the realist 
claims, moral realities; it sees attitudes, as it were, as being not 
logically involved in those referential meanings. Contrary to the 
realist, Blackburn does not attempt to apply the mind-independence 
model of ontology of value in the interpretation of the features of 
moral realities.'-9 In this point of view, quasi-realism is very close to 
the idea of accompanying meaning of X-words: both theories do not 
see moral experience as a matter of discovering something which 
exists independently of us; they picture moral realities as something 
the pupil places on things.3° So there are some similarities between 
quasi-realism and the idea of accompanying meanings. 
However, some dissimilarities also appear between quasi-realism 
and the idea of accompanying meanings especially when quasi-realism 
is applied into the account of the nature of morality. Blackburn's 
projectivism, the sub-theory of his quasi-realism, interprets the 
function of moral words as expressing attitudes or feelings; the 
speaker projects, with the words, his own attitudes onto the things 
concerned. This projectivist interpretation goes with Austin's idea of 
28 The realist claim that there is a mind-independent moral reality might be 
epitomised as follows: 'The real world is thought of as what is there anyway, 
irrespective of what we may happen to believe about it. It sets the independent 
standard to which our beliefs must conform if they are to be true. What is real is 
independent of our minds'. And the moral realist accepts, without any modification, 
this realist tenet, thus: Moral value 'exists out there in the world, independently of our 
experience of it', or, to say, mind-independently, 'waiting to be encountered'. This 
epitome of realism is adopted mainly from N. McNaughton (1988) op. cit., p. 94. 
29 Simon Blackburn (1984) op. cit., p. 219; idem (1993) op. cit., ch. 9. 
3() J.L. Mackie (1977) Ethics (Penguin). 
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the perlocutionary function of language.31 Certainly we often express 
our feelings or attitudes with words or sentences and there is in fact a 
certain sort of word or sentence which performs this kind of function. 
We use words or sentences very often with exclamation marks to 
express specific feelings, to project our attitudes, and to induce other 
persons' behaviour. If Blackburn's projectivism includes even this 
kind of language use in its theoretical components, it would confuse 
moral meanings with some psychological meanings language may 
convey in its use and, for this very reason, make a mistake in 
interpretation of the moral meaning of words by replacing it instead 
with psychological interpretation of language. 
The concept 'attitude' was first introduced by the protagonist of 
emotiv ism, Charles Stevenson, to interpret the nature of moral 
judgments. According to him, moral judgments are expressions of the 
speaker's attitudes.32 Attitudes are of course involved in the 
expressions both of personal preference and of moral evaluation, 
especially in using the evaluative word 'good'. Emotivism and quasi-
realism do not take account for X-words in their theoretical systems. 
However, the emotivist, including Blackburn, does not make any clear 
distinction between these two kinds of expression. Emotivism has not 
yet identified and characterised clearly the nature of attitudes and their 
origin. About this responsibility, proponents of the emotive theory are 
silent and accordingly fail to avoid an empty circularity in resolving 
the matter, as Alasdair Maclntyre indicates.33 
Insofar as attitudes are concerned, the emotivist may see something 
31 For the perlocutionary act, see J.L. Austin (1962) How to Do Things with 
Words, Lecture VIII (Harvard University Press). 
32 Charles L. Stevenson (1944) op. cit., pp. 21-2. 
33 Alasdair Maclntyre (1981) After 'Virtue, p. 12 (London: Duckworth). 
There he says: 'Moral judgments express feelings or attitudes', it is said. 'What kind 
of feelings or attitudes?' we ask. 'Feelings or attitudes of approval', is the reply. 
`What kind of approval?' we ask, perhaps remarking that approval is of many kinds 
...identifying the relevant kind of approval as moral approval ...becomes vacuously 
circular. 
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which the pupil ought to do and at the same time he may be inclined to 
do something else; hence the two opposing cases are compatible in 
emotivism; one is for moral obligation and the other for psychological 
fact. This compatibility comes directly, it seems to me, from the 
emotivist's insufficient distinction between the meanings of moral 
attitudes or feelings and those of the psychological features of them. In 
whatever way the projectivist uses the words 'attitudes' and 'feelings' 
and interprets their features, if he does not make any sufficient 
clarification of the meanings of these words in moral terms, inter alia, 
he will then easily fail to avoid the perversion of the words and 
consequently unable to see other meanings of the words. This is so, 
insofar as the problem of fact-value distinction in ethics still remains. 
Insofar as quasi-realism and its sub-theory projectivism root, in their 
origin, in emotivism, they could not identify the authentic place of 
morality in human mind. For this very reason, Blackburn's 
projectivism carries in itself a decisive weak point in its theoretical 
base. 
Projection of one's attitudes or feelings onto other persons is a 
psychological mechanism; thus projectivism pictures what is only the 
mechanism as something that one can contemplate as an object in itself, 
as John McDowell rightly understands it.34 However, the way of 
interpretation of the function of language as a psychological 
mechanism is one thing, and that of interpretation of it within an 
epistemological sense is quite another. However, the accompanying 
meanings are neither purely emotive ones, nor mere expressions of 
our feelings, nor inherent to X-words; they are thought to be carried 
as we see things through the moral eye. At this juncture, the two 
theories diverge significantly. 
The idea of accompanying meaning is a theory which has a distance 
from the projectivist psychological interpretation of our use of words 
or sentences; it is rather a way of seeing human affairs with moral 
34 John McDowell (1985) Values and secondary qualities, in Ted Honderich 
(ed.) Morality and Objectivity, pp. 121-3 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
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eyes, ie. with a moral point of view; in this sense, the idea of 
accompanying meaning is a way of interpretation of the use of moral 
language and of our awareness of morality in terms of logic and 
epistemology in an educational context. 
Plato's 'sun' is an effluence of the power of seeing, whatever it 
may be. The light of the sun enables the eye to see perfectly and the 
visible to appear. Without this light of the sun, seeing is impossible 
altogether in an epistemological sense.35 The light of the sun, to 
paraphrase, is the prerequisite for a perfect seeing. That is to say, we 
see things with the light of the sun. In epistemology when the pupil 
sees a certain specific thing the pupil usually sees it as one of a kind 
and (or) 'from a point of view', as was initially suggested by David 
Hume and claimed again by J. Urmson and William Frankena, though 
there are some differences between their theories. Therefore, saying 
that the pupil sees certain things, for example, in terms of biology, is 
logically equivalent to saying that the pupil sees them with the 'point 
of view' the discipline implies.36 To reiterate, the pupil sees thing 
biologically relevant with the eye empowered by the form of biology; 
seeings necessitate certain points of view in order to see things 
properly. 
35 For perfect sight, in Plato's view, four factors are necessary: an eye 
capable of seeing, an object capable of being seen, light in the eye and the object, and 
finally the sun of which the light is an effluence. See B. Jowett (1888) ?he Republic of 
Plato, book vi (Oxford: Clarendon Press; R.L. Nettleship (1935) The Theory of 
Education in Ptato's Republic, p. 150 (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
36 The 'point of view' metaphor initially comes from David Hume, especially 
when he seeks of 'the point of view of humanity' from which the moral sentiment is 
felt and from which one speaks the moral language, see David Hume (1957) An 
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.93 (New York: The Liberal Arts Press). 
And also see K. Baier (1958) The Moral Point of View (New York: Cornell University 
Press); William Frankena's two articles 'The Concept of Morality' and 'Moral Point 
of View Theories' given at the Humanities Institute, North Carolina, in fall 1979. 
Urmson distinguishes the object of seeing as a kind from the object of seeing 'from a 
point of view', see J.O. Urmson (1968) the Emotive Theory of Ethics, ch. 9 (London: 
Hutchinson University Library). David Hume's and William Frankena's version of 
the 'moral point of view' can also be found in A. Baier (1985) Postures of the Mind, 
ch. 9 (London: Methuen). 
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In the same way, the pupil sees education with some points of view 
which are inherited in the history of educational thoughts, that is to 
say, with an 'educational eye' (mind). And the same again would be 
the case in seeing morally relevant things. If the pupil is equipped 
enough with moral mind, he will see the thing with that mind. 'Seeing 
things with moral mind' means that one sees things, as Urmson 
emphasises, with 'moral points of view'.37 This is a notional seeing 
which always takes place with moral notions, as I prefer to use the 
phrase here in a specific way.38 However, the moral notions applied 
here are not logically different from the idea of accompanying 
meanings of X-words so far clarified and identified, precisely because 
to say that X-words have some distinctive accompanying meanings is 
logically equivalent to saying that the pupil sees the referents of X-
words with moral notions. 
Acquisition of moral notions is thus a prerequisite for 'moral 
seeing', because this seeing is logically impossible unless one acquires 
moral notions. 'Human dignity', 'fraternity', 'justice', ... belong to 
moral notions. However, moral notions might more properly be 
exemplified by the locus classicus in Mencius; there are four minds, 
according to him: the mind of commiseration, the mind of shame and 
dislike, the mind of complaisance, and the mind of right and wrong. 
These minds are essential to man; therefore all persons have these 
minds just as they have their four limbs, if they are educated persons, 
37 For Urmson's suggestion of this subject, see Urmson (1968) op. cit., 
p.108 (London: Hutchinson University Library) where he suggests that the 'from a 
point of view' use of 'good' is very important and common in moral contexts. 
38 I found that the same phrase 'moral notions' was used by J. Kovesi. See, 
J. Kovesi (1967) Moral Notions, ch. 1 (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul). His idea 
of 'notions' concurs in parts with mine when he says: `...all that we perceive are 
qualities given to our senses, ... : there is no quality of being-a-table as such that we 
could perceive; we construct ... our notion of a table out of empirically-given 
qualities'. See, ibid., p. 2. But his exemplifications of moral notions (eg lying, 
revenge, inadvertence, cheating) seem to me irrelevant, just because they are not 
purely notional in their qualities. See, again, ibid., p. 13. 
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according to Mencius.39 And Mencius adds that the mind of 
commiseration is the clue to the principle of benevolence, the mind of 
shame and dislike to that of righteousness, the mind of complaisance to 
that of propriety, and the mind of right or wrong to that of wisdom.` 
Morally qualified men have a mind which cannot bear to see the 
sufferings of others; therefore, if a person suddenly sees a child about 
to fall into a well, he will without exception have the mind of 
commiseration and rescue the child from drowning; this rescuing is 
nothing to do with gaining the favour of the child's parents, nor with 
the praise of their neighbours and friends.41 These four minds, 
Mencius has specified, are essentials of morality; they are the moral 
elements of our nature. However, moral notions are not restricted in 
their range to the examples borrowed from Mencius. They might be 
ad infinitum in scope. Such being the case, if the pupil bears these 
notions in mind, then he would certainly see things as morally relevant 
with these notions. Therefore, it would necessarily be impossible in an 
epistemological sense to understand what could be meant by these 
notions unless the pupil has such notions in his mind. 
However, moral notions are non-factual or non-physical; they are 
our mental states, properly speaking; they cannot, therefore, be 
thought as being involved in the descriptive meanings of X-words. Just 
in this sense, the language of moral notions is different altogether in 
its nature even from X-words. For this reason, I will use this language 
in the name of 'notional words'. 
Notional words - 'benevolence', `(human) dignity', 'propriety', 
`justice', etc. - do not simply describe things which come into view to 
our physical eyes, because they do not have any particular factual 
denotations, unlike the case of X-words; nor do they have any factual 
connotation, because they are in relation to our notions of human 
39 
 J. Legge (1960) 'The Chinese Classics, book. ii, ch. 6, p. 202 (Hong Kong 
University Press). 
41 Thiel 
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aspirations like morality and humanity.42 De facto, it is the false 
assumption that all words or phrases have meanings on the model of 
names which are associated with some typical referents. Notional 
words, contrary to X-words, pick out no particular things or 
activities, as is the case of the word, for instance, 'education'. 
Referents of descriptive meanings of X-words are sensible and 
destructible in a physical sense, because they are the things in the 
world; they are mind-independent realities, so to speak. However, the 
referents of notional words are out of our physical eyesight; hence, 
invisible, untouchable and indestructible.43 The figures of notional 
words distinctively appear when we compare it carefully with that of 
X-words: the denotation of the word 'kicking' in T-statement exists 
there and then; the event as referent of 'murdering' in the statement 
`The murder in the Cathedral was wrong' was there and then, in 
Canterbury 1170; but the mind of commiseration, as a moral notion, 
for instance, does not denote any particular thing which exist 
outwardly, simply because the meaning of the 'mind of 
commiseration' or the 'mind of complaisance' is not factual. For this 
reason, notional words do not refer to mind-independent realities, the 
realist's moral realities; their qualities are not percipi but concipi. 
Against the above claim someone will argue, thus; there could be 
certain human behaviours which correspond to the meaning of 'mind 
of commiseration', for instance. Certainly, enormous behaviours are 
around us, which are related in one way or another to the meaning of 
`mind of commiseration'; ie. behaviours such as caring for poor 
42 A very similar idea to this claim will be found in Wittgenstein (1958) op. 
cit., sec. 613, where he writes, thus: 'Willing is not the name of an action'. 
'This is exactly reverence for life' or 'That is precisely what I mean by 
human dignity', a teacher may say in this somewhat odd way. However, what is the 
referent of the phrase 'reverence for life'?; and again what is the very fact that is 
exactly corresponding to the phrase 'human dignity'? What are the referents of the 
indicative pronouns 'this' and 'that' in the teacher's statements; is there any sensible, 
clear, objective and definite object as a denotation of the indicative pronoun 'this' or 
`that'? No affirmative answers are possible for these questions. 'This is exactly 
reverence for life' might be corrected, thus; 'This shows reverence for life'. 
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people and collecting gifts for lonely people at Christmas. Someone 
may therefore insist that all these behaviours can be called by the 
phrase 'mind of commiseration'. But this insistence faces a logical 
difficulty, because the phrase is not a name of a particular thing. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein once wrote that 'to have understood the 
definition means to have in one's mind an idea of the thing defined, 
and that is a sample or picture'.44 If the pupil has understood the 
meaning of an X-word such as 'stealing', he may very likely draw in 
his mind a picture corresponding to the meaning of the word. The 
picture he might draw may be very clear and simple in its perspicuity. 
But the case is quite impossible for all notional words, because the 
pupil who could draw panoptically a picture of 'stealing' would fail in 
the case of drawing the picture of 'mind of commiseration' or 'mind 
of complaisance'. The picture of 'mind of commiseration' cannot be 
drawn on a drawing paper in the same way as the case of 'stealing', 
because the referent of 'mind of commiseration', if any, does not 
appear actually as a perspicuous picture in our mind as in the case of 
`stealing'; rather it must be understood as something notional, because 
it does not carry with it any perceptual connotation. Commiseration is 
not an event or an action, it is one of our notional mind. 
Our notions are in some part tacit intellectual powers; thus they 
have in principle the problem of articulation, though certain other part 
of them are appearing in words. They are rather sentient, implicit 
operations of intelligence; hence, tacit components of our ideas.45  
Moral notions are very often not clearly expressed in language in their 
essential sense; they are non-descriptive, as it were.' Let us suppose 
that the teacher teaches the pupil the concept 'bachelor'. For successful 
teaching the teacher might show the pupil a clear descriptive 
44 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) ibid., sec. 73 
45 For the inarticulate intelligence see, Michael Polanyi (1958) Personal 
Knowie4e, pp. 77-81 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
ab Ludwig Wittgenstein (1951) Tractatus Logko-Philosophicus, 6.57-7 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
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circumscription of the attributes of the concept of bachelor, as we see 
this point in Socrates's dialectics. This teaching is actually possible, 
because the concept 'bachelor' circumscribes its attributes very 
clearly, ie. 'unmarried' in marital condition, 'maturity' in physical 
development and 'male' in sex. However, the teaching of the language-
game of notional words is quite different from the teaching even of 
the language-game of X-words, because clear circumscriptions of the 
components of the meanings of notional words are impossible at all. 
We can see this impossibility when we attempt to define the meanings 
of, for instance, 'mind of commiseration', 'mind of complaisance' and 
`human dignity'. If a word does not possess clear connotations, it also 
does not possess any clear denotation. 
However, we must note here one important fact: without X-words 
moral notions have nothing to do with this practical world of life and, 
conversely, without moral notions X-words might be empty vessels 
having nothing to carry. The case of seeing things denoted by X-words 
like 'rescuing' and 'kicking', for instance, is different in essence from 
the case of seeing a flower, because we see rescuing and kicking 
through moral notions as is not the case when seeing a flower. 
Whenever we see things the X-words denote we see them both with 
descriptive meanings of the words and with moral notions. This means 
that the seeing in moral terms accompanies moral notions in a specific 
way. Through human history man has always seen morally relevant 
things with moral notions, ever since he created and acquired such 
notions. In this regard, if there are accompanying meanings with the 
descriptive meanings of X-words, as examined thus far, it might be 
said that moral notions are added, in the process of history, to the 
descriptive meanings of X-words. However, this interpretation of 
moral notions must not be confused with the realist's claim that moral 
realities are inherently involved in the descriptive meanings of X-
words. 
Learning X-words is not altogether neutral from value situations, 
as is claimed by R.W. Beardsmore: `... the people by whom we are 
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taught themselves possess certain values. They do not merely describe 
certain actions as murder, suicide, or lying, but also react to them in 
characteristic ways'.47 He speaks about certain descriptive terms 
which accompany certain kinds of value both in the process of 
learning them and in their use. St. Augustine also once confessed that 
he learned the use of language not through the formal teaching of 
language but through the life with his brothers, the life in which he 
encountered the expression of face, the play of the eyes, the movement 
of other parts of body, and the tone of voice all of which express our 
state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. 8  
This way of language learning might be the natural and typical one in 
any society and at any historical period; this way of learning might 
better be expressible by the phrase 'forms of life' to which 
Wittgenstein and Williams gave much attention.' 
The adaptation of many different uses of words necessarily brings 
an accompaniment of many other significant and specific meanings as 
well as their initial, descriptive meanings. X-words are accompanied 
by such meanings, as is shown in the preceding section, and the 
meanings work together with their initial meanings if they are used in 
a fuller sense, ie. in moral terms. In this way X-words are seen as 
having a very specific kind of relation to notional words. Without 
having accompanying meanings rendered by moral notions X-words 
cannot enter into the centre of moral discourse; this means that moral 
notions qualify X-words. If an X-word is thought to be truly at the 
heart of some serious moral conversation, this means that again the 
X-word carries its accompanying meaning. However, clear 
interpretation of the relationship between X-words and notional words 
is hardly to be expected. Is there any logical connection between the 
words 'helping' and 'mind of complaisance' or between 'rescuing' and 
47 R.W. Beardsmore (1969) Moral Reasoning, p. 95 (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul). 
St. Augustine (1961) Confessions, book 1 (Penguin). 
See Bernard Williams (1985) op. cit., chs. 7 & 8. 
Moral realism, moral words and the accompanying meanings 48 
`mind of commiseration'? These two pairs of word - pairings of an 
X-word and a notional word - seem to have a very close relationship 
in their specific use in moral terms. However, X-words are not 
logically related to moral notions; this means that no descriptive 
meanings of the words 'helping' and 'rescuing' can be found at all in 
the words for moral notions 'mind of complaisance' and 'mind of 
commiseration'. And no clear causal relationships are found between 
the meaning of 'helping' and 'mind of complaisance' and between the 
meaning of 'rescuing' and 'mind of commiseration', simply because 
the concepts 'complaisance' and 'commiseration' are not factual ones; 
they belong to different categories in their nature. For this very 
reason, no logical or factual relationship between X-words and moral 
notions is found. 
However, one last point needs to be emphasised, although it has 
been already mentioned in this chapter, is that one sees things in 
certain perspectives. This is so, if the pupil has not merely inert 
knowledge of the world. In moral situations two different seeings - the 
descriptive and the notional - work together, not separately but 
concomitantly. But the descriptive seeing alone is meaningless in a 
moral sense, because it does not necessarily or naturally consort with 
notional seeing in an epistemological sense. Seeing things in moral 
terms necessitates notional seeing; moral seeing logically presupposes 
moral notions. The two seeings are thoroughly different in their 
meanings; they are, in other words, different 'ways of looking at 
things'. This is the point that the moral realist misconceives and that 
the teacher must pay much attention. This is because as follows. The 
pupils who are all having different colour-experiences will agree 
about the colour of a flower when they are looking at the same red 
flower. The colour of a flower can be seen in one and the same way 
by every pupil, if he is not colour-blind. And in this case one single 
seeing - descriptive seeing alone - would be sufficient to see correctly 
the colour of a flower. But if this assertion is applied to the case of 
seeing the situations denoted by X-words, it would make no sense at 
Moral realism, moral words and the accompanying meanings 4.9 
all. Seeing a situation of rescuing in a moral sense is not like seeing a 
red flower: it presupposes some moral notions with which the pupil is 
able to see such a situation. 
( 11 clpit'l 
Non-Realism and the Logic of Moral 
Statements 
The moral realist, whether he is an internalist or an externalist, asserts 
that moral realities are something to be found in the world; they are 
independent of us, observable and discovered. For these reasons the 
moral realist says that 'I see the goodness in children's behaviours and 
see sometimes their cruelty to something, as I see the beauty of 
landscapes; there is a mind-independent, distinctive range of moral 
reality': Based on this realist conception of moral reality, both 
moral intellectualism and the modern educational theories of cognitive 
morality interpret the meaning of a moral statement 'X is good' ('X' 
in this open sentence is to be replaced by X-words, the nature of which 
is characterised in the preceding chapter) as a statement which 
describes what we see as a moral reality which exists there in the 
world, mind-independently, in the same way other things exist. For X 
we can substitute a host of names of kinds of things which are morally 
relevant. As for the case of the modern educational theorist of 
cognitive morality, if one relies on moral realism, he would be 
convinced that the aim of teaching 'X is good' statements (this 
paradigmatic type of moral statement shall be called at a proper place 
`X-statement', henceforth) in schools is to enable the pupil to sense a 
certain mind-independent moral reality which can be objectively 
' John McDowell (1978) Are moral requirements hypothetical imperative?, 
Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 52, p. 13-29. 
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described by the word 'X'.2 
Certainly, X-words are observational terms; therefore observation 
of denotations of X-words might be possible, if it is required in 
understanding the meanings of moral statements. However, if the 
teacher takes this realist view without any serious reflection upon it, 
and engages in teaching his pupil to see moral realities in terms of the 
realist principle, then both the teacher and the pupil may be led to 
difficulty in understanding and identification of the moral realities 
which are assumed, by the realist, to be there in the world and 
described by moral statements. The difficulty will be seen as much 
more serious, if we examine the structure of moral statements, 
especially the relationship between the subjects and the predicates of 
the statements. In this chapter, applying and criticising some 
traditional ethical theories, this realist difficulty will be clarified, and 
from this an account of the logic of moral statements will be derived, 
with which the meaning of moral understanding can be interpreted 
without relying on the moral realist's tenets. 
3.1 Traditional ethics, realism and the difficulties 
in understanding 'X is good' statements 
Words in statements are joined together by certain sorts of logical 
devices, and the devices differ according to different structures of 
statement. The device in mathematical statements is logical 
equilibration of numbers, and that binding biological words might be 
causal relationships, for instance, the adaptational mechanism between 
the biological elements of organisms and their environments. It is, 
however, very difficult to see what kind of logical device actually 
2 Frankena's theory of MEX and Hirst's theory of moral education within 
his concept of liberal education, both of which are about the development of moral 
judgment might be a typical example of this moral realism. For Frankena's phrase 
MEX (moral education for judgments), see the introductory chapter of the thesis. 
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conjoins the words 'X' and 'good' in an X-statement. 
Ethical naturalism is akin, in many respects, to the realist 
viewpoint on moral realities. This is clearly so, especially when we 
examine utilitarianism, a representative of ethical naturalism. The 
ethical naturalist reduces the meaning of the moral word 'good' to that 
which is describable in a factual sense, ie. to 'desire satisfaction' or 
`acquisition of pleasure'. The reduced form of a moral statement, then, 
might be that 'X gives satisfaction' or 'X gives pleasure' and the 
logical link between the subject 'X' and the predicate 'satisfaction' or 
`pleasure' of this reduced form may seem to be interpreted by the 
logic of factual relationship; in this case any enquiry about the 
relationship must be over the question of whether or not X factually 
gives us satisfaction or pleasure, though it is debatable whether this 
could be regarded as an ethical question. 
The naturalist transformation of a moral statement might be that 
the quality of a thing (X) which gives us pleasure is good'. The first 
part of the transformed statement 'the quality of a thing (X) which 
gives us pleasure' is factual; of course, as far as this factual argument 
concerns us it can and must be claimed in a factual sense. What is 
more, this statement is not at all problematic in its grammatical form. 
But the second half part of the statement '[what is] pleasant is good' 
raises a much more serious philosophical problem just when it is taken 
in ethical terms. This is simply because if the pupil translates the 
meaning of the moral word 'good' into words which describe natural 
properties like 'acquisition of pleasure' or 'desire satisfaction', one 
will necessarily fall into the naturalistic fallacy, as is suggested by 
G.E. Moore.' Further, 'Good' in moral statements is not 'good of a 
kind' but 'good from a point of view', following Urmson's 
classification of such statements, thus the 'good' is not so closely tied 
to the noun that relates to it' Nonetheless, the naturalist confidently 
G.E. Moore (1959) Principia Ethica, p. 6 (Cambridge University Press). 
4 J. Urmson (1968) 'The Emotive 'Theory of Ethics, ch. 9 (London: Hutchinson 
University Library). 
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believes that since some combination of natural or factual properties 
involves the quality of goodness, this quality of goodness is inseparable 
from these natural properties. Because of this belief, he consequently 
ignores the dissimilarities between the two different parts of the 
statement; Certain qualities of thing give us pleasure and the pleasure 
is good. The first half part is a factual judgment whereas the other 
part is a value judgment; therefore, saying that the quality of a thing 
gives us pleasure is not, in any sense, logically identical to saying that 
pleasure is morally good. An enquiry about whether or not a certain 
thing actually gives us pleasure is one thing and a question about 
whether or not the pleasure which a certain quality of a thing gives us 
is morally good is quite another. 
The naturalist's major premiss 'X gives pleasure', which is 
conceived as describing a factual relationship between the quality of X 
and pleasure, does by no means raise any problem in its own structure; 
it is rather a necessary part of a sound moral judgment, because prior 
to any moral judgment there must be a valid factual judgment which is 
relevant to that judgment. However, the most important point to make 
here is that the factual judgment alone is insufficient for a perfect 
moral judgment; this is simply because moral judgments do not consist 
solely in the fact-finding parts in their whole process; factual 
judgments, or the natural property of X and pleasure in the factual 
judgment, do not, in a logical sense, involve value or moral 
properties. Enquiry about whether the fact X gives us pleasure or not 
is essentially of a factual question, but moral questions are far beyond 
such factual enquiries in their characters. The problem related to the 
naturalist transformation of moral statement arises, therefore, in the 
judgment 'pleasure is good'. In this premiss, the pupil will inevitably 
confront a crucial problem, if he gives serious consideration to the 
matter of the logical disconnection between the subject 'pleasure' and 
the predicate 'good': the logical difficulty in binding the subject and 
the predicate of the premiss. 
A.J. Ayer mentions that it is sometimes morally wrong to perform 
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an action which causes more pleasure than pain or more satisfaction 
than discontent; it is not at all self-contradictory to say that doing a 
pleasant thing is not morally good or that a certain bad thing may be 
desired.' This point was first suggested by Aristotle; 'good' is 
determinate, according to him, but 'pleasure' is not; pleasure admits of 
degrees of extremity; not all pleasures are necessarily good, some of 
them are even bad. Some painful activities might be sometimes judged 
morally good; and some pleasant activities also might be sometimes 
judged morally wrong. Aristotle states thus: 
... since activities differ in respect of goodness and badness, and some are worthy to 
be chosen, others to be avoided, and others neutral, so, too, are the pleasure; for to 
each activity there is a proper pleasure. The pleasure proper to a worthy activity is 
good and that proper to an unworthy activity bad; just as the appetites for noble 
objects are laudable, those for base objects culpable ... As activities are different, 
then, so are the corresponding pleasures.6 
In this passage Aristotle illuminates the point that the qualities of thing 
which give us pleasure are not always good. This means that 'pleasure' 
is not always equivalent, in its logical sense, to the goodness of an 
activity; it is not an ultimate determinant in evaluating an activity, 
though an activity gives us pleasure in one way or another. The ethical 
determinants of an activity must be something other than pleasure, as 
is suggested by the adjectives 'worthy' and 'unworthy' which qualify 
an activity as such in the above quotation. We should therefore admit 
that certain pleasures can be taken as morally justifiable but others 
cannot: some pleasures can be 'desirability characterisations' and 
therefore taken in moral terms.' 'Pleasure' is not the final ground on 
which justification of moral 'good' is based. 
5 A.J. Ayer (1970) Language, Truth and Logic, p. 105 (London: Victor 
Gollancz) 
Aristotle (1915) Ethka Nkomachea, 1175b (Oxford University Press). 
(Italics mine) 
R.M. Hare (1969) Descriptivism, in W.D. Hudson (ed.) 'The Is-Ought 
Question, p. 250 (London: Macmillan). 
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Even when we take the meaning of pleasure as an epiphenomenal 
term, the problem remains just the same for the naturalist's 
transformation. Aristotle, it seems, makes this point when he defines 
the nature of pleasure: 
... there are many things we should be keen about even if they brought no pleasure, 
eg seeing, remembering, knowing, possessing the virtues. If pleasures necessarily do 
accompany these, that makes no odds; we should choose these even if no pleasure 
resulted. It seems to be clear, then, that neither is pleasure the good nor is all pleasure 
desirable, 
This passage suggests not only a logical difficulty in the naturalist's 
reduction of moral good to the natural properties of human nature, 
but also an epistemological obscurity of our vision in seeking a logical 
device which actually binds, in a specific way, 'pleasure' and 'good' in 
the naturalist's form of moral judgment. 
The moral realist, of course, claims that goodness exists in rerum 
natura. If this is the case, then the goodness which is assumed, by the 
realist, to be in rerum natura, ie. in 'pleasure', must be perceived 
through the senses. However, it is debatable whether it should be so 
regarded, in an epistemological sense. What is more, nowhere does the 
realist show us clearly what are the ingredients of goodness which he 
assumed to be there in 'pleasure' or in rerum natura. As to the 
question whether moral realities are part of the fabric of the world, 
one can hardly give an affirmative answer. This difficulty, it seems to 
me, comes basically from the realist's metaphysical assumption of 
moral realities as being in rerum natura, particularly from his 
problematic tenets; the observability, describability, independence of 
moral realities. These metaphysical tenets give us much more 
difficulty if we try to make sure of the nature of moral realities in 
accordance with the realist's ontology. This is especially so, when we 
encounter some realists' agreement on the claim that 'moral properties 
are not physical properties and moral facts are not physical facts, but 
Aristotle (1915) op. cit. p. 12 (Italics mine). 
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all the same they are real properties and facts', as is acutely pointed 
out by Hare.' Moral realism thus offers many problems in 
understanding the nature of moral realities, and the difficulties of the 
naturalistic approach to moral understanding might be the corollaries 
of this weakness of moral realism. 
On the other hand, the ethical intuitionist holds that moral 
statements can be known to be true by intuition; they are something to 
be known self-evidently, without involving any process of inference. 
The intuitionist has attempted to explicate this way of understanding of 
moral statements, but reached the result unsatisfactorily by restricting 
the explication just to the meaning of the predicate 'good' and its 
converse 'bad'. As Moore maintains, the predicate 'good' is simple in 
its characteristics; therefore, indefinable and unanalysable. For this 
very reason, the meaning of 'good' should be understood in an 
intuitive way, according to him. Thus the intuitionist interpretation of 
the way of understanding moral goodness makes opaque, in the 
intuitionists' logic, our vision of any satisfactory answer for the 
question; what is the logical device which binds, in a moral statement, 
the subject (X) that essentially denotes a factual object and the 
predicate (good) that is indefinable and unanalysable? 
Certainly, some moral statements might be accepted by the pupil 
immediately. However, it would be very difficult for us to discern 
whether or not this immediacy in accepting moral statements is exactly 
the same, in its meaning, to the intuitive understanding per se. This is 
because many ambiguities and difficulties exist in the meaning of the 
intuitionist's phrase 'immediate apprehension of moral realities'. Many 
ambiguities appear as we ask a philosophical question about the 
meaning of the intuitionist's phrase. In fact the case of the pupil's 
`immediate apprehension' of the meaning of moral statements, if any 
such case exists, is very uncertain, because it is always problematic to 
decide whether it should be so regarded in a logical sense or 
R.M. Hare (1985) Ontology in ethics, in: Ted Honderich (ed.) Morality 
and Objectivity, p. 48 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
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psychological sense or some other specific cultural, anthropological 
senses. 
W.D. Ross sees an affinity between the intuitive seeing of moral 
realities and the intuitive understanding of geometrical axioms like 'A 
whole is greater than any of its parts'.1° For the intuitionist, moral 
knowledge, if there is any, resembles geometrical knowledge in the 
way that relationships between geometrical terms are grasped by 
intuition. Geometrical axioms might be apprehended without any 
complex logical catena of inference, and the same might be the case 
for the basic principles of algebra, the principle of identity, for 
instance. The same claim reappears in H.A. Prichard's ethical 
theories.11 He interprets the meaning of moral understanding, thus: 
moral understanding is immediate, in precisely the sense in which a 
mathematical understanding is immediate, eg the understanding that 
this three-sided figure, in virtue of its being three-sided, must have 
three angles. Understanding in both areas is immediate in the sense 
that our insights into statements directly and necessarily lead us to 
recognise that the meanings of predicates are involved by subjects.12  
However, if a moral statement is claimed to be understood as true 
immediately in the same way as we understand a geometrical statement 
like 'A square contains right angles', then a logical difficulty arises 
right away. In a logical or analytical statement some properties of the 
subject are possessed by the predicate, as is shown by the case that the 
meaning of the predicate 'right angles' in the geometrical statement 'A 
square contains right angles' is possessed by the subject 'square'. But 
the subject and the predicate in a moral statement are not, in their 
characteristics, words which can be interpreted in the same way as the 
geometrical words; for this reason, the subject in a moral statement is 
not connected to its predicate in the same way as that of a geometrical 
Press). 
" W.D. Ross (1930) 'The N:ght and the Good, p. 121 (Oxford: Clarendon 
II H.A. Prichard (1949) Moral Obligation (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
12 ibid., p. 8. 
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statement. Moral statements are fundamentally different, in their 
logical structures, from geometrical statements. Because of this fact 
the intuitionist's application of geometrical intuition to the 
interpretation of moral awareness is hardly tenable. 
The meaning of the intuitionist phrase 'immediate apprehension of 
moral realities' can so easily be confused with some psychological 
tendencies which accept favourably, without giving any simple 
reasoning, the truth of certain moral utterances. Cultural 
anthropology, too, tells us that members of a certain society accept, 
without any question, certain specific value claims which are culturally 
pervasive in one way or another in that society. The immediate 
understanding of the meaning of a geometrical statement like 'A whole 
is greater than any of its parts' may generally be called 'intuition'. 
However, even in this simple understanding, there must be at least a 
basic ratiocination in a strict sense. And this understanding is possible 
only when we already have such concepts as 'whole' and `part'; 
without having these concepts no immediate understanding of the 
geometrical statement is possible at all. In fact, even the psychological 
and cultural tendencies of immediate acceptance of certain utterances 
or value claims cannot be interpreted, in a fuller sense, without 
presupposing some attitudes or notions which are, in advance, 
possessed by us. For these reasons, the intuitionist phrase 'immediate 
apprehension of moral realities' is very ambiguous and unlikely to be 
accepted in an interpretation of the meaning of moral understanding. 
A moral statement, for example, 'Stealing is wrong' may be 
itntnediately accepted as a valid judgment even by the pupil whose 
moral acumen is not much developed. However, it is debatable 
whether such an acceptance can be taken as an intuitive awareness of 
wrongness. The difficulty of evaluating immediate apprehension of 
moral realities might be suggested, if one carefully observes what is 
happening between the teacher and the pupil in the classroom in which 
a moral conversation is taking place, as Rousseau shows us with his 
example in Emife. There are some cases of serious asking about the 
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whys and wherefores of the moral judgments and some viciously 
infinite regress of justification in defining the meaning of 
wrongness.13 
`Intuition' is etymologically a Latin derivation; the Latin 'intueor' 
means `to look at' or 'I gaze on'. Both phrases `to look at' or 'gazing 
on' presuppose a certain kind of object. The property of the predicate 
`good' in a moral statement may be an object which is a non-natural 
simple notion, and therefore unanalysable and indefinable, as is 
maintained by the intuitionist.' If this is taken as such, the property 
of 'good' might be seen in such a way as the intuitionist holds. 
However, the property of the subject in a moral statement is an object 
of seeing which is fundamentally different from that of the predicate; 
the property of the subject is natural, and therefore describable and 
definable, whereas that of the predicate is non-natural and 
unanalysable. Therefore the subject of a moral statement and its 
predicate are objects which assume different ways of 'gazing on'. 
Considering this point we are confronting again a logical problem of 
how the intuitionist connects the subject which is an object of a 
different seeing from the seeing which is required for the predicate. 
In fact the moral word 'good' is used in conjunction with words 
which are concrete and factual, as can be seen in the exemplary cases 
of moral statements like A, is good', 'X, is good', A3 is good', ... An 
is good'. Let us suppose here that 'Xi ', A„,', `X3' stand for, for 
example, 'caring' (for ageing persons), 'truth-telling', 'rescuing' (a 
drowning child) respectively. Even though we generally take it for 
" Rousseau writes, in his work Emile, about the difficulty of moral 
awareness and that of definitions of moral concepts, thus. Master: You must not do 
that. Child: Why not? Master: Because it is wrong. Child: Wrong! What is wrong? 
Master: What is forbidden you. Child: Why is it wrong to do what is forbidden? 
Master: You will be punished for disobedience. Child: I will do it when no one is 
looking. Master: We shall watch you. Child: I will hide. Master: We shall ask you 
what you were doing. Child: I shall tell a lie. Master: You must not tell lies. Child: 
Why must not I tell lies? Master: Because it is wrong, etc. See Emile (trans. B. 
Foxley), p. 54 (London, Dent). 
" G.E. Moore (1959) Prinzipia Ethica, p. 6 (Cambridge University Press). 
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granted ex hypothesi that 'Xi', 'X2', 'X3' are all assessed as good in 
moral terms, it would be still very difficult for the intuitionist to 
explain how the analysable and definable terms can effectively be 
connected to the unanalysable and indefinable terms. Perhaps the 
intuitionist may explain the structure of moral statements from the 
way that the property of the predicate 'good', which is assumed by the 
intuitionist to have a simple quality on which we gaze, is embedded in 
the meanings of 'X i', `X,', `X3'. However, it would be logically 
difficult for the intuitionist to claim that these subjects commonly 
share both simple and indefinable qualities and descriptive properties 
together. This matter is a serious problem which the intuitionist 
confronts and must be examined in a very sophisticated way. 
These difficulties of ethical realism which we encounter in 
considering the structure of moral statements, engender very crucial 
problems which must be seriously examined before we teach such 
statements at school while mainly relying on realist claims on the 
nature of morality. As far as we engage in moral education while 
relying on moral realism, it would be a logical demand to do this job 
within the bounds of statements. This is simply because moral realism 
is one of the various kinds of moral cognitivism which maintain that 
moral realities can be precisely described by words and statements in 
the same way other things could be. And if we take our moral 
expressions in this way, it would be a logical demand, again, to claim 
that the teacher must understand the structure of such expressions in 
the same way that natural or social scientists understand their 
statements. However, unfortunately, the difficulties laid out in the 
above examination of ethical realism show that this logical demand is 
hardly satisfiable. 
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3.2 Projectivism, quasi-realism and 
the categorial problem 
Neither any relevant analysis of the meaning of 'good', nor any 
positive contribution to the interpretation of the logic of moral 
statements could be found in classical ethical emotivism. ls The 
classical emotivist proclaims, applying the verificationist principle, 
that moral statements are nothing but pseudo-propositions. This is 
because the predicates of moral statements are apprehended by the 
classical emotivist as having only the function of ejaculation of the 
speaker's feelings which arise from the speaker's attitudes towards the 
facts that constitute the subjects of moral statements. If this is so 
regarded, it will anomalously transform an moral statement into `X!!' 
(the subject with exclamation marks), as is held by the verificationist, 
Rudolf Carnap, amongst the classical emotivists. As a result, this 
anomalous form, which consists of the subject and the exclamation 
marks, leads to a broken-grammar view and, of course, any idea of a 
conceptual relationship between the subject and the predicate is hardly 
tenable from this view. Insofar as the 'broken-grammar view' is held, 
it is theoretically impossible to find in the classical emotivist 
conception of moral statements any logical catenae which are 
presumed to bind the subjects and the predicates together in moral 
statements.I6 
A varying viewpoint of morality, which will be called 'modern 
ethical emotivism', has emerged from the 'attitude' theory of classical 
emotivism. Charles L. Stevenson assumes that there exist cognitive 
15 The phrase 'classical ethical emotivism' is used here to distinguish it from 
modern ethical emotivism which is modified and thus allows more cognitive elements 
in moral arguments; we see in main this trend in R.M. Hare's claims. 'Classical 
ethical emotivism' belongs to the extremist negative view on the justifiability of moral 
statements, the view which is largely based on logical positivism, and thus denies the 
cognitive elements in moral arguments. 
I ' For the broken grammar view of moral statement, see Rudolf Carnap 
(1935) Phdosophq and Logical- Syntax (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
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elements in moral attitudes, especially as he asserts that 'all 
disagreement in attitude is rooted in disagreement in belief' about the 
world. And, according to him, moral agreements or disagreements are 
reconcilable by reason.17 However, modern emotivism (in brief) does 
not yet reach satisfactorily the point that suffices for a positive and 
distinctive interpretation of the relationship between the subjects and 
the predicates in moral statements. Modern emotivism claims that the 
statement 'X is good' can be transformed into the statement 'I approve 
of X'. However, this modern emotivist's transformation tells us 
nothing at all about the matter of the relationship between the subject 
`X' and the predicate 'good' in the statement, except for its interest in 
the emotional or attitudinal aspect of the use of the word 'good'. As a 
result, if one applies Stevenson's idea to the interpretation of the 
nature of moral statements, one would soon face the problem of 
irrelevance in using this interpretation exclusively for moral terms. 
Stevenson actually uses the word 'attitude' in relation to the meanings 
of many words; aspirations, wants, preferences, desires and so on. 
However, these words can be used in many other different domains 
than in ethics, eg in anthropology, psychology and sociology. 
R.M. Hare, a prescriptivist, seems to be much nearer, in claiming 
the attitudinal view of morality, to those who seek a possibility of a 
positive relationship between 'X' and 'good' in an X-statement. 
Reflecting upon some features of moral statements, Hare argues that 
the term 'good' is evaluative and therefore in making moral judgments 
it necessarily makes sense to ask for the reason why it is judged so.18 
To be an evaluative statement means to have in one way or another 
certain justificatory grounds, simply because evaluation logically 
necessitates a certain sort of criterion for the fulfillment of its own 
specific purpose; this is so whether or not the grounds can be clearly 
" Charles L. Stevenson (1944) Ethics and.  Language, p. 136 (New Haven: 
Yale University Press). 
18 R.M. Hare (1972) 'The Language of Morals, p. 176 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press). 
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expressed in words. 
In the Harean view, goodness in an evaluative statement, for 
example, 'This book is good' appears in its transposition 'the character 
in this book is very funny'.19 Hare claims that there seems to be some 
close logical connection between the judgment 'This strawberry is 
good' and the statements on which it supervenes 'This strawberry is 
sweet' or 'This strawberry is juicy'.2° However, his supervenient 
form leaves much more obscurity than clarity, when he maintains that 
there is 'some close logical connection' between the meaning of the 
evaluative word 'good' and the meaning of the factual word 'sweet' or 
`juicy'. In logic, no such connection is allowed. The crucial problem in 
this case is about the way he connects the factual word 'sweet' or 
`juicy' to the value word 'good'. A certain kind of connection between 
those words may be possible in certain evaluative statements about 
physical or psychological things, as has just been shown by the Harean 
supervenient forms. But in the moral sphere such a possibility is 
hardly acceptable in that it does not safely escape from the logical 
deadlock of the 'is-ought' problem in ethics. In this sense the Harean 
supervenient form faces the same difficulty that is found in the 
naturalist transformation of moral statements aforementioned. 
Moral projectivism, based on quasi-realism, might be a much 
improved form of moral emotivism. Quasi-realism is trying to work 
out a realistic point of view of moral realities, while recognizing 
rightly the subjective sources of our judgments, inside our own 
attitudes, needs, desires, and natures.' Thus it maintains that there are 
real moral values and that many of them are independent of us, like 
some improved sets of attitudes that are coherent and consistent. 
19 W.D. Hudson (1983) Modern Moral Philosophy, pp. 164 & 183 (London: 
Macmillan). 
20 R.M. Hare (1972) op. cit., p. 111. 
21 Simon Blackburn (1984) Spreading the Word, p. 197 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press); Simon Blackburn (1993) Essays in Quasi-Realism, ch. 9 (Oxford University 
Press). 
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Applying the analogy with secondary qualities and without abandoning 
a non-realist account of value, quasi-realism claims that value, like 
colour, is interwoven into the fabric of our experience of the world 
and therefore can be observed.22 But, according to the projectivist, 
the fabric of our experience does not accurately represent anything in 
the world, because 'value and colour are to be thought of as something 
we create in perceiving the world'.23 
Value and colour, from the very nature of secondary qualities, are 
`modes of our awareness of the world and not properties of the 
world'.' Protected by quasi-realism as such, projectivism explains 
moral utterances as a form of expression adequate to our needs.25 
Projectivism in this sense sides in part with the non-realist position 
about moral properties; thus, according to it, moral properties are 
taken to be qualities which are not there in the world, but qualities 
which we project onto the world; they are our valuational response 
onto the world, as it were. If this is so, the structure of X-statements 
must be explained by showing that they are our moral expressions or 
projections of our moral attitudes onto the things denoted by the 
The emotivist account of moral realities is far removed from its origin, 
since some emotivists have turned to a common conception of what are traditionally 
called 'secondary qualities', like colours, sound, smell and taste. 
2' For this part I relied much on D. McNaughton (1988) Moral 'Vision, p.78 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 
24 ibid. And for projectivism, quasi-realism and the idea of secondary 
qualities, see following writings: Simon Blackburn (1984) op. cit., ch. 6 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press); Simon Blackburn (1993) op. cit.; John Dancy (1993) Moral 
Reasons, ch. 9 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell); P.M.S. Hacker (1987) Appearance and 
Reality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell); Colin McGinn (1983) The Subjective NIew, ch.8 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press); G. Strawson (1989) Red and 'red', Synthese, 78, 193-
232; Simon Blackburn (1985) Errors and the phenomenology of value, John 
McDowell (1985) Values and secondary qualities, in T. Honderich (ed.) Morality and 
Objectivity (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul); J.L. Mackie (1980) flumes Moral 
Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul); Simon Blackburn (1981) Rule-following 
and moral realism, in S. Holtzman and C. Leich (eds.) 'Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
25  ibid., p. 195. 
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subjects of X-statements, the things which are observed by us and 
impinge on us. This may be a plausible explanatory theory of the 
nature of moral expressions. 
However, the projectivist explanation does not actually show us any 
clarity in its own position on the relationship between the subjects and 
the predicates of moral statements. On this point, the projectivist, it 
seems, adds nothing more than the modern emotivist view to the 
interpretation of the relationship between the subjects and the 
predicates of moral statements. Projectivism is an explanatory theory, 
as is initially understood and shown by the Humean picture of moral 
realities, which maintains that moral values are projections of our 
subjective sentiments. However, the projectivist does not take such 
sentiments as simple psychological phenomena which fluctuate in 
differing times and places. In this sense, to protect his conception of 
moral realities Simon Blackburn applies quasi-realism and writes: 
`Protected by quasi-realism, my projectivist says the things that sound 
so realist to begin with - that there are real obligations and values, and 
that many of them are independent of us, for example'.26 
If projectivism is adequately protected by quasi-realism, as is held 
by Blackburn, for instance, the projectivist of course will not take our 
sentiments as something which are simply given. On this point 
Blackburn writes further: 
We have sentiments and other reactions, caused by natural features of things, and we 
`gild' or 'stain' the world by describing it as if it contained features answering to 
these sentiments, in the way that the niceness of an ice-cream answers to the pleasure 
it gives us.' 
We respond to, and describe, some independent aspects of reality when 
'6 Simon Blackburn (1985) Errors and the phenomenology of value, in T. 
Honderich (ed.) Morality and Objectivity, p. 11 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
(Italics mine) And also see his works (1984) op. cit., ch. 6 and (1993) op. cit.. 
27 Simon Blackburn (1985) op. cit., p. 5. 
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we moralize, according to Simon Blackburn.28 Thus, Blackburn's 
projectivism, differing from a revisionist projectivism which is 
represented by Mackie's error theory, seeks to defend a propositional 
form which we give to moral utterances.' In this sense, though there 
are many problems of inadequacy in the results of this quest, 
projectivism accommodates, in its theoretical point of view, the 
propositional grammar of ethics, 'the realist-seeming grammar of 
moral discourse'.3° For Blackburn, the sentiments which we project 
onto the world exist objectively. Just on this point, Blackburn's picture 
of moral realities is very close to that which the realist advocates. But 
Blackburn's projectivism would confront, in its theoretical base, the 
difficulties in interpretation both of the nature of sentiments we 
project onto the world and of the way in which the sentiments and the 
world are joined together, to create some specific qualities, without 
ignoring the everlasting philosophical problem of the value-fact 
distinction. 
Blackburn's metaphor of projection dilutes to a large degree the 
value-fact distinction and obfuscates our minds about the different 
categories of value and fact. This is so especially when we carefully 
examine the implications of his interpretation of projectivism: 'we gild 
or stain the world with the colours borrowed from internal sentiment' 
and this activity 'gives our creation its own life, and its own 
dependence on facts'.31 But in this projectivist interpretation there 
exists much obscurity about the reality or the world which is gilded or 
stained with the colours borrowed from our internal sentiment and 
28 ibid. 
29 For J. Mackie's 'error theory', see J. Mackie (1976) Problems from Locke, 
p.16 (Oxford: Clarendon Press); J. Mackie (1977) Ethics: Inventing YCyht and Wrong, 
ch.1 (Penguin); J. Mackie (1980) Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul). In these works he describes himself as a moral sceptic and his theory of ethics 
as an error theory, taking secondary quality perception to involve a projective error. 
30 For Mackie's point of view on this subject, see J. Mackie (1977) op. cit. 
31 Simon Blackburn (1984) op. cit. (Italics mine) 
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about the way this 'gives our creation its own life', ie. about the way 
the factual world can be gilded or stained with the colours of value 
properties and how it comes to have value properties. Thus far no 
crucial discrepancy is found between Blackburn's account and Hume's 
insistence that we do not experience objects as having value. 
Blackburn's account was initially Hume's idea; we see this point in 
Hume's language: 
...the distinct boundaries and offices of reason and of taste are easily ascertained. 
The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood; the latter gives the 
sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The one discovers objects, as 
they really stand in nature, without addition or diminution: the other has a productive 
faculty, and gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from 
internal sentiment, raises, in a manner, a new creation32 
However to this distinction of reason and taste, Blackburn adds his 
own account for moral realities and makes a considerable discrepancy 
between his own and Hume's idea of ontology of value. Blackburn 
writes: 
All the information about the world which we take in would be describable in natural 
terms. But just as we can use that information to construct theories involving higher-
order concepts, such as those of physics, so we can use it to construct the moral 
concepts. But when we have done so, we have a further description of the world, and 
are regarding it as containing further, moral, states of affairs.33  
From this consideration, moral value, Blackburn claims, virtually 
exists there in the world. If we apply this claim to the interpretation of 
the nature of moral statements, all subjects in moral statements would 
be taken to involve moral qualities which are there by gilding or 
staining, and we respond to such gilded or stained qualities of what 
subjects denote or to what our sensibilities find in the world. 
according to Blackburn's claim. If this is so, then this way of 
2 David Hume (1957) An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p.112 
(New York: The Liberal Arts Press). 
" Simon Blackburn (1984) op. cit., p.182. (Italics mine) 
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interpretation might be understood as nothing but a combination of 
those of realism and classical emotivism. 
However, moral realism and emotivism are, until now, conceived 
by many philosophers as two opposing theories. Therefore, on these 
theoretical bases, there must be some logical difficulty in tying them 
together, the two theories which have ever been theoretically dangling 
loose. In fact Blackburn's projectivism does not satisfy at the same 
time both realism and emotivism. On the one hand it is contrary to 
moral emotivism in claiming that value-properties really exist mind-
independently, impinge on us, and are genuinely observable. On the 
other hand projectivism is a little far from a popularised moral 
realism in that it is quite inconceivable that the qualities of objects 
which are gilded or stained are truly observable, describable, and 
mind-independent. Moral realism is, in its general feature, committed 
to the observability and describability of moral reality.34 Projections 
of sentiment might be conceivable more adequately in a subjective 
way, as the emotivist claims. In projectivism, the difference between 
`being and seeming' is very uncertain. 
To establish projectivism the projectivist takes the case of colour-
property as an example. But the example is not proper for the 
establishment of the theory. Colour-properties, here taken as a 
secondary quality, may be mind-independent and observable in a 
sense. But colours are typically colours of bodies and, unlike value 
properties, they are sensory appearances which can be conceived as 
objects of observation. In this regard, 'colours are primary properties 
of objects, not of something objects make or give off'; they should be 
seen as more akin to primary qualities. P.M.S. Hacker writes thus: 
Colours are not looks. Roses are red and fragrant, they have a fragrant smell, but 
they do not have a red look any more than the way to Tipperary has a long look. To 
D.O. Brink (1989) Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, ch. 2 
(Cambridge University Press). 
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be red is to have a colour, not a look.35  
Value-properties cannot easily be explained in the same way as colour-
properties can be explained, precisely because the former are non-
physical properties, whereas the latter are physical. Awareness of 
values, unlike awareness of colour properties, is not constitutive of 
what it is to have perceptual experience of the external world, as is 
suggested by C. McGinn.36 'To be red is to have a colour, not a look'; 
it is to have physical properties of colour, amongst others. But to be 
good is not a matter of having something like physical properties, not 
a matter of appearances. These two statements clearly illustrate the 
difference between the nature of colour-properties and that of value-
properties. Perception of colour and that of value are not at all 
categorised in their nature by one and the same criterion. A secondary 
quality experience of colour presents itself 'as perceptual awareness of 
properties genuinely possessed by the objects that confront one'.37 
One sees properties of colours through one's physical eye. Thus 'an 
experience of something as red can count as a case of being presented 
with a property that is there anyway - there independently of the 
experience itself'." 
Different people may have different colour-experiences, different 
experiences of presented phenomenal qualities. This is because colour-
properties we experience are revealed in sensory experience and the 
sensation of experiences is different in accordance with different 
35 P.M.S. Hacker (1987) Appearance and Reality, pp. 121-3 (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell). The word 'look' here applies not only to mean the act of looking, but 
also to mean the visible features of the objects of vision. 
Cohn McGinn (1983) The Subjective View, p. 155 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press). 
John McDowell (1985) Values and secondary qualities, in T. Honderich 
(ed.) Morality and Objectivity, p. 112 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
38 Ibid.; G. Evans (1980) Things without the mind, in Z. van Straaten (ed.) 
Philosophical- Subjects: Essays presented to P.F. Strawson, pp. 77-8 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press). 
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phenomenal environments. For this very reason colour words must 
not be words for particular L-properties; they must be essentially 
phenomenal-quality words.39 Kant has readily noticed this point, as he 
writes: 
Colours ... cannot rightly be regarded as properties of things, but only as changes in 
the subject, changes which may, indeed, be different for different men.40 
But what remains true, even in terms of the phenomenal quality of 
colours, is that our colour-experience is mainly of sensual perception 
in which physical reflections arise and we see first such reflections 
through our physical eyes. 
Hume's distinction between 'impressions' and 'ideas' may help us in 
understanding the nature of colour-experience. Impressions, in Hume's 
theory, include all our sensations, passions and emotions, especially all 
our more lively perceptions: hearing, seeing, feeling, hating, desiring, 
willing, etc, whereas ideas are 
the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the 
perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only, those which arise from 
the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure and uneasiness it may 
occasion.41  
When we feel a passion or emotion of any kind, or have the images of 
external objects conveyed by our senses; the perception of the mind is 
what Hume calls 'impression'. And when we reflect on a passion or an 
object which is not present, this perception is an idea. Colour-experience, 
thus, mainly belongs to the category of impression, rather than idea. 
19 
 G. Strawson (1989) Red and 'red', Synthese 78, p. 223. Here the term 
`L-properties' means the case that a certain thing we experience has certain constant 
light-reflection, light absorption, light emission properties under lighting conditions 
are constant and there we do not see the (colour-) properties differently. See also 
ibid., p. 197. 
40 Immanuel Kant (1965) Critique of Pure Reason (trans. N. Kemp Smith), 
B45 (London: Macmillan). 
41 David Hume (1969) A Treatise of Human Nature, p.49 (Penguin). 
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However, our value-perception does not belong to this category; it 
belongs to reflection of impressions, of 'the images of external objects 
conveyed by our senses'. 
Regarding this point it would be not so difficult to assent to the 
claim that the idea of 'secondary qualities' of things, like colour-
properties, cannot properly be counted as a theory which can interpret 
the feature of moral properties. This is mainly because moral values, 
even if they are thought ex hypothesi to exist independently just as 
other things exist in the world, are not objects of sensual perceptions. 
Moral values are not attributes which can be perceptible by our mere 
sight and touch. As Hume writes, we may 'feel a passion of any kind 
or have the images of external objects conveyed by our sense'. And, 
for our whole of experience of perceptions, it would be quite 
impossible to draw a sharp line below which such perceptions are 
sensual and above which they are non-sensual or notional. There also 
seems to be seamless continuity between the sensuous pleasure of 'red' 
roses and the aesthetic enjoyment of the colour as a whole. But sensual 
perceptions - passions and emotions, for instance - are impressions, 
not value-perceptions. Moral values are not objects of purely sensual 
perception; they must be taken in a different way. 
Therefore, it is very difficult, in the moral domain, to say, 
applying quasi-realism, that there exist moral values as secondary 
qualities (of things) just in the same way as colour-properties of 
flowers exist. A flower has both shape and colour, a primary quality 
and a secondary quality, so called; thus we can say: the rose in the 
garden has a certain particular shape and it is red. And the predicates, 
in this case, are involved in the subject, as is shown by the statement. 
This statement is factual; the flower has a red colour, not a look; it has 
a certain shape, not a look. However, in an moral statement the 
relationship between the subject and the predicate cannot be 
interpreted in the same way as in the case of the statement 'The flower 
in the garden is red' in which the predicate 'red' is factually involved 
in the subject. We can successfully draw a picture of a flower with 
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shape and colour; however, it is factually impossible for us to draw a 
picture of the subject of a moral statement, with the value or non-
physical quality which is meant by the predicate `good'. The two 
statements are something disparate. 
In fact Blackburn does not clearly answer the question of what are 
the independent aspects of moral-properties which are supposed to be 
there in the world as secondary qualities or what are the moral 
sentiments, in moral terms, which are assumed, by Blackburn, to be 
`spread on the world'. To establish projectivism one needs to explore 
further these problems in terms of ethics, especially the problems of 
the nature of moral properties and the sentiments. Much difficulty 
exists indeed in projectivism and this difficulty again leads to an 
educational problem which we shall encounter without doubt if we 
apply the projectivist idea of morality and endeavour to show the pupil 
the grammar of moral statements according to the view of the 
projectivist theory. 
3.3 Between the subjects and the predicates 
in moral statements and the moral notions 
Information about the real world which we take in must be describable 
in factual terms. The subjects in moral statements are factual terms, 
and they first give us some factual information, amongst others, about 
the world. However, it is hardly acceptable that the subject itself in a 
moral statement describes moral realities as clearly as it gives us 
information about the world. What is more, it is argued in the 
preceding sections that moral realities defy description, even though 
we assume ex hypothesi there are such realities, as is claimed by the 
realist. For this reason, the grammar of moral statements, more 
precisely the relationship between the subjects and the predicates in 
moral statements, cannot be shown properly in the realist 
interpretation of the character of X-words. 
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Quasi-realism, which relies mainly on projectivism, confronts, in 
parsing 'X' and 'good' in an X-statement, the same ontological 
problem of moral realities as moral realism faces. 'Projecting' in its 
etymological origin means what Hume referred to as 'gilding and 
staining all natural objects with the colours borrowed from internal 
sentiments', or 'the mind spreading itself on the world'. However, 
when Blackburn revised projectivism and developed quasi-realism, his 
thinking varied greatly from the projectivism which initially emerged 
from the Humean view of moral utterance. Blackburn's projectivism 
has deviated considerably from its original meaning, in his claiming 
the describability of moral statements and the possibility of mind-
independent moral realities. Thus quasi-realism has already turned 
completely towards moral realism, as I have already shown. Things, 
which are mind-independent, do not in their descriptive concepts 
possess something of moral realities, unlike what the realist or the 
quasi-realist assume to be there in the real world. An 'impulse from a 
vernal wood' may strongly stimulate some people to feel reverence for 
life as a moral reality in some particular way, but it is important to 
notice that the vernal wood does not intrinsically or conceptually 
possess such a moral reality. Nature itself never taught us that there 
really exists such a moral reality. For this reason I have rejected these 
theories as improper for the interpretation of the logic of moral 
statements. 
All statements, including moral statements, are expressions of our 
thoughts or sometimes feelings about things we encounter, whether or 
not the statements are expressed properly in some propositional forms. 
But things might be otherwise than they are, because things could be 
seen from different points of view and words also could be used in 
different ways.42 ` A prism decomposes light' is a factual statement in 
which the nature of decomposition is naturally given to a prism and 
thereby the subject 'prism', in its intrinsic nature, possesses the 
attribute of decomposing light. Therefore, if there is a prism of which 
42 David Lewis (1973) Counterfactuals, p. 84 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 
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we can fairly say 'It is really a prism', then it always possesses its 
constant reality of decomposing light, other things being equal. For 
this exemplary statement no different points of view could be given, 
except the physical disposition of the decomposition of light. However, 
X-words, unlike the case of the word 'prism', cannot be interpreted in 
this consistent way. They may be used for pure description of a certain 
value-neutral fact in a certain specific situation, as is the case, to take a 
very simple instance for clarity's sake, of the word 'abortion' and the 
statement the word constitutes. The word 'abortion', in a medical 
sense, may sometimes be used in a quite different way from a moral 
point of view. However, the word is accompanied by certain moral 
notions or certain particular moral points of view, if and only if the 
word comes into a serious moral discourse. 
`Truth-telling' can be used in a moral sense and it also can be used 
in a factual sense as it is used in a court of judicature; a certain moral 
notion accompanies the use of the word in one case but not in the other 
case. 'Kicking' might be another example, it can be used in different 
ways in different contexts, the different contexts, for instance, which 
the two statements 'kicking a ball' and 'kicking a boy' imply. Even 
love is not always divine or moral: it is in some cases debasing and 
erotic, for instance. These cases of love are very natural in their 
characters. But 'love' in morals and that in divinity are non-natural as 
are the cases of love for the sub-human, friendship and charity.43 The 
love that is natural may be necessary in a natural law but the one that 
is for friendship or charity is non-natural; thus without the former 
none of us would have been begotten and reared, but we may breed 
and survive without the latter. The former are too obviously 
connected with our nervous system, too obviously shared with the 
brutes, but the latter seem to raise us to the level of non-natural 
quality, ie. the level of having moral qualities, amongst others. 
Insofar as X-words have both conceptual and descriptive meanings, 
as For the distinctions between several kinds of love and clarifications of 
them, see C.S. Lewis (1960) ?he Four Loves (Glasgow: Collins). 
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X-words do not always reveal clearly or necessarily carry moral 
notions in moral statements; this point can be seen in the use of the 
words 'truth-telling', 'kicking', 'love' as are exemplified above and 
equally for the words 'lying' and 'promise'.44 'Lying is wrong' may 
be taken as a valid statement in an ordinary sense, but it is not always 
to be taken so; lying can be acceptable in a certain particular 
circumstance, as we see in the case in which a doctor tells his patient a 
lie, for some medical purposes, about the result of diagnosis of the 
patient's disease. But lying in this case is used for non-moral ends, 
perhaps for the purpose of medical treatment of the patient; it also can 
be used even in some moral ends, if a doctor tells a lie about the result 
of the diagnosis of the patient's hopeless disease after he seriously 
reflects about whether his truth-telling about the result may give the 
patient mental sufferings. This case shows that 'lying' is not always 
used in a moral sense; it does not always have a particular fixed 
meaning; it can be used in many different ways in accordance with 
different points of view. 
X-words, if they are properly used in moral discourse, would be 
used with a much fuller sense of their meaning than when they are 
used in non-moral discourse; they are used not just in a descriptive or 
conceptual sense (a narrower sense), but also in some other important 
sense, ie. in a fuller sense with which they carry imaginations, 
emotions and moral notions. 'Polygamy' or 'monogamy' may be used 
only in a narrower sense if they describe certain institutions value-
neutrally, but they might be otherwise if they are used in a much 
fuller sense; they would then convey certain imaginations, emotions, 
and, amongst others, moral notions. Beyond the descriptive or 
conceptual faculty, the use of an X-word largely depends on how the 
word is taken by a particular speaker in his moral conversation.45 In 
Press). 
44 Philippa Foot (1967) Theories of Ethics, pp. 124-5 (Oxford University 
Press). 
45 Cf. R.M. Hare (1952) Language of Morals, pp. 112-3 (Oxford University 
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this sense, moral statements are no longer appreciated as a way of 
asserting only that some state of affairs obtains, but as a way, in their 
specific character, of expressing our moral notions in relation to the 
world. This is a particular character of moral statements; the meaning 
of a moral statement varies entirely in accordance with whether or not 
we see the object an X-word denotes with some moral notions. 
However, the point is that words do not always clearly and 
successfully reveal their multifarious meanings on the surface 
structure of statements which they compose, as is the case of drawings. 
Drawings convey to us some clear idea of the beauty of scenery, but 
some other ideas do not clearly and always appear on the horizon of 
our simple perception, as with the sense of beauty that drawings 
reveal. In the same way some words, in certain particular statements, 
reveal their meanings only in part, not in a fuller sense, due to their 
idiosyncratic grammar of expression. Statements like 'Doing a is 
good' in sports, or 'Doing 3 is good' in a musical play, show clearly 
this specific grammar of expression. No lucidity about the reason why 
one should do a or 3 rather than x or 8 has appeared on the surface of 
these statements. But this does not necessarily mean that no reason 
exists for doing a or p. We can enquire about the whys and the 
wherefores from the speakers of the statements and may hear the 
proper kind of answer; that is to say, by doing a the centre assists the 
right wing in Rugby and doing such a thing eventually leads to the 
winning of the game, or by doing 13 the clarinettist makes the music 
much more harmonious and thus plays the music more beautifully. 
For the speakers in these cases the 'good' means winning the game or 
playing more beautiful music. However, the reasons why these actions 
are called 'good' do not yet clearly appear on the surface of the 
statements. 
We express our thoughts, emotions and feelings through 
movements of the body, sounds, drawing and sentences, etc. In the 
same way we express our moral notions through our actions or 
sentences. 'The human body is the best picture of the human soul,' 
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writes Wittgenstein.` The same thought might well be applied, 
without any alteration, to sentences and actions as an extended form of 
sentences.47 But such notions do not clearly appear on the surface of 
moral statements, though they accompany X-words when the words 
are used adequately in moral discourse; this is because notions do not 
carry descriptive or perceptual connotations. Therefore, these notions 
are assumed to be somewhere in moral statements, ie. beneath the 
moral statements. This means that moral statements are not such 
descriptive statements as the moral realist claims, depicting moral 
realities as he assumes, but are a certain specific way of expression as 
a form of our seeing something from a moral point of view or with 
moral notions. Being understood in this way, it must be assumed that 
moral statements are a certain specific form of statement which does 
not plainly reveal these notions in its surface meanings, but a form of 
statement which is sustained by moral notions that must be assumed to 
lie beneath the surface in a grammatical sense or in our mind in an 
ontological sense. The notions are hidden from the statements; they are 
invisible from a grammatical point of view. This way of 
characterisation of moral statements might seem to be steering clear of 
the weakness of moral realism which makes a grammatical difficulty 
in construing the structure of moral statements. 
Projectivism, in a positive view, might be taken in part as a 
distinctive theory that highlights the character of human expressions. 
However, relying too heavily on moral emotivism, the projectivist 
partially sees and erroneously examines the nature of moral 
utterances, and thus overlooks an important feature of moral 
statements, with which moral statements can be construed more 
adequately than when interpreted improperly by relying mainly on 
moral emotivism. Blackburn's projectivism or quasi-realism is a 
46 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) Philosophical Investigation, part ii, iv (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell). 
47 From this account might be derived the statement 'Actions are the best 
picture of moral notions'. 
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continual harking back to emotivism and loses a positive 
transformation its initial meaning. When words such as 'rescuing', 
`helping', 'stealing', 'murdering', ... are uttered by someone else, we 
sometimes feel certain kinds of strong emotion and project them 
towards the utterance or what the words denote, as the projectivist 
claims; we often feel a particular timbre and ambient abomination 
when we hear the word, for instance, 'murder'. This is so especially 
when these words come into moral discourse. The word 'kicks' in 
T-statement 'T kicks a boy' causes offence to someone, but this is not 
the case for the same word in S-statement 'S kicks a ball'; there is a 
remarkable contrast between the two different uses of the same word 
`kicks'. A person speaks the word 'stealing' with a very unpleasant 
speech sound, but does not for the word 'helping'. The same is also 
true for the case of the word `water-pollution'; the word in most cases 
is used in a factual or scientific term, but when it once enters into 
moral discourse it carries a very strong abhorrent feeling. The 
meaning of the word that is used in an environmental scientist's report 
is fundamentally different from the feeling the word produces when it 
is used in moral colloquy. From this observation comes a very simple 
clarity about the fact that certain particular emotional attitudes 
accompany some words when we use them in moral discourse. 
Certainly, these emotional attitudes are, in their nature, too vague 
to be cognitive or meaningful elements in construing relevant 
statements, as Wittgenstein and A.J. Ayer suggest; they may be 
counted as pure psychological reactions towards the impressions the 
exemplary words produce and also as factors breaking the grammar of 
moral statements, as is claimed by the verificationist.48 But the 
emotivist, in seeing the other facet that his theory implies in itself, 
does not have any interest in examination of the nature of emotional 
attitude in relation to the idea of moral notions, ie. the idea of 
underlying or accompanying meanings of words. This is because, it 
48 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1965) A lecture on ethics, the Philosophical Review, 
vol. LXX1V, p. 12; A. J. Ayer (1963) Language, Truth and Logic (Penguin). 
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seems to me, the emotivist misses the point that we express our 
attitudes towards the utterance of some words from some religious or 
political points of view and in the same way from moral points of 
view. Attitudes, in this point-of-view theme, might be thought to be 
rooted, in whatever way it may be, in certain kinds of basic notions 
through which we assess the world, though there exists much difficulty 
in the articulation of these basic notions. 
Hume's phrase 'the point of view of humanity' might be one 
proper example of the basic notions.' Many philosophers and 
psychologists introduce a view which takes emotions to be 
combinations of affects, cognitions and desires. Sartre seems to 
characterise certain emotions, such as horror, in terms of affective 
ways of seeing the world; and other philosophers, influenced by 
Sartre, have claimed that emotions are interpretive patterns of 
awareness of the world and the people in it.5° S. Schachter and J.E. 
Singer also define emotion as 'a joint function of a state of 
physiological arousal and an appropriate cognition', and many other 
exponents of this view, including A. Maclntyre, C.D. Broad, S. 
Hampshire and J. Marks, speak of emotions as feelings along with 
beliefs or imaginations; they understand emotions as `affectively 
charged cognitions'.51 R.C. Solomon, amongst others, has given a 
49 David Hume (1957) An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p. 93 
(New York: The Liberal Arts Press). 
5° J.-P. Sartre (1962) Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, pp. 75-9, 86 
(London; Methuen). For other philosophers' view, see: C. Calhoun (1984) 
Cognitive emotions?, in C. Calhoun and R.C. Solomon (eds.) 'What is an motion?, 
pp. 340, 342 (Oxford University Press); R. de Sousa 1980) The rationality of 
emotions, in A.O. Rorty (ed.) explaining Emotions, pp. 137-8, 141 (University of 
California Press); R.C. Solomon (1977) The logic of emotion, Nous, vol. 11, no. 1, 
p. 46; R.C. Solomon (1977) Sartre on emotion, in P.A. Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy 
of yean-Pauf Sartre, pp. 220-7 (La Salle: Open Court); Solomon says in places that in 
equating emotions with judgements, he has in mind 'interpretive' or 'constitutive' 
judgements in a Sartrean sense. 
51 S. Schachter and J.E. Singer (1984) Cognitive, social, and physiological 
determinants of emotional state, in C. Calhoun and R.C. Solomon (eds.) What is an 
Emotion?, p. 177 (Oxford University Press); A. Maclntyre (1971) Emotion, 
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purely cognitive account of emotions, analysing them in terms of such 
phenomena as thoughts, awareness, and apprehensions. These accounts 
might seem more promising than other suggestions. Solomon writes 
thus: 
I cannot be angry if I do not believe that someone has wronged or offended me. 
Accordingly, we might say that anger involves a moral judgment ..., an appeal to 
moral standards and not merely personal evaluations. My anger is that set of 
judgments. Similarly, my embarrassment is my judgment to the effect that I am in an 
exceedingly awkward situation. My shame is my judgment to the effect that I am 
responsible for an untoward situation or incident. My sadness, my sorrow, and my 
grief are judgments of various severity to the effect that I have suffered a loss. An 
emotion is an evaluative (or a 'normative') judgment, a judgment about my situation 
and about myself and/or about all other people.52 
The cognitivist claims that emotions are actually sets of judgments, 
thoughts, or awareness, and so, given the appropriate set of cognitions, 
one will indeed have an emotion. J. Oakley partially dissents from 
these cognitivist claims, but the epitome of his main objection to the 
claim might be that cognition alone is insufficient for emotion; yet he 
agrees with the involvement of cognitions in the concept of emotion, 
as is given by his own conceptualisation of emotion: 'an emotion is a 
complex which involves dynamically related elements of cognition, 
desire, and affectivity'.53  
A thoroughgoing investigation of the use of X-words reveals much 
more clearly the existence of accompanying emotions when we use the 
words, though they often seem to be contingent, as we have examined 
behaviour and belief, in Against the Self-images of the Age, pp. 234-5 (London: 
Duckworth); C.D. Broad (1971) Emotion and sentiment, in D.R. Cheney (ed.) 
Broad's Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy, 
 , p. 283 (London: Allen & Unwin); S. 
Hampshire (1971) Sincerity and single-mindedness, in Freedom of Mind and Other 
Essays, p. 239 (Princeton University Press); J. Marks (1982) A theory of emotion, 
Philosophical Studies, vol. 42, no. 2, p. 227. 
52 R.C. Solomon (1976) The Passions, p. 187 (Doubleday: Anchor). 
53 J. Oakley (1992) Morality and the Emotions, p. 6 (Routledge). 
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them so far. Such emotions may not have seemed, for some 
philosophers, to be clear in their meaning, and consequently the idea 
of the association between the emotions and the words might have 
counted for them as something. meaningless. However, the idea of 
association must not be counted for nothing and put aside as is done by 
some philosophers, like Ayer and Wittgenstein. The point is that the 
word 'kicks' in T-statement carries some emotional meanings in its 
use, but the same word in S-statement does not carry with it any 
emotion; and no other reason for the point can be seen, except that the 
former case invites moral assessment whereas the latter does not. Both 
T and S-statement share one and the same grammar, but they are 
clearly different in their meanings as we see from the different uses of 
the word 'kicks' in the statements and the entirely different functions -
positive or negative - in the accompanying emotions in the use of the 
word. The words entering into moral discourse always carry certain 
particular emotions like sympathy or antipathy, but the words outside 
moral discourse may or may not do so. It follows from this fact that 
the emotions arising in moral discourse are not to be taken as 
something totally meaningless; they make themselves a specific 
meaning in moral discourse; therefore, they must be taken rather as a 
sine qua non which makes our colloquy moral in one way or another; 
they are distinctive, insofar as they accompany some serious moral 
discourse. 
Certain things are objects for which we have emotions morally 
relevant at the very moment we see them, but other things are not; 
certain words carry our emotions at a time when we utter them, but 
other words do not. Therefore, these emotions are something which 
must not be taken, in a logical sense, as something worthless which is a 
pure psychological reaction to certain things as long as they are 
accounted for morally relevant ones. This means that something 
logically precedes the accompaniment of emotions; ex nihilo nihil fit, 
ie. the accompaniment of emotions is something to do with the way of 
moral seeing or the moral notions. The point is that the emotions are 
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closely related in one way or another to the points of view with which 
we see things and utter the words. Seeing a thing carries some 
particular emotions especially when we see it from a certain point of 
view, but it may not carry the same emotions if we see the same thing 
from other points of view. Likewise, for an environmental researcher 
the factual phenomenon in which rivers are polluted with filthy waste 
from factories does not carry emotions about the pollution in the same 
way and degree that such a phenomenon carries a moralist's emotions 
against it. This suggests that having emotions is logically related to 
seeing things in some specific ways or with some points of view. The 
moral emotivist fails to touch this basic ground of moral emotions and 
its causal relations with the way of moral seeing. It seems that if the 
emotivist were to accept the idea of accompanying meanings of moral 
statements, not his idea that characterises moral attitudes as simple or 
meaningless feelings, the emotivist or the verificationist broken-
grammar view of moral statements would not result. C.L. Stevenson's 
conception of 'attitude' adjoins this point I have just suggested, but this 
classical emotivist view of attitude falls too short s4 
Different experiences of the world entail different ways of seeing 
and vice versa. We see certain things from certain specific points of 
view: in this case emotions accompany seeings; but in other cases they 
do not. Of course, there are some exceptional cases, like anxiety and 
phobia, in which certain emotions arise without such seeing. In a 
logical sense, therefore, the relationships between the ways of seeing 
and the accompaniment of emotions are contingent. However, a 
particular connection, in many other cases, must be presumed to exist 
between the emotions and the ways of seeing things around us from 
certain points of view. This means that the emotions have surely 
something to do with the ways of seeing things. This critical point 
might be sustained by the cognitive-affective theories of emotion 
54 Charles L. Stevenson (1944) Ethics and Language (Yale University Press). 
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which suggest that emotions accompany cognitions or beliefs.'?  
However, this is what the classical moral emotivist erroneously 
disregards. In other words, the classical emotivist fails to see a 
particular connection between the ways of seeing and the 
accompaniment of emotions in the ways of seeing. 
The seeing of things from moral points of view is distinctive, in its 
logic, from the seeing of things with other points of view; we may see 
a certain thing from a moral point of view; we may see the same thing 
from a political point of view; and the two seeings are different in 
their meaning. However, the meaning of the phrase 'seeing things 
from moral points of view' is not different in its logic from the 
meaning of the phrase 'seeing things [with] moral notions'. Moral 
seeing, if it is truly a moral seeing, always presupposes moral notions; 
without them no moral seeing takes place. 
`The notion of persons", R.S. Peters rightly says (applying Kant's 
supreme ethical principle), 'picked out not simply the fact; it also bore 
witness to the ethical importance of the face.' The ethical importance 
of the fact is not naturally shared by the fact per se; the fact shares 
something of ethical importance only when a seeing with moral 
notions takes place. Therefore, it must be granted that moral notions 
are something which do not exist in the fact itself; they must be 
somewhere outside the factual properties; they might be something 
like mental properties. The colour-impression in 'It looks red' cannot 
be detached from the object, but moral notions do not belong to this 
case; they are genetically exogenous.'' If it is true to say that we have 
moral notions and see things with these notions, it would necessarily 
follow that moral statements are concerned with our representations of 
5 J. Marks (1982) A Theory of Emotion, ThdosophicaiStudies, vol. 42, no. 
2. J. Oakley (1993) Morality and the Emotions, pp. 28-37 (London: Routledge). 
sh R.S. Peters (1966) Ethics & Education, p. 209 (London: George Allen & 
Unwin). (Italics mine) 
57 See Hume's argument again, which is quoted in the last part of the 
preceding section. 
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our moral notions.58 It is however not an easy job to discover whether 
we first understood the reference of the subject of a moral statement 
and thought of it afterwards in moral terms, or approached it the 
other way around. Nonetheless, it is very clear that we do indeed see, 
with our moral notions, a particular thing as morally relevant. 
Moral seeing presupposes moral notions; it is a kind of notional 
seeing which is significantly different from classical emotivism and its 
transformation. Moral statements might well be examples of our 
representations of our moral notions. However, the moral notions do 
not clearly appear in moral statements; therefore we cannot see them 
in the grammatical structure of moral statements. They are not 
conceptually involved by the subjects of moral statements; what is 
more, they are not such primary or secondary qualities as those which 
can be grasped through our physical perceptions, since they do not 
carry the perceptual connotation. Nevertheless, if we once appreciate 
both claims, that moral seeing presupposes moral notions, and that 
these notions do not appear on the surface structure of moral 
statements, then we should alternatively admit that they exist 
somewhere between the subjects and the predicates of moral 
statements; this is not because they are thought to be so in terms of a 
metaphysical assumption that value systems precede all value 
judgments, but because, as a logical necessity, if the subjects do not 
conceptually involve value properties which belong or relate to the 
meanings of the predicates, then alternatively the value properties 
must be taken to mediate between the subjects and the predicates. In 
being beneath the surface structure of moral statements, it must be 
understood, moral notions connect the subjects and the predicates in 
moral statements. 
The naturalist's form of transformation of an moral statement, 'X 
gives us pleasure and pleasure is good', might be an example of 
58 This representational theory (of perception) rejects the naive realist view of 
perception; it holds that our experiences have intentional content. See, F. Jackson 
(1977) Perception (Cambridge University Press). 
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mediate inference, although this naturalist form of inference has been 
considered to have some weakness when we examine the naturalist 
mediate variable 'pleasure' (eg 'pleasure' that is descriptive in a factual 
sense), which must be assessed again by the sense of moral goodness.'`' 
But if we apply the idea of moral notions, instead of applying the idea 
of the naturalist mediate variables, we can reveal more clearly how 
moral notions function meaningfully between the subjects and the 
predicates of moral statements and how they exist beneath the surface 
structure of X-statements, thus: X is accompanied by (and therefore 
represents) a moral notion and the moral notion is good, therefore we 
can safely get an X-statement, ie. 'X is good'. A moral notion, for 
instance, the mind of commiseration or the mind of complaisance, to 
borrow Mencius's terms in this form of inference, differs 
considerably in its characteristics from the naturalist's mediate 
variable 'pleasure'; the former is characterised by a notional word 
which intrinsically expresses the positing by a human mind of a value, 
whereas the latter is characterised by a factual word. 
Human behaviour, if it is not to be taken as unconscious, is 
accompanied by (and therefore represents) some notional entities. If 
we admit this argument, we should also accept that moral behaviour 
(X) is accompanied by some moral notions. One behaves in a specific 
way and one's notions ride the behaviour; if this is true, it would 
follow that when one behaves in terms of morals, some moral notions 
accompany the behaviour; if not, the behaviour could not be properly 
called 'moral behaviour' at all. In the same way if one looks at X, the 
looking is notional. 'X is accompanied by (and therefore represents) 
moral notion'. in the above paragraph, is a factual statement, because 
it is basically a factual thing to enquire whether or not the behaviour is 
accompanied by the moral notion, though such an enquiry is extremely 
difficult to carry out (and thus must be left for another study). 
However, to say that 'moral notion is good' is a kind of categorial 
59 See section 2.1 for the naturalist's transformation of an X-statement and 
the criticism I made. 
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statement which means that the moral notion belongs to the category 
of moral goodness. 
If we follow this approach to the examination of the structure of 
moral statements and the place of moral notions mediating them, it 
would be not so difficult for us to understand the fact that moral 
notions do not appear in the grammatical structure of the sentences; 
they are something invisible and cannot appear on the surface of the 
statements; they are hidden, in their features, by the appearance, 
because they are lying beneath the descriptive meanings of X-words, 
ie. beneath the appearances X-words denote. Though they lie behind 
our descriptive use of words, they nevertheless connect the subjects 
and the predicates of moral statements in a particular way suggested 
above and consequently signify that the statements express our mind 
meaningfully. Such being understood, it seems, contrary to the realist 
claim, that the mediate variables 'moral notions' are not something 
independent from us; this is because they are not of the realist or the 
projectivist conception of the qualities of things which seem to be 
independently as other things are in the world; they might be 
something constituting the postures of the mind. 
Rejecting the realist idea of moral realism and criticising some 
existing ethical theories, especially with ethical emotivism and 
projectivism or quasi-realism, the logical device conjoining the 
subjects and the predicates of moral statements has been established. 
The realist idea is first rejected, ie. the realist tenets of moral realities 
which are explained in terms of mind-independency and objective 
observation, on the account both that the predicates in moral 
statements are not at all mind-independent, observational terms and 
that the subjects or X-words are primarily factual whereas moral 
realities are not to be considered to be in rerum natura, ie. with the 
factual meanings of X-words. 
Blackburn's quasi-realism, as a much developed branch of ethical 
emotivism, seemed to be much closer to my idea, because it recognises 
subjective sources of our moral judgments. However, applying the 
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concept of secondary quality, quasi-realism admits that values exist in 
the way of something like colour or something which is interwoven 
into the fabric of our experience of external world. Thus, Blackburn's 
picture of moral realities is akin to moral realism which is criticised 
through this chapter. 
Rejecting and criticising the existing theories in terms of the nature 
of moral statements, I have sketched a profound theory which explains 
the way with which we see the structure of moral statements, without 
committing the realist error of confusing factual realities of things and 
our valuational propensity to things around us. This theory admits 
ethical emotivism, but partly, because rejecting its undifferentiated 
idea of our emotive responses onto the world, it does not fall into the 
emotivist's naive interpretation of the nature of emotions. Thus the 
theory does not see moral statements as something of 'expressing 
attitudes' or 'expressive semantics'.6° The theory instead sees moral 
statements as evaluative semantics which are, in a logical sense, unable 
to be thought in another way from the way of seeing things through 
our moral notions. However, on the surface of such statements do not 
appear the moral notions with which we see things; they are 
grammatically hidden beneath the surface structure of the statements. 
" These terms have been borrowed from M. Devitt (1984) Realism and 
Truth, p. 55 (Oxford: Blackwell). 
Chapter 4 
Beyond the Realist Mode of Rationality: 
the dimension of moral notions 
Modern educational theorists, including Paul H. Hirst, accept the 
realist assumption, without much alteration, in their theories of moral 
education, wherein they aim to foster ultimately the rational moral 
mind of the pupil.' This assumption is allied to a strong conviction of 
the increasing rationality of human conduct, and also to the view that 
progressive growth in scientific knowledge seems to be able to 
uncover the natural order of things, as is indicated in B. Smart's 
comment on the modernity of rationality and truth.' However, it 
seems that the assumption gives rise to much difficulty when applied to 
moral education, if a serious examination is given to the realist's 
claims for the rationality of moral beliefs and to his ontology of moral 
I Cf. Paul H. Hirst's early thinking on the theory of moral education and the 
aims of education in general, and other modern theorists' analyses of moral 
education, for instance, those of William K. Frankena and John Wilson. See, Paul 
H. Hirst (1965) Liberal education and the nature of knowledge, in R.D. Archambault 
(ed.) Phdosophicaf Analysis and Education (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul); Paul H. 
Hirst (1967) Public and private values and religious educational content, in T.R. 
Sizer (ed.) Religion and Public Education (Houghton Mifflin, Boston); Paul H. Hirst 
(1974) Moral Education in a Secular Society (University of London Press); William K. 
Frankena (1958) Toward a philosophy of moral education, Harvard Educational 
Review, 28, Fall; John Wilson (1990) A New Introduction to Moral Education 
(London: Cassell Educational Ltd.). 
= B. Smart (1992) Modern Conditions, Postmodern Controversies, p. 62 
(London: Routledge). 
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realities. It would be indeed very baffling, if one takes the view of 
moral notions developed in the preceding chapters, to accept the 
position that we can justify moral beliefs, in education, on the grounds 
of the rationality of morality and the realist ontology of moral 
realities. 
Relying on the idea of 'moral notions', this chapter will offer a 
brief critical examination of the realist claim of rationality in relation 
to moral judgments, and proceed to establish a non-realist position on 
moral understanding, based on the conception of 'moral notions'. For 
this purpose, more detailed features of moral notions will be identified 
through an in-depth analysis of their logical characteristics, and also 
the place of moral notions in moral understanding will be specified. 
4.1 Differences between seeing what is really there 
and seeing what seems to be there 
Truth is logically presupposed as a guiding principle in the pursuit of 
knowledge of what is the case. From the argument in Plato's grteaetetus 
to the viewpoint of recent epistemologists such as A..I. Ayer and R.M. 
Chisholm, it has been convincingly maintained that knowing 
presupposes truth. In this regard, if the pupil knows that p, then it is 
necessarily the case that p must be true.1 Realism, amongst other 
theories, takes this condition of knowing as a cardinal principle for all 
academic enquiries, even if it is not made explicit. The same position 
is taken by the moral realist, and many similar ideas have been upheld 
by educational theorists who side with modern rationalism, as is seen, 
for instance, in Hirst's early theory of liberal education, and his theory 
of moral education in particular, although Hirst's position is now a bit 
different. Hirst writes: 
3 Plato (1973) Theaetetus, p. 201 (Oxford University Press). R.M. 
Chisholm (1957) Perceiving: a Philosophical Study, p. 16 (Cornell University Press). 
A.J. Ayer (1956) 'fie Problem of Knowledge, p. 34 (London: Macmillan). 
Beyond the realist mode of rationality and truth 90 
The form, by virtue of its particular terms and logic, has expressions and statements 
(possibly answering distinctive types of question) that in some way or other, 
however indirect it may be, are testable against experience. This is the case in 
scientific knowledge, moral knowledge, and in the arts, though in the arts no 
questions are explicit and the criteria for the tests are only partially expressible in 
words.` 
It is however very debatable whether all human intellectual pursuits 
should be so regarded, including the sphere of moral education, in the 
same way as the realist claims and as Hirst writes above. Diverse types 
of argument, which deny the rationality of moral judgments, abound 
in the field of metaethics. Amongst these is the case for moral 
emotivism, for instance. The non-realist, who partly, if not entirely, 
accepts ethical emotivism, denies the possibility of objective moral 
realities and rational claims based on them. The non-realist instead 
believes that moral statements are expressions of our moral feelings 
about the world and, for this very reason, they are deemed, by the 
realist, not to be assessed by the realist standard of verification. 
According to a moral realist, like John McDowell, moral realities 
exist in the way things are in the world, independently of our 
experience of them. For him, therefore, moral realities must be 
something that can be seen or discovered by the pupil in a certain 
specific way.5 If this is the case, then the seeing would be objective, 
and thus moral statements, which are regarded by the realist as the 
descriptions of moral realities which we actually see, could be verified 
as true or false. However, it can hardly be sustained that the structure 
of moral statements meets the suppositions of moral realism, if we 
take the non-realist view which claims that moral realities are not what 
are 'really there' but what only seem to be there when we see things 
with moral notions. 
Paul H. Hirst (1965) op. cit., p. 129. (Italics mine) 
5 John McDowell (1978) Are moral requirements hypothetical imperatives?, 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 52, pp. 13-29. 
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`Seeing what is really there' presupposes something which exists 
there in the world independently from the pupil who sees it. And in 
this case, the denotation of a X-word must be an object, whatever 
realism means by 'seeing', and, only if this is so, could the realist 
safely say that he sees a certain moral reality which a X-word denotes. 
It is, nonetheless, very difficult to agree that moral realities exist in 
the way that the realist maintains, and can be 'seen' objectively by the 
pupil in the class room. However, it would be assumed that many a 
pupil would 'see' nothing else except for the factual elements which 
X-words denote, when they are given a moral statement; this is 
particularly likely for the judgment of the moral-novitiate who is at 
the initial stage of moral understanding. This is because X-words like 
`helping' and `rescuing'(a life) connote in their primary meanings 
factual or empirical properties, and the same is true for other X-
words. 
The referents of X-words are obviously observable by the pupil's 
physical seeing, because they are factual things and thereby necessitate 
observations for the final attestation of their objective existence.' 
However, if the moral realist insists that moral reality exists mind-
independently in the real world and can be discovered by perception, 
then he would become a naive realist who views moral reality as an 
immediate object of perception. And an epistemological difficulty at 
once arises immediately from this naive or common-sense realist 
position, the difficulty in discerning the moral realities, whatever they 
may be, from the whole image reflected on the pupil's retina. The 
realist observation of moral reality is based on the assumption that 
(' Man first sees the physical world; the seeing in this case is possible by 
virtue of physical laws; thus this seeing can be called 'physical seeing'. However, 
without utilising epistemological principles and apparatuses (ie concepts), man is 
helpless with physical seeing alone, because he is unable to make any distinction 
among the spinning whirl of lights and colours or the conglomeration of images of 
things around conveyed by his optical sense. Seeing with epistemological principles 
and apparatuses might be called 'conceptual seeing'. The phrase 'physical seeing' is 
very similar in its use to the physiological criterion of seeing that appears in 
Wittgenstein (1958) ibid, part ii, xi, 212e. For the initial idea of 'seeing', see J.F. 
Soltis (1966) Seeing, Knowing and Believing, ch. 5 (London: George Allen & Unwin). 
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value and fact are not to be precisely differentiated. However, it is 
logically improbable that the factual image reflected on the pupil's 
retina necessarily reflects to us at the same time the moral realities 
which the realist assumes to be there in the factual events. 
Realism bases its classification on empiricism, as Hilary Putnam 
writes correctly.' It is a theory about the external world as perceived 
by observers. Realism has been developed from naturalism and 
physicalism; thus it sees truth as correspondence between statements 
and worlds, ie. between statements and some sets of things the 
statements describe.8 Therefore, the realist conception of the truth of 
any statement basically depends on how well statements correspond 
with the things they refer to. However, the issue of truth in moral 
statements hardly fits this realist condition for truth. The difficulty 
arises mainly from the differing nature of ways of seeing; seeing 
things that are really there as physical objects or qualities is one thing 
and seeing moral realities quite another. Moral reality, if it exists, 
does not appear in the world as clearly and objectively as things 'that 
are really there'; and seeing moral realities, accordingly, does not 
requires the same conditions as seeing things 'that are really there'. It 
would, therefore, not be difficult to find that the pupil who is asked to 
`see' moral realities in an actual situation will be very much confused, 
if he endeavours to do so in accordance with the realist principle of 
epistemology. The pupil, it would not be very difficult to suppose, will 
instantly face a great difficulty in discerning any moral reality before 
he picks it out, if a realist teacher teaches his pupil a moral statement 
of the form 'X is good' and expects him to pick out the actual moral 
element from the things 'X' denotes. Things themselves tell or show us 
nothing of value; they reflect nothing of moral reality by themselves 
Hilary Putnam (1975) What is realism?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, pp. 177-94; Hilary Putnam (1978) Meaning and the Moral Sciences, p. 123 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul); Hilary Putnam (1983) Realism and Reason: 
Philosophical Papers, vol. 3 (Cambridge University Press). 
8 M. Devitt (1991) Realism de Truth, p. viii-x (Oxford: Blackwell). 
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for the pupil's eyes, even though we admit ex hypothesi that there are 
such realities as is assumed by the realist teacher. 
No correspondence theory of truth is possible in a strict sense, 
according to Blackburn. Blackburn maintains that any acceptance of 
correspondence theory results in implausible ideas. He writes thus: 
This invitation [however] may lead to bad development: to the idea of the mind's 
awareness of fact as something which, favorably, is uncontaminated by judgment, 
and purely passive; or to the idea of thoughts as pictures in the mind copying the 
world, or to the idea that each individual judgment has it own identity regardless of its 
associations with any others in a body of beliefs, and is in turn made true by one 
isolated, self-subsistent state of affairs.9 
In the sky there is no distinction of east and west; people create the 
distinctions out of their own minds and then believe them to be true. 
Just as a picture is drawn by an artist, all our civilisations and cultural 
surroundings are created by the activities of the mind. The moral 
mind is not purely passive in its nature: it creates something ideal in its 
own core; it is not a copy of the world; it rather constructs the moral 
world it enshrines. And yet the moral mind is not isolated from other 
beliefs; it is a complex product of the pursuit of the good life. If these 
statements are accepted, then, unlike the case of the correspondence 
between the statement 'Snow is white' and the colour of the snow in 
the yard, the claim that the moral statement 'X is good' points to a 
certain definite reality of goodness to which the statement 
corresponds, in the way that realism implies, would be absurd. 
Saussure, as a linguist, also does not accept the realist's 
correspondence theory of truth; he rather favours truth as a 
grammatically correct assertion in a linguistic expression.' There is a 
deep gap between realities and linguistic expressions. Thus the 
structural linguist rejects both the realist's conception of objective 
Press). 
9 Simon Blackburn (1984) Spreading the Word, p. 248 (Oxford: Clarendon 
I° Cf. The Wittgensteinian conception of language-game and certainty. 
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reality and his theory of truth. On the contrary, he conceives language 
as something which gives a special 'spectrum of reality'; for him 
language creates a distinct form of the world. Not always does 
language describe simply the world as it is; rather it creates more 
often than not something which is not really there; it creates something 
which is possible." The objects of our intellectual enquiry do not 
always and simply exist outside our conceptual schemes, nor are they 
discovered; instead, they are created, as in the cases of geometry, arts 
and ethics, in particular.'' From this argument, it follows that 
meanings of words do not always have language-independent referents 
to which meanings correspond.13 It is indeed hardly tenable that the 
function of language is description and nothing else. Language does 
much more than describing things. Therefore, if someone says that all 
utterances, including the aesthetic and the moral, are descriptive, he 
would commit a 'descriptive fallacy', to borrow a phrase from J. 
Austin. 14 
Vice and virtue may be compared to sounds, colours, heat and 
cold, as Hume states.' Values might be understood as something 
interwoven into the fabric of our experience of the world and, 
therefore, they might be observed, that is to say, as secondary 
qualities. But the observation of values is not the same thing as seeing 
what is really there, because values are not qualities in physical 
objects; they are something in the mind. Values are to be thought of as 
standards with which we evaluate things when we perceive something 
D. Lewis (1973) Counterfactuals, p. 84 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 
I2 Cf. Hilary Putnam (1982) Reason, Truth and History, p. 52 (Cambridge 
University Press). 
13 Cf. F. Saussure (1966) Course in General Linguistics, pp. 111-2 (New 
York: McGraw-Hill). 
Press). " J. Austin (1962) How to Do Things with Words, p. 3 (Harvard University 
" David Hume (1978) A Treatise of Human Nature (ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge), 
book. iii, part. i, sec. i. 
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agreeable or disagreeable. They are, it seems, modes of our assessment 
of the world and, for this reason, if we describe them as actual 
properties of the world, it would be misleading; they are not in rerum 
natura. 
Bernard Williams partly accepts the above point, as he makes a 
distinction between the world which exists independently of our 
experience and the world which seems to exist.16 In other words, 
there are two different worlds; one is the world which is really there, 
and the other is the one which only seems to be there; they are perhaps 
the two worlds denoted by Kant's terms as `noumena' and 
`phenomena'. If there are two different worlds, then there can 
certainly be two different `seeings': seeing what is really there and 
seeing what seems to be there. Once we accept the distinction between 
the two seeings, there would be no further difficulty in accepting the 
non-realist claim that moral realities are not what are really there in 
the world. 'Seeing what is really there' and 'seeing what seems to be 
there' are fundamentally different in an epistemological sense. The 
moral realist, it seems, confuses this point, and this confusion leads 
consequently to the absurd support of a correspondence theory of 
truth which is invalid in the sphere of morality. 
Different conceptions of the way of seeing things, as clarified 
above, yield different envisions of truth: one fits for seeing what is 
really there and the other for seeing what seems to be there; the 
former, contrary to the latter, bases itself exclusively on the empiricist 
view of truth and consequently relates only to enquiries about anything 
outside the world of mental and subjective explorations. Hence things 
in the case of the former can be properly and truly known through 
some fixed standard of scientific method erected on an assumed 
Archimedian point which is far out of a contact with a subjective way 
of seeing things. 
Allied exclusively to rationalism or objectivism, the realist 
conception of truth suppresses thoroughly the conventionality of our 
16 Bernard Williams (1985) op. cit. 
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way of seeing, which is developed and transmitted through a long 
history of practical transitions in how things are understood. In this 
way, the realist tries to touch only something real, objective and 
scientific, as he considers. As Gadamer points out, the imperialism of 
scientific method and its restrictions upon what counts as truth 
engender much more difficulty than any other theory of truth in the 
history of epistemology." Therefore, it could hardly be maintained 
that the natural sciences are the sole mode of acquiring true knowledge 
and the universally applicable model of intellectual exploration.' 
Scientific imperialism is seriously defective through overlooking other 
types of human enquiry which accommodate human intellectual 
uncertainty, in their methodology and therefore surpass exclusively 
confined rationality. The realist conception of truth seriously confines 
itself only to the correspondence between descriptions and objects to 
which the descriptions refer and to the way of seeing what is 'really' 
there, at the cost of ignoring other conceptions of truth in relation to 
seeing what seems to be there. 
4.2 Ineffability and vagueness of moral notions 
Tools in a carpenter's tool-box differ in their shape and colour, in 
their weight and size, and in their use in particular. Every tool in a 
tool box has perhaps been made for a particular purpose of use. But an 
instrument held in a masterly carpenter's hand is not used for only one 
fixed specific purpose of manipulation. Likewise, there are many 
relative meanings in the use of a word, just as many different uses 
exist for a tool in a carpenter's hand; the realist misses this crucial 
point about language. The multiplicity of the use of words appears in 
their practice in many language-games, as we usually experience in the 
1 7 H. -G. Gadamer (1975) Truth and Method (London: Sheed & Ward). 
1 8 This part owes much to R. Usher and R. Edwards (1994) Postmodernism 
and Education: Different 'Voices, Different Worlds, ch. 2 (London: Routledge). 
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use of ordinary language and also even in specific theoretical 
discourses.' 'Seeing' and 'objects of seeing' are not used solely in an 
invariable sense. They have a wide range of applications, especially 
when they are used for different contexts and specific purposes. 
Differentiation of the meanings of 'seeing' entirely depends on the 
nature of the different objects of seeing. Certain objects are factual, as 
in the case of observations in the enquiries of some natural sciences, 
and certain other objects are purely conceptual or 'notional', such as 
those considered in this text. The seeing of factual objects is exactly 
equivalent to the seeing 'what is really there'; the objects of seeing in 
this case are mind-independent or external to the mind, like a teapot 
and a toboggan. In this respect, if a pupil really knows what a 
toboggan is, he would then have an idea or a picture of a toboggan in 
his mind. In this case, the picture might be very clear and simple in its 
perspicuity and, a fortiori, he could draw a picture of toboggan 
clearly on a piece of paper and it would be equivalent to the image 
which is reflected in his mind. 
However, conceptual seeing, in its logical sense, can take place 
without such factual objects as are mentioned above. Having made a 
thorough investigation of his life and epistemic ideal, Plato, it seems, 
devoted himself to helping his students to see those objects of seeing, 
which exist independently of physical eyes. In a geometrical enquiry, 
lines, points and circles do not necessarily require to be drawn on a 
piece of paper, though they are useful, as often as not, for the students 
who are at a lower level of geometry. A triangle on a paper is not 
exactly how it is defined in terms of geometry. In a logical sense, a 
defined triangle does not exist there in the real world, unlike the way a 
toboggan exists; infinity, a number which is conceptualised as 
unlimited, boundless and endless in quantity, does not have any 
19 See Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) Philosophical Investigation, section 23 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell), where Wittgenstein writes about the multiplicity of 
language-games; `... giving orders, and obeying them - describing the appearance of 
an object, or giving its measurements - constructing an object from a description (a 
drawing) - reporting an event - speculating about an event ...' 
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extension, so it is properly expressed by the symbol 'co' in a limited 
extension on a piece of paper; it exists in our mind; it is conceptual in 
its essential sense.2° Geometricians see for instance a concept which is 
defined as a 'plane polygon having three straight sides'. 
Seeing things through moral notions is not quite different, at least 
in its basic mode, from conceptual seeing, just because both do not 
have any fixed factual objects of seeing; notional seeing is, in this 
sense, on a par with conceptual seeing. However, one critical point to 
be made here is that, unlike such objects of conceptual seeing as 
`triangle' or 'infinity' (of number), those of notional seeing do not 
always have any succinctly definable elements. 'Benevolence', for 
example, does not have any clearly defined conceptual element; the 
same is true for the case of 'reverence for life'. Thus, use of the 
pronouns 'this' and 'that' in both statements, 'This is reverence for 
life' and 'That is what benevolence denotes' would be very 
improbable. In contrast to the case of 'triangle', the denotations of 
20 Mathematical knowledge originates, as we understand it, from the practical 
activities of Egyptians, Babylonians and Chinese. However, much developed 
mathematics in a later period was no longer tied to practical activities; it was only 
occasionally that mathematicians were concerned with the physical properties of real 
things, though in applied mathematics this is nowadays not the case. As a matter of 
fact, a very limited study of our mathematical understanding is possible through 
observations and manipulations of ordinary things, as we see in the results of 
Piaget's experimental research on the development of children's mathematical 
concepts. But rods and beads in childhood mathematics are simply the classroom 
children's mathematical toys, and these must be abandoned later as their mathematical 
thinking is more developed. Several millennia ago, mathematical knowledge was 
rudimentary and from this humble beginning it has evolved and changed in its form 
into the present impressive corpus of highly abstract knowledge. Thus, referents of 
mathematical words at an advanced level no longer remain as perceptual items like the 
rods and beads what may be useful in the mathematical learning at its lowest level, for 
instance, at the level of concrete operations in Piajet's theory of cognitive 
development. Cf. G. Frege (1971) On the Foundations of Geometry and Formal izeories 
of Arithmetic (ed. and trans. E.H.W. Kluge) (Yale University Press) and P. Kitcher 
(1984) the Nature of Mathematical Knowlei* (Oxford University Press). Both works 
will be a great help to understanding historically the origin and transitions of 
mathematical knowledge. However, the two authors take quite different lines on the 
exploration of the nature of mathematical knowledge; Frege defends the apriorist 
thesis of mathematical knowledge, but on the contrary Kitcher rejects apriorism and 
thereby holds mathematical empiricism. 
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these demonstrative pronouns are too hazy to see in terms of 
conceptual sense. A fortiori, notional seeing can take place even when 
there exists something which is very little or not at all to do with the 
concept of a notional term. For example, it would be indeed very 
striking to apprehend that one sees 'sufferings of others' through the 
moral notion `benevolence'; 'sufferings of others' are not the 
conceptual referents of benevolence, nor are they meanings of the 
term at all. Nonetheless, one sees such things through moral notions. 
Notional seeing goes far beyond the scope of conceptual seeing; it has 
some objects other than the conceptual elements, compared to the case 
of conceptual seeing which has no other objects than conceptual 
elements themselves. Thus, if one recognises this fundamental 
characteristic of notional seeing, one would therefore notice that it is 
very absurd in an epistemological sense to ask such questions as 'What 
is the referent of benevolence?' and furthermore 'What is there in the 
real world, to which the statement - This is benevolence or That is 
reverence for life - corresponds?'; 'What are the things the 
demonstrative pronouns - this and that - denote?' Notional seeing does 
not have any 'evidence-independent' referent, nor does it have more 
often than not any defined concepts. Seeing things through moral 
notions is beyond the factual and very often the conceptual scopes of 
observation. 
Such being the case, it would be logically impossible to draw a 
picture of 'benevolence' or of 'reverence for life', for instance. 
Nevertheless, one could try to draw a picture of benevolence in an 
imaginary way, like a cartoon which shows how 'a man collects money 
for the lonely people' or 'a boy helps one's handicapped friend 
walking on the rough ground'. This imaginary expression may be 
related in one way or another to some meaning of benevolence, but it 
could not be said that what the cartoon of benevolence expresses is 
isomorphic to 'benevolence' in all its contexts. There is certainly an 
aspectual difference between them, ie. between the picture of 
benevolence drawn by the pupil and the meaning of 'benevolence' per 
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se. The imaginary expression of 'benevolence' is distinctive from the 
conceptual manifestation of 'triangle'. It is essentially a matter of 
linking some sort of impression to certain actual and possible 
perceptions of things, like the sufferings of others or seeing a child 
drowning in a river.`` The image of benevolence is not conceptual, 
since the definiens of the term 'benevolence', if there is any, cannot be 
stated completely with words so as to be unequivocal and clear-cut in 
its meaning, though Mencius roughly defines it as 'the feeling of 
commiseration'.`' It is therefore far from the requirement of 
sharpness which we have for a realist picture, and also far from the 
mathematician's clarity of definition; the man who has a moral mind 
`sees' sufferings of others' through the notion of benevolence. 
`There is a quality of life', as writes A.N. Whitehead, 'which lies 
always beyond the fact of life'.23 This quality is embedded in the way 
of living; it is often as not hidden deeply beneath the descriptive level 
of living; hence invisible. Yet, the quality of life is meaningful; it is 
`spun' by us in a specific way. Goodness in life is a 'non-natural 
quality', as G.E. Moore writes, and thus it neither exists in a particular 
time period nor in a terrestrial part of the world, nor presents itself to 
be perceived by our sensory experience. Goodness is a notional quality 
and therefore 'mystical' to the extent that the word functions without 
any definite factual reference. This notional world might be 
comparable to Lao-Tzu's metaphysical interpretation of Tao (way or 
main principle) in his Tao 're Ching, where he writes; it is something `... 
you look at, but cannot see, ... you listen to, but cannot hear, ... you 
try to grasp, but cannot get hold of, -924 In this phrase, the main 
principle which seems to lie beneath every phenomenon, either natural 
21 Simon Blackburn (1984) op. cit., p. 234 (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
22 J. Legge (1960) The Chinese Classics, book. ii, ch. 6, p. 202 (Hong Kong 
University Press). 
23 A.N. Whitehead (1926) Religion in the Mating, p. 80 (Cambridge 
University Press). 
24 • 0  Tzu, Tao Te Ching, ch. 14. 
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or non-natural, is vastly remote from our power of physical 
perception. In Lao-Tzu's metaphysics, the main principle is something 
that cannot be either denominated or illustrated by words; it is 
nevertheless something, according to his metaphysical illustration, 
which must be there in the world in which we live and 'which cannot 
be said', thus mystical to some extent; there are, it seems, order and 
complexity which express it, but what transcends the limit of our 
lingual expressions. 
The world of moral notions might be compared, in an analogical 
sense, to the 'bland dark stuff' of the universe; it is ineffable and 
inarticulate. The meaning of the phrase 'respect for persons' as an 
expression of a part of the notional world is 'complex, controversial 
and in crucial ways confused', as Michael Katz has shown in his paper 
`Respect for Person and Students: charting some ethical territory'.25 
The notional world does not, accordingly, appear explicitly on the 
`surface' of the mind or, in a more extreme way, in the factual or 
sensual world. It is rather mingled into practice, which is extremely 
complex, featureless and imprecise. Thus, if we try to give any name 
for the notions we have in mind, most parts of them become lost in 
language; such notions are beyond 'what can be said', hence practical 
rather than theoretical. The nature of moral notions in this sense 
almost agrees with J. White's conception of 'basic values' which are 
interpreted as 'deeply embedded features of our common life without 
which that life would be inconceivable'.2°  
The imprecision and vagueness of the words for moral notions are 
25 See Philosophy of Education 1991 (Proceedings of the forty-seven annual 
meeting of the American Philosphy of Education Society), pp. 185-95 . 
''' John White (1990) Education and the good Life, pp. 118-9 (London: Kogan 
Page), where he continues; 'Attachment to one's friends is one such value. If you 
asked me why friendship is a good thing, I would not know how to reply. I could not 
point you to any more fundamental value on which it rests; and neither would I want 
to say that the value of friendship has an existence of its own in some Platonic world 
of values ...they provide the framework for our common life. We have indeed created 
them and refashioned them - on a long time-scale, of course - so as to make this life 
less vulnerable and uncomfortable, and to enable us the better to flourish.' 
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determined in principle not by the nature of the words themselves, but 
rather by the characters of notional qualities per se. What is more, 
moral notions reside in human function, and so they seem to be for 
man, as Aristotle postulates.'' They are therefore very difficult to 
describe; moral language fails more often than not to reveal this 
dimension. Though there are some words in moral dialogue, like 
`reverence' (for life), 'benevolence', (human) 'dignity' and most likely 
`goodness', these are not words whose meanings are clearly disclosed 
or efficiently revealed; they do not 'speak for themselves', as it were. 
Many moral notions can hardly be articulated, either in words or 
images, very similar to the values which are ineffable and far from 
having clear-cut meanings, even though there are some value-words 
which are articulated to some extent; however, they are, in a strict 
sense, 'what cannot be said'. Human self-knowledge also necessarily 
belongs to this particular case.28 
Not altogether differing from the way that teachers are unable to 
give a well articulated lingual and propositional account of their work 
in education, the practical dimension of moral life eludes the network 
of language as publicly used. This is mainly because moral notions are 
elusive in their nature and laid down in depths beneath our compound 
moral practices. For this reason, moral notions are often excluded 
from the category of knowledge, as some philosophers refuse to accept 
them in the field of knowledge. However, it would be premature to 
conceive that moral notions are purely emotional, as is claimed by the 
logical positivist or the ethical emotivist, and therefore meaningless 
altogether, and that they are disordered and outside the cognitive 
world. Though a large part of the notional mind seems to be too dark 
and delicate to distinguish and mould, it must be granted that the 
notional mind still effectively guides our thinking and imagination 
27 Aristotle (1915a) Ethica Nkomachea (trans. D. Ross), 1097b (Oxford 
University Press). 
28 See also, D.W. Hamlyn (1977) Self knowledge, in T. Mischell (ed.) The 
Self, pp. 170-89 (Oxford: Blackwell). 
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when they deal with morality at its deepest level. Man inclines to 
express one's notional mind in various ways - facial or emotional 
expressions, positive or negative behavioural responses, and multiplex 
ways of life shown in certain specific mores - even if they are usually 
unsatisfactory. In fact, the notional mind in its very nature drives to 
tell us something and to reveal something which is quite beyond what 
can be said. In its context, it would be better to accept this notional 
expression as a special kind of language. 
Notional language tells us 'what cannot be said' in a particular way, 
contrary to the language of fact which is the oppositional pair of 
notional language and tells us 'what can be said'. The majority of 
moral notions would be rather characterised by something that is 
`tacit' or `prearticulate' or 'ineffable', to borrow Michael Polanyi's 
terms again.29 Knowing and expressing something, as Polanyi writes, 
`operate widely without causing us to utter any explicit statements', 
and even when they do issue in an utterance this is used merely as an 
instrument for enlarging the range of tacit powers that organise it.3°  
`Benevolence' may be used for expressing a certain position of our 
moral notions, but even in that case the word cannot depict precisely 
something one intends to express which is embedded in the depth of 
one's mind. In principle one cannot say 'what cannot be said'; a 
fortiori, one cannot say exactly even 'what can be said'; language 
disfigures and very often misrepresents life. Differing from language 
of fact, notional language mainly concerns the amorphous quality of 
the mind and therefore it has no definite or bounded meaning. The 
quality of life eludes the descriptive power of language; hence the 
vagueness or looseness of language, as found especially in notional 
language, is a distinctive aspect for a particular form of expression; 
M. Black is clearly aware of this remarkable point.31 Articulation in 
Press). 
'9 Michael Polanyi (1962) op. cit., ch. 5 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
Michael Polanyi (1958) The Study of Man, p. 27 (University of Chicago 
31 M. Black (1962) The Importance of Language (Englewood Cliff, N.J.). 
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any sense pictures essential constituents of life, but only in some 
reduced scale; therefore, it lends itself more easily to the work of the 
imaginative manifestation of life. This is important particularly for the 
manifestations of moral life which are in essence delicately constituted 
by tacit components. 
The articulation of substantial commitments of 'benevolence' must 
be very vague, broad and far reaching. According to Mencius, 'all 
men have a mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of other 
persons (in some cases, all other living beings, including plants) ... 
From this case we may perceive that the feeling of sympathy is 
essential to man ...'32 In his work, Mencius articulates this mind, 
which is essential to man, as 'benevolence', as introduced earlier. 
However, the remaining task is to make clear what the term 
`benevolence' means; 'benevolence' may literally mean the 'wish to do 
good or activity in doing good'. But this makeshift definition touches 
only the surface of such a notional quality of human mind, not its 
bottom; thus it lays on us a still further heavy and improbable onus of 
definition of the meaning of 'doing good'; such a requirement leads 
naturally to the problem of vicious infinite regress. The mind which is 
denoted with the term 'benevolence' is too meager to be articulated 
more exactly. Mental qualities are far from reaching the requirement 
of legitimate articulation, because they are indefinite and boundless in 
their nature; they are shifting, elusive and polymorphous; hence they 
defy analysis. 
4.3 Beneath the phenomena: the dimension of 
moral notions 
Moral notions are amorphous. This conception of the nature of moral 
notions necessarily rejects the modernist view of moral education, in 
which a rigorous rationality in all moral conversations is 
'2 J. Legge (1960) op. cit. (Italics mine) 
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inappropriately sought. For this reason, the conception agrees partly 
with ethical emotivism. However, the authentic idea of 'moral 
notions', developed thus far, is not tantamount to that of the ethical 
emotivist, because the idea does not altogether deny the possibility of 
public agreement on moral judgments based on moral notions and 
consequently does not entirely exclude the possibility of cognitive 
morality. This point will be made here more distinctly, establishing a 
non-realistic point of view which stands clear from modern 
rationalism and the realistic way of understanding things, but still 
resists getting lost in the cosmic spectrum of skepticism. 
Different modes of discourse yield different ways of justification. 
To demand the same criteria of justification for all logically different 
intellectual discourses is therefore to commit a justificatory mistake by 
ignoring the different modes of discourse. Some set their justificatory 
standards of truth to the rationalist or the realist tenets. Not every 
discourse can be justified in a rationalist or realistic way. Defined so 
narrowly, the rationalist stance of justification does not reach the 
point. Paul Feyerabend's conception of incommensurability tells the 
weakness of rationalism and realism.33 Marking the vital points 
involved in competing scientific theories reveals that they share no 
general standards of choice which scientists could appeal to when they 
adopt or work on one theory rather than another. Therefore, we are 
led necessarily to face the subjective aspect of enquiry. Choice among 
competing scientific theories cannot be determined by logically 
compelling arguments. Different scientists may make different choices 
in responding to the same situation. 
The rejection of objectivity in natural sciences extends into the 
spheres of social sciences and also of ethics. No overarching cultural 
standards and social norms can be guaranteed as bases for 
comparisons; nor does any objective, fixed methodological principle 
33 Paul Feyerabend (1975) Against Method Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of 
Knowkt* (London: New Left Books); Paul Feyerabend (1978) Science in a Free 
Society (London: Verso). 
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exist on which we can rely as we make a judgment of superiority. 
Peter Winch and Roger Trigg both advocate this incommensurability 
between those things conceived by the different languages used in 
different societies. Winch's case for conventionalism and 
incommensurability in social sciences, mainly based on different 
linguistic analyses, suggests that there is no touchstone with which 
objective comparison can be made across different cultural and 
linguistic forms of life. Denying Lakatos's claim for the superiority of 
science, which defines in a positive way the relationship between 
science and other forms of knowledge, Feyerabend also constructs his 
own idea of the incommensurability between forms of knowledge, at 
least with an implication that there cannot be a decisive claim in 
favour of science over other forms of knowledge.34 Things can be 
seen in different ways in accordance with different cultural contexts, 
ie. with different uses of language in different societies. 
Moral notions are too vague to be scientific ideas and too esoteric 
to be objective, like the 'imagos' which are somewhat inchoate 
`pictures' or not fully formed understandings of idealisations.35  
Commensurability in the time of Aristotle was taken as a hallmark of 
truly scientific arguments. Nonetheless, Aristotle's view of TpovicyLg, 
it seems, at first opened a new vista for practical deliberations, each of 
which has a unique form of discourse. He writes thus; 
... There will be many philosophic wisdoms; there will not be one concerned with the 
good of all animals (any more than there is one art of medicine for all existing things), 
34 See Peter Winch (1958) The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to 
Philosophy, p. 15 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul); Peter Winch (1970) 
Understanding a primitive society; in B.R. Wilson (ed.) Rationality (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell); Roger Trigg (1973) Reason and Commitment, pp. 9-10 (Cambridge 
University Press); For Lakatos's position, see I. Lakatos (1971) History of science 
and its rational reconstructions, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 8 
(Dordrecht: Reidel); Paul Feyerabend (1975) op. cit., p. 253. 
3' R. Wallace (1994) Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, 2.4 (Harvard 
University Press); T. Williamson (1996) Vagueness (London: Routledge). 
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but a different philosophic wisdom about the good of each species.' 
Practical deliberation about morals is not like scientific understanding, 
because it is in many cases anthropocentric. Deliberations about 
practical matters and also the words for them, at least in terms of 
Aristotle's ethics, are indeterminate, imprecise and indefinite, not 
because they are not adequate, but because of their necessary 
features.37 Every statement concerning matters of practice ought to 
be made in outline and not with precision; so Aristotle writes.38 
Human understanding of practical matters is very different from that 
of theoretical matters which has to satisfy the scientific way of 
enquiry. This is not because ethics has not yet reached the level of an 
authorised discipline, but because it is not in its nature a study which 
must satisfy scientific rigour. For this very reason, contrary to Plato's 
approach, Aristotle emphasises repeatedly the point that the goal of 
ethical discourse is not purely to reach theoretical conclusions, but to 
attain some practical effects. 
Aristotle attacks Plato's conception of goodness, which has recently 
been explained by Martha Nussbaum as something which lacks any 
`fragility'39. Contrary to the singleness of the Platonic conception of 
the form of the Good, Aristotle's 'good' is used in the categories of 
substance, quality and relation, and, among these categories, substance 
is prior in nature to the rest; therefore, there could not be a common 
Idea set over all these goods.' 'Goodness', in Aristotle's terminology, 
'Aristotle (1915a) op. cit., 1141 a31-2. 
37 /bid., 1137b17-19. 
38 /bid, 1103b34-1104a10. 
Martha Nussbaum compares Plato and Aristotle's conceptions of 
`goodness'; thus, she interprets the 'goodness' in Plato's theory as having no 
`fragility' and that in Aristotelian ethics as having 'fragility'. For this, see Martha 
Nussbaum (1986) The Fragility of Goodness, parts ii & iii (Cambridge University 
Press). 
'Aristotle (1915a), op. cit., 1095a16-22. 
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cannot be something universally present in all cases of substantial 
goods. Rejecting thus Plato's unified scheme of ethics, 'Aristotle 
argues that the values that are constitutive of a good human life are 
plural and incommensurable', according to Martha Nussbaum.' 
Aristotle gives us as an example the plurality of pleasure. Pleasures 
are distinct one from another, without having any commensurability; 
they are different kinds of excellent activity;42 they differ in kind, as 
the associated activities differ.43 Some of them are worthy of choice 
and some others are not; some are better and some others worse; some 
of them are pleasant only to corrupt people, while some others are 
pleasant to good people.' 'Pleasure' can be used for many different 
purposes. 
However, from the claim of the ineffability, vagueness and 
incommensurability of moral notions, a pessimistic view of inevitable 
disagreement in moral discourses does not necessarily follow; nor the 
view that seeing things through moral notions is altogether 
meaningless and helplessly esoteric. Even though the nature of moral 
notions enriches and evokes the vagueness of meanings in our moral 
discourses, it seems that there is a corresponding variation in a tacit 
coefficient of meaning and consequently a possible strength in 
expressing the complexities of moral notions and experiences. In order 
to express the 'rough ground' of our moral notions, language must be 
less precise in its conceptual circumscription. With a language which 
was all made up of precisely encompassing descriptions, expressions of 
our moral notions would not be possible. As it turns out, language, of 
any kind, fails to picture the moral notions which are deeply hidden in 
a culture; culture does not easily allow linguistic or conceptual 
delineation. Life is too fresh and complicated to manifest itself within 
4' Martha Nussbaum, op. cit., p. 294. 
42 Aristotle (1915a), op. cit., 1153b9-12. 
43 ibid., 1173b28ff. 
44 /6id, 1173b20ff. 
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the horizon of lingual expression. Notional quality of 'life' might be 
the most significant one, but it is something which has not yet been 
touched; there is indeed the 'inexpressible', to borrow Wittgenstein's 
term .45  
As the above proves, moral notions are too vague to be articulated 
clearly, to have self-contained meanings and to be contents for 
substantial communication. Such an account of the nature of moral 
notions avoids most distinctively the optimistic but very limited view 
of human enquiry which is favoured by the modern scientist and the 
rationalist, both of whom are over confident in the extreme view that 
language is meaningful when and only when it is used for 'what can be 
said', as is asserted in Wittgenstein's early thought.46 However, 
language does not necessarily mirror the world, simply because there 
is a `mirrorless world', such as is seen through the eyes of the anti-
realist, for instance, Richard Rorty.47 Not all parts of the mind reflect 
themselves on the 'mirror' of reality. 
Moral notions very often represent themselves through habitual 
ways of acting and doing things; they are the motives of such actions. 
To adopt Iris Murdoch's phrases, moral notions are understood by 
some 'modes of vision' or 'qualities of consciousness'.48 For this 
reason, moral notions must be in their own right and therefore 
accounted as in their logic, unable to be reduced to the simple 
reflections of naive emotions or of something like simple aspirations. 
Beyond mere desires or aspirations, these modes and qualities of the 
notional mind seem to be determined in the experience of culture and 
these, in a reverse way, constitute the traditions of society. And these 
notional qualities pervade all the environment of forms of life. 
45 Ludwig Wittgenstein(1951) Tractatus Logico-Phdosophicus, 6.52, 6.522 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
46 /bid, 6.53. 
47 Richard Roty(1979) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 360 (Princeton 
University Press). 
48 Iris Murdoch (1991) The Sovereignty of Good, p. 91 (London: Routledge). 
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However, in many cases, emotions accompany expressions of 
moral notions and are accompanied by morally relevant behaviours; 
when one has the mind of 'benevolence', it causes simultaneously 
certain modes of moral behaviour. Emotions and other affective states 
in some cases contain and reveal value and valuations, and then are 
related in one way or another to moral notions, though in other cases 
they are not.49 Desiring company might mean something like seeking 
emotional comfort and, for this reason, it cannot be clearly 
distinguished from the mind of 'fraternity' which involves some kind 
of moral sentiment. 'Fraternity' goes with 'love% they essentially 
involve emotions such as care, concern, interest, and sympathy; these 
emotions are morally significant in that they are embodied in our 
caring about promoting each other's good life; some range of human 
emotions share moral notions.50 The majority of the sentiments of 
desire for good company share some morally significant notions of 
humanity, though these sentiments do not necessarily appear as an 
articulated form of communication.51 Deeply seated in human nature 
and in our social traditions alike, such sentiments are rooted far 
beyond the intellectual and rational touch of our routine social life. 
They cut much deeper than scientific delineations of things. 
The grandeur of human sentiments offers richness of moral 
imagination, ie. notional resources of morality. In this fact, such 
sentiments are to be thought of as having much to do with moral 
notions. These sentiments seem to transmit to actual social life through 
the vehicles of shared experiences and various ways of communal life, 
49 In recent times the majority of philosophers in the fields of philosophy of 
mind and philosophical psychology have held that emotions are important for ethical 
knowledge and values are constituted by emotions. Emotions and values are closely 
intertwined, according to these philosophers. See, M. Stocker (1996) How emotions 
reveal value, in M. Stocker and E. Hegeman 'Valuing Emotions (Cambridge University 
Press). 
5° J. Oakley (1992) Morality and the Emotions, pp. 57-8 (London: Routledge). 
51 Cf. Michael Polanyi (1983) Personal Knowledge, ch. 7 (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul). 
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particularly through sharing vocabularies which are accompanied by 
morally significant additional meanings.52 Including even assenting or 
dissenting facial expressions and ejaculations of 'boo-hurrah' feelings, 
multifarious ways of conversation, taking place in our traditions, are 
all constituents of the realms of meaningful life. The authentic form of 
conversation, it seems, takes place significantly with such moral 
sentiments which might be accounted properly as the extension of 
moral notions. Insofar as this specifically extended form of 
conversation proceeds well in our traditions without confronting any 
impairing breach, there must be a certain degree of public agreement. 
What is more, such a claim of agreement should legitimately be 
accepted in the way that traditions have shifted through the normal 
process of cultural transition and are based on deep and 'rough 
ground' commonly shared by the people in any society. 
The conception of 'deep and rough ground of traditions' fit better 
the nature of notional language, to return to the coined word, rather 
than that of the language of fact whose meanings float without root in 
many ways in accordance with the indefinitely large disjunctive sets of 
attitudinal perspectives on the things referred to by the language and 
where therefore no common agreement could be found. For instance, 
`murdering' as a X-word carries in itself ambivalence, because it 
helplessly allows many different perspectives for people who have 
differing attitudes to the event the word denotes. However, if one pays 
serious attention, not to the purposes of the act, but to the misery of 
the killing of a human being, then one would feel a very strong 
sentiment of sympathy for the victim, a sentiment which is possessed 
by all people whether they see the event in view of religion or of 
politics. The surface or lexical meaning of 'murder' falls too short of 
touching the underlying ground of the meaning - the feeling of 
52 In this perspective, the claim is distinct from Oakeshott's stance which 
excludes, in the domain of 'rational conduct', experiences that are embedded in a 
traditional mode of conduct. Such experiences are not 'rational', according to 
Oakeshott. See Michael Oakeshott (1962) Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, pp. 
84-5 (London: Methuen). 
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`commiserations', to borrow again Mencius's term.53 In the same way, 
two medical doctors' different ways of speaking about one and the 
same thing - one tells the truth about the diagnosis of a patient's fatal 
illness and the other does not tell the truth about the result of diagnosis 
- are different in their meanings and have no parallel at all between 
them on the surface level. However, the case becomes different, if one 
tries to see what they say from the underlying motive in both human 
minds, for instance, `commiseration'; the two doctor's words are not 
contrary in their deep meaning. Having a limited grammar, a X-word 
fails to refer to all our minds , as art disfigures life. The grammar of 
language of fact, in this account of it, is inappropriate for the 
underlying meanings of the practical expressions of human life. Per 
contra, notional language tells us something which is authentic and it 
far surpasses the grammatical limitations and various forms of 
representations of things, though sometimes this happens in a form of 
paradox. However. this does not necessarily mean that notional 
language destroys grammar. 
The fragility of referents is the character of words. Complexity 
and diversity of meaning necessarily arise in the use of language of 
fact: nonetheless. beneath the diversity of the language, as is indicated 
above, are appropriate grounds of ethical goodness that are internal to 
the traditions and practices of our social life; this is so, even though 
the plurality of moral norms has been sustained by some philosophers 
like Alasdair Maclntyre, Bernard Williams, and Philippa Foot; these 
philosophers place much reliance on specific modes of virtues or 
moral norms that are local both in origin and in application, as 
Nussbaum mentions with concern.' Such moral philosophers seem to 
read only the meaning that language of fact carries; therefore they 
54 Cf. J. Legge (1960) op. cit. 
Martha Nussbaum (1993) Non-relative virtues: an Aristotlelean approach, 
in Martha Nussbaum & et al. The Qualities of Life, p. 243 (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
For the conception of the rationality that is constituted by traditions, see Alasdair 
Maclntyre (1981) After Virtue, ch. 17 (London: Duckworth): Alasdair Maclntyre 
(1988) Whose justice? Which Rationality?, XVIII (London: Duckworth). 
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appear to be missing something underlying; hence come 'different 
voices and different worlds'. 
However, moral conversations, if we read the grammar of notional 
language, do not drift inertly on the waves of the projections of 
individual or local interests and of shifting traditional tides. By 
contrast, moral discussion always seeks in depth the common grounds 
shared by seemingly different moral outlooks. Such enquiry for 
`moral depth' appears in Aristotle, though he does not use the same 
language as is adopted here. 
`There is no one thing', in Aristotle's discussion of the nature of 
pleasure', that is always pleasant, because our nature is not simple but 
there is another element in us as well'.55 There may be many kinds of 
pleasure and no commensurability between them. The joie de vivre of 
a man is not always to do with goodness; it is very often ungood; it is a 
natural endowment, a gift of nature. Aristotle, however, seeks 
continuously the goodness of pleasure, and at the end of the discussion 
he concludes that God always enjoys a single and simple pleasure, not 
its multiplicity or mutability.' 'This account', according to 
Nussbaum, 'is supposed to be objective in the sense that it is justifiable 
by reference to reasons that do not derive merely from local traditions 
and practices, but rather from features of humanness that lie beneath 
all local traditions and are there to be seen whether or not they are in 
fact recognised in local traditions' S7 One of the Aristotle's most 
obvious concerns, it is worth noticing, is his criticism of local moral 
traditions. Through this criticism he reached point of showing that 
something actually exists, which is most agreeable to our sense of 
goodness. There seems to be a large degree of agreement between 
local traditions, as is said by Aristotle in his Politics; 'as a general rule 
55 Aristotle (1915a), op. cit., 1154b20. 
56 	 1154b26. 
57 Martha Nussbaum, op. cit. (Italics mine) 
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it is not what is ancient but what is good that the world wants'.58 
Even though there are many differing, competing and incompatible 
virtues which are 'what can be said', they have, it seems, in Aristotle's 
theory of ethics, some commonality as a result of which different 
people may have common notions of morality. 'One may also 
observe', writes Aristotle, 'in one's travels to distant countries the 
feelings of recognition and affiliation that link every human being to 
every other human being'.59 Such feelings that fasten human concerns 
together might constitute significant moral notions which are essential 
to all human beings, though they are amorphous in their features. 
Thus, as one encounters a human being's misery, one would share 
some sense of this archetypal notion, across different cultural 
traditions, like the feeling of commiseration or the sense of 
humanness. Insofar as these notions are essential to all human beings, 
they could not be accounted for as something which has nothing to do 
absolutely with the objectivity of the mind, though this objectivity of 
the mind could not receive the realist attestation of finality. 
"Aristotle (1883) The Parities of Aristotle (trans. J. Welldon), book ii, ch. viii 
(London: MacMillan) (Italics mine); E. Barker's version of the statement is: 'all men, 
as a rule, seek to follow, not the line of tradition, but some idea of the good'. 
59Aristotle (1915a), op. cit., 1155a21-2. 
Part II 
Knowing, Doing and Moral Education 
Prologue of Part II 
Knowing, Doing and Moral Education 
Clarifications of 'moral knowing' have to be prior to the discussions of moral 
education in general. For the development of moral mind, it is logically required 
that the nature of moral knowing should be identified in advance. However, 
different views on the constituents of the moral mind abound in the theories of 
moral education and therefore different characterisations of the nature of moral 
knowing. Moral knowing seems to place itself specifically between the theoretical 
and the practical in types of knowledge and is defined in this respect, amongst 
others, by moral notions which are, in their character, quite beyond both the limit 
of descriptivism and the rigidity of rational reasoning. In this consideration 
dualism in moral education — the spurious assumption of two moralities and two 
aims in one education which is prevalent in modern theories of moral education —
would no longer stand on the newly established concept of moral knowing. Moral 
knowing reformulated thus leads the way to the moral internalism as an 
interpretation of behavioural motivation, apart from being helplessly reliant on 
behaviour externalism which attracts the dualism. The concept of moral notions 
comprises broadly all components of both moral knowing and doing and integrates 
them in a logical sense; hence not two moralities, nor two aims of moral education 
can be postulated in moral education. However, it is not likely that morality 
prepares its own place on the rationalist conception of curriculum inherited from 
Socratic dialectics proper. It seems instead more probable that moralities keep 
their seats beneath all arts and sciences subjects, and under the whole milieu of 
school life. At the roots of all arts and sciences subjects, it seems, lies the 
vagueness of moral values and traditions centred on the notion of humanity 
culturally transmitted and evolved in the process of human history. On these 
`rough grounds' root possibly the competed and agreed notions of morals. The 
development of moral notions in education depends largely upon the way of 
perceiving such grounds through cultural experiences the school curriculum 
prepares. 
Chapter 5 
Moral Knowing in Education: 
a distinctive character of the mind 
Since the publication of Maclntyre's After Virtue and Williams's Ethics 
and the Limits of Philosophy, amongst other works, philosophers of morals 
have paid great attention to the nature of moral knowing and offered a 
variety of renewed discussions of the theme.' In fact, this same theme 
has almost always been taken as the most central concern of ethics, 
particularly since Socrates's dialectic enquiry about moral problems 
emerged and a specific conception of 'knowing' with regard to leading 
a 'good life' began to form and develop. The meaning of moral 
knowing implied in Socrates's dialectic seems indeed hardly to be on 
the same plane as that of his contemporaries, including the Sophists; 
this is so even with Aristotle's arguments about the matter. Traces of 
many more stages in the conceptual evolution of 'moral knowing' are 
readily seen in the history of Greek ethics which includes particularly 
For most people the use of the phrase 'moral knowledge' or 'moral 
knowing' may seem to be invalid. They use 'knowledge' or 'knowing' in a narrow 
sense, referring only to what is known, a range of information, a body of known 
facts or skills. Nonetheless, in this work, I shall use the phrase, not because it is 
ideal, but because it should also be used in a rather broader sense in all educational 
perspectives to embrace more fully the impalpable notions of morality on which our 
practical moral lives are based. In fact, the term 'knowledge' is used ordinarily to 
refer to various types of complex situations in which a person is acquainted with, has 
personal experience of, is aware of, understands, perceives, or is versed in or skilled 
in things, states or processes. 
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the Sophists' and the Aristotelian ethics. In the classical Greek period 
and since then, the conception of 'moral knowing' has evolved in 
accordance with the growing tendency which sees ethics as a discipline 
based on knowledge; and this disciplinary conception of moral 
knowing has spread widely into the domains of moral philosophy and 
moral education. 
However, the problem which ensued in education is that the 
discipline-based view of ethics fragments the conception of a moral 
mind and as a result loses a crucially important primary meaning of 
`moral knowing'. The moral mind which is to be fostered in education 
should be characterised by not exclusively relying on the disciplinary 
conception of moral knowing, but essentially by a conception of moral 
knowing which accommodates the whole spectrum of the pupil's 
growing moral awareness in the whole context of his life. The discipline-
based view of the nature of moral knowing is not suitable at all for the 
education of the pupil's moral development. The use of 'moral 
knowing' in ethics is not always on a par with its use in education. 
Criticising the discipline-based moral curriculum and re-establishing 
especially an educational view of moral knowing, this chapter will 
therefore illustrate the specific character of the moral mind which is 
to be developed in moral education. 
5.1 The evolution of ethical enquiry 
and the shift of the meaning of moral knowing 
Disciplines are constantly evolving, and from this process of evolution 
comes the very extensive shifts of the conception of 'knowing' in each 
discipline. It is, however, observable that two influential trends are 
characteristic in the history of disciplinary developments. The first is 
the attempt to seek an objectivity-oriented methodology. Articulation 
of our notions of the world might be one of the crucial requisites of 
the method. Highly developed symbolic language and supremely 
Moral mowing in education 119 
refined meanings of words are prerequisites of objectivity of enquiry. 
The second is the attempt to eliminate the 'symbiotic' parts of 
disciplines. Value-neutralisation in scientific studies might well be part 
of this trend. The rejection of value attributes is considered to be a 
necessary condition of scientific study. However, the two trends have 
left behind some of the most precious meanings of knowing which are 
primary, comparable to the ethical elements of political thinking that 
have been lost in the process of its development. 
In fact, the revolution in modern politics, initiated first by 
Machiavelli and Thomas More, resolutely rejected ethical components 
in favouring scientific accuracy in political thinking. The discontinuity 
between ethics and politics might be seen as a monumental mark in the 
scientific development of politics. For the same reason, Hobbes was no 
longer doing Aristotelian politics which was understood by Aristotle 
as continuous with the study of ethics. Aristotle understood ethics as a 
part of politics; for him politics is the study concerned with finding 
the common good for individuals and communities. He actually treated 
Ethics Nicamachea and Politics as a single enquiry.' However, through 
the process of differentiation from ethics, politics has been established 
a specific form of science, but of course with the rejection of the 
ethical components that were involved in Aristotelian politics. 
In its evolution and differentiation, ethics has been taken the same 
way as other disciplines. Pre-Socratic ethics relied mainly on the art of 
rhetoric. This is because the social demands for an 'art of conduct' 
naturally called for the rhetoricians who seemed to have skill in 
inculcating the accepted moral principles in the people's minds. For 
the ancient Greek scholars, such as the Sophists, the 'art of words' was 
related to the 'art of conduct'. Rhetoric was thought of as something to 
do with the pursuit of the good life. However, it was by Socrates that 
the problem of the bewitchment of language was raised seriously in 
= Aristotle (1915b) Magna Moralia (trans. St. George Stock), 1181a24-1182a1 
(Oxford University Press); Aristotle (1915a) Ethka Nicomachea (trans. W.D. Ross), 
1094b5-10, 1181b12-23 (Oxford University Press). 
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ethics. Socrates's primary concern was keeping the clarity of the 
meaning of words in ethical arguments, and the logical consistency of 
arguments. Using his own philosophical device 'dialectic', Socrates 
used to awaken his interlocutors from using the unclear meanings of 
words in one case and logical absurdity in the other. Socrates seriously 
felt the scientific need for clear meanings of moral words which 
perhaps would be achieved through the careful elaboration and 
refinement of meanings in the light of the scientific criteria of truth. 
In Plato's Euthyphro, dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro sets 
about the problem of defining 'holiness'. Euthyphro gives several 
examples of 'holiness' in answering Socrates's question about the 
meaning of 'holiness', but without answering the question. Socrates 
does not ask for such a list of examples of holiness; he asked only for 
the essential meaning of the term. The same form of dialogue can also 
be found in Gorgias, Symposium and Meno where the meanings of 
'justice', 'love' and 'virtue' respectively are discussed seriously and 
steadily.3 Such an attempt at defining the meanings of words was 
common to all disciplines at their birth. 
For Socrates there is true knowledge, though 'true knowledge' in 
the Socratic conception was very nebulous and vague; this was so for 
the meaning of moral knowing at least until his successor Plato shaped 
it in more perfect form and Aristotle characterised it in a more detail 
and as clearly and sharply as possible.' Aristotle seems to have 
understood Socratic conception of moral knowing correctly, when he 
maintained that all virtues in Socratic ethics are reducible to 
knowledge which is theoretical in character. Aristotle's Ethic(' Eudemia 
3 Plato (1971) Euthyphro, in The Last Day of Socrates, 44e-ff (Penguin 
Classics); Plato (1979) Gorgias (trans. T. Irwin) (Oxford: Clarendon Press); Plato 
(1984) 1'(eno (trans. R.W. Sharpies) (Warminster: Aris & Phillips); Plato (1994) 
Sumposium (trans. R. Waterfield) (Oxford University Press). 
4 Aristotle (1915a) op. cit., 1144b28, where he writes: 'Socrates, then, 
thought the virtues were rules or rational principles (for he thought they were, all of 
them, forms of scientific knowledge), while we think they involve a rational 
principle'. 
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reads as follows: 
Socrates, then, the elder, thought the knowledge of virtue to be the end, and used to 
enquire what justice is, what bravery and each of the parts of virtue; and his conduct 
was reasonable, for he thought all the virtues to be kinds of knowledge ...Therefore 
he (Socrates) inquired what virtue (justice) is, not how to or from what it arises. This 
is correct with regard to theoretical knowledge, for there is no other part of astronomy 
or physics or geometry except knowing and contemplating the nature of the things 
which are the subjects of those sciences, ...5  
Socrates thought 'all the virtues to be kinds of knowledge', though 
precisely why he was prepared to equate virtue and knowledge so 
boldly is not entirely clear except that he attributed great power to the 
rational examination of human thoughts about the common good. 
`The force of Socrates's argument depends upon an inseparable union 
of the conceptions of virtue and interest in the single notion of Good', 
according to Sidgwick.6 Certainly Socrates's 'knowledge' was not yet 
fully differentiated, compared to Plato's forms of knowledge and 
Aristotle's types of knowledge. Socrates speaks of virtue in one case as 
cppovimg, in another as Entaryllii, and in still another as TEXVI1.7 
Thus, 'knowledge' in Socrates's dialogue comprises a broad range of 
human knowing, as Maclntyre accurately comments: 
The knowledge that constitutes virtue involves not only beliefs that such and such is 
the case but also a capacity for recognising relevant distinctions and an ability to act. 
These are all bound together by the Socratic uses of Entongti and TExvii, and any 
attempt to separate them out inevitably leads at once to a simplification and to a 
falsification of the Socratic view.' 
Aristotle (1915c) Ethica Eudemia, 1216b 3-8 (Oxford University Press). 
(Brackets and Italics mine) 
Henry Sidgwick (1993) Outlines of the History of Et/iics, p. 26 (Bristol: 
Thoemmes Press). 
Plato, Ladies, 193b5, 195al, 195c11. 
8 Alasdair Maclntyre (1966) A Short a fistory of Ethics, p. 21 (New York: 
Macmillan). 
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`Knowing' in the Socratic conception seems to be comprehensive. 
Thus, for Socrates, if we have learned geometry or architecture, we 
are architects and geometers; to know justice is to be just. Explaining 
this claim, Henry Sidgwick maintains that it would be a misconception 
if we think of knowledge of virtue as distinct from interest.9 
However, the most critical point is that Socrates's conception of 
moral knowledge is rather nearer in its meaning to the nature of crafts 
(TExvi), which refers to the knowledge of the means for something to 
be achieved. Socrates takes the view that scientific knowledge conduces 
to production and the knowledge of how to use the product; he regards 
virtue as instrumental to happiness.m Because of this undifferentiated 
conception of knowledge, Socrates fails to recognise other qualities of 
moral virtue. What is more, identifying moral virtue with theoretical 
knowledge, he makes it distinct from the pre-theoretical qualities of 
the mind, amongst others, and accordingly from feelings and states of 
character." For him, the non-rational or the pre-theoretical is 
regarded as an aberration in knowing. As a consequence, the non-
rational character of awareness disappears from Socrates's conception 
of moral knowing, as is corroborated by both Lathes and Channides. 
Denying partly the Socratic assumption, Plato argues that virtues 
are not purely cognitive; they are constituted partly by non-rational 
quality, as we see from his division of the soul.' Plato believes that 
purely theoretical knowledge is not the sole component of moral 
virtue; he recognises the non-rational quality of the moral mind, but 
he prefers most distinctively the rational quality to the non-rational. 
For this reason, 'the ethics of Plato', writes Henry Sidgwick, 'cannot 
properly be treated as a finished result, but rather as a continual 
9 ibid. 
1° Plato, Euthydemus, 289b4-6. 
11 Aristotle (1915b), op. cit., 1182a15-23. 
12 Plato, Lathes, 192b-e, 194cd; Plato, Charmides, 159b; Plato (1961) The 
Collected Dialogues of Plato (eds. E. Hamilton & H. Cairns) (Princeton University 
Press). 
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movement from the position of Socrates towards the more complete 
and articulate system of Aristotle'.13 Contrary to Socrates, Plato's 
account of ethics proposes a dualist conception of the moral mind 
which dichotomises it into rational and non-rational parts. 
In a more detailed analysis, Aristotle divides virtues into two 
kinds: the moral and the intellectual. Moral virtues are distinct in 
Aristotle from intellectual virtues, as shown by the distinction between 
`health' and 'medical science'. However, a distinction of the intellectual 
virtue is further developed, that is, the theoretical understanding of 
what is demonstrable, necessary and eternal; the practical virtue that is 
how to secure proper means for the right ends or the good life; and 
the productive virtue that is how to make things in accordance with 
rules.' However, for Aristotle, ethical enquiry belongs to the 
category of practical wisdom. Contrary to Socrates's ethics, it is not 
purely theoretical; nor is it simply productive. 'Practical wisdom 
cannot be scientific knowledge (theoretical wisdom), nor art' in 
Aristotle's system of intellectual virtue. 15 In this way, Aristotle 
characterises the scope of ethical enquiry more narrowly in its scope 
than his two predecessors, and makes a radical change in the meaning 
of moral knowing, though it still remains in the domain of intellectual 
pursuits. 
Aristotle's 'practical wisdom' (ypovriotg) is equivalent to 
`prudence' which differs in its meaning from simple understanding 
and hence cannot be identified with scientific knowledge in the strict 
sense; it should be rather understood as 'the means to the end'. 
Aristotle explains in this way: 
The work of man is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as 
13 Henry Sidgwick (1993), op. cit., p. 36. 
" Aristotle (1915a) op. cit., book. vi; David Ross (1923) Aristotle, p.195 
(London: Routledge); W.K.C. Guthrie (1981) A History of greetPhifosophy, vol. vi, 
ch. viii (Cambridge University Press). 
15 Aristotle (1915a) op. cit., 1140b1-5, 1140b20-25. 
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moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes 
us take the right means.... for the one determines the end and the other makes us do 
the things that lead to the end:6 
The form of practical wisdom is identical with the practical 
syllogism." Alasdair Maclntyre reformulates mutatis mutandis the 
process of Aristotle's practical syllogism, as follows: i) a certain end W 
is proposed, but not expressed in a form of reasoning, ii) an 
alternative assertion follows, for instance, in the way that 'x promotes 
.p', iii) a decision comes; 4:s is an instance of x , iv) therefore, comes 
the action 4).18 The practical syllogism involves in its process a 
rational proceeding, viz. seizing relevant facts, weighing them up, 
considering alternatives, and making a right decision. However, the 
fact is that between moral virtue and practical wisdom as a branch of 
intellectual virtue remains a logical gulf, though Aristotle mentions 
that they are closely and reciprocally related; the first concerns the 
end, the second concerns the means. Thus, practical wisdom in the 
Aristotelian edifice of knowledge falls into a different category from 
moral virtue in its logical sense. 
No differences can be found between the development of ethics and 
the evolutions of other disciplines. Ethics in fact has developed 
through defining terms descriptively, systemising the form of 
reasoning with logical rigour, and pruning meanings and thoughts 
which are unable or less able to be described or articulated with 
clarity. Therefore, it was not accidental to take, though unduly, the 
most highly developed rational mode of practical syllogism for the 
form of moral judgment. 
Kant assumes that man's moral life consists of the reason which is 
' 6 ibid, 1144a6-9; 1145a5-6. 
I 7 W.F.R. Hardie (1968) Aristotle's Ethical qh.eory, pp. 240-3 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press). 
18 Alasdair Maclntyre (1981) After Virtue, p. 151 (London: Duckworth). 
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not theoretical but, as he calls it, `practical'.19 However, 'practical 
reasoning' is not completely excluded from the Kantian account of the 
theoretical or the transcendental; for Kant, the reason is an organic 
whole which is capable of functioning both practically and 
theoretically. In Kantian ethics all moral conceptions have their seat 
and origin completely a priori in the reason; they cannot be obtained 
by abstraction from any empirical evidence. It is essential for the 
purity of moral knowing that practical principles deserve to be 
fundamental in moral judgments. Kant writes as follows: 
It is not only of the greatest necessity, from a purely speculative point of view, but is 
also of the greatest practical importance, to derive these notions and laws from pure 
reason, to keep them pure and unmixed, and even to determine the compass of this 
practical or pure rational knowledge, that is, to determine the whole faculty of pure 
practical reason.2°  
Practical reasoning in Kantian ethics thus cannot be considered apart 
from theoretical or rational knowledge. Theoretical reasoning is 
always presupposed in Kantian practical reasoning. In this way, moral 
principles are found to be altogether a priori, free from everything 
empirical, and their nature is defined in terms of metaphysical aspects. 
Kant explains the nature of moral principles thus: 
Just as pure mathematics are distinguished from applied, pure logic from applied, so 
if we choose we may also distinguish pure philosophy of morals (metaphysics) from 
applied (viz, applied to human nature). By this designation we are also at once 
reminded that moral principles are not based on properties of human nature, but must 
subsist a priori of themselves, while from such principles practical rules must be 
capable of being deduced for every rational nature, and accordingly for that of man.'' 
`Practical reasoning' here implies 'a purely speculative point of view' 
19 Immanuel Kant (1949) Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals 
(trans. Thomas K. Abbott), p. 73 and passim (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill). 
2° 1buf., p. 29. 
21 16ut., p. 28. (Italics mine) 
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which is derived from pure reason and which is treated independently 
as pure philosophy; it is about the world of the a priori which lies far 
beyond the world which is 'based on properties of human nature', 
properties which are non-rational in a great measure. 
A contemporary version of the rationality-based conception of 
morality would be Paul H. Hirst's and Richard S. Peters's idea of 
morality. However, G.H. Bantock finds that 'Peters has been much 
influenced by the thought of the procedures relevant in scientific 
learning and discovery'.22 In fact, Peters sees a methodological link 
between morality and science in the value of the rational process 
assumed to be involved in both cases; he writes: 
Both science and morality involve being reasonable or the use of reason ... (This) 
means the determination to follow reasons and to disregard irrelevant considerations, 
or acting in accordance with certain procedures which are essential to discovering the 
truth..." 
`Knowing', in this conception of morality, would be nothing other 
than reasoning relevantly. And this conception has been very 
influential on the way of understanding morality. 
After Socrates, virtues are distinguished and classified in a distinct 
form of knowledge in accordance with the differentiation principles of 
disciplines. When a discipline develops, the meanings of words must 
be clarified and the form of dialogue systemised. Ethics is not 
exceptional to this paradigm of evolution. However, the result is that 
the meaning of 'moral knowing' has been defined more and more 
narrowly, losing and leaving behind the non-rational part of the moral 
mind, which seems in part inarticulate and contingent but still seems to 
have an important raison d'etre in perceiving things in a particular 
way. The disciplinary evolution of ethics restricts the meaning of 
22 G.H. Bantock (1967) Education, Culture and the Emotion, p. 141 (London: 
Faber & Faber). 
23 Richard S. Peters (1973) Authority, Responsibility and Education, p. 27 
(London: George Allen & Unwin). 
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`moral knowing' to an intellectual or practical virtue of the mind. 
Hence comes the strictly limited use of 'moral knowing' which 
concentrates on pure ratiocination of moral judgments and excludes 
other complex components of virtue, which encompass multivalent 
perceptions of the fabrics of moral life. 
5.2 Irrelevancy of discipline-based curriculum 
and the fragmented moral mind 
All disciplines have developed so far through taking the same course 
of evolution; clarity of meanings of words and rigidity of arguments 
were the sine qua non of a developed discipline. However, there have 
always been important connections between the evolutionary history of 
the developed forms of disciplines and the evolutionary pathway of 
school subjects and their content. Hence comes the myth: 'for every 
school subject there must be a corresponding discipline'.' As the 
history of curriculum shows, the myth has always been a dominant 
power in the planning of school curriculum. Thus, the curriculum 
theorist selects school subjects and subject matter 'only from 
disciplines'. 
Many educators' well-known views of the curriculum manifest the 
myth. For instance, Bruner's discipline-centred curriculum and Hirst's 
forms of knowledge theory in his conception of liberal education 
exemplify it. These curriculum theories represent the 'discipline-based 
curriculum' which takes the view that school subjects mirror 
disciplines. The curriculum theorists hold the view, for instance, that 
literary criticism should be first taught, then studied in literature; they 
favour teaching about literature rather than reading literature; they 
24 Cf. Jane Roland Martin (1994) The disciplines and the curriculum, in idem 
Changing the Educational. 
 Landscape (London: Routledge), and originally in Educational 
Philosophy and Theory, vol. 1 (1969). She discusses the theme, but without 
consideration of the developmental history and characters of disciplines. 
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view the school curriculum as sets of theories. Such theorists forget 
the facts that literary criticism is not literature per se and that 
disciplines are remote from the pupil's ordinary concerns. Thus, the 
problem is that the discipline-based curriculum mistakenly rules out 
the very subject matter which ought not to be ruled out, that which is 
considerably remote from any approved discipline but important and 
useful when considering educational values. Amongst educational 
concerns, there are emotions to be fostered, attitudes to be developed, 
convictions to be edified, and ways of acting to be promoted, for 
instance. 
Through the process of evolution disciplines metamorphosed 
considerably and thereby lost their original way of knowing the 
world. In fact, through rejection and simplification of the primary 
meanings of knowing, the evolution of disciplines has seriously limited 
the scope of each discipline. Modern politics, for example, shows this 
rejection and simplification of primary meanings. Machiavelli reduced 
the scope of political understanding to technical skill, and Hobbes too 
contributed to this development through establishing politics as a 
science. However, the remarkable point is that the loss in modern 
political thinking is far too primal to be made good; this is particularly 
evident if we examine the Aristotelian politics. With the loss of the 
ethical basis of political dialogue, modern politics lost, for instance, 
the pedagogical attitude towards the character formation of a people 
and the prudent understanding of political situations. 'Knowing' in 
politics came to be defined more narrowly than at the birth of the 
discipline. 
The loss of primary meanings of knowing in disciplines leads in 
turn to a very serious problem, if it is related to the aims of education 
and the meaning of knowing which was implied in the pre-discipline-
based school curriculum. However, the most distinctive seriousness of 
the loss may be found in 'morals' as a school subject. In the first place, 
it is not at all difficult to see that the discipline-based subjects advocate 
keeping the descriptivist view of definition for the purpose of the 
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clarity of meanings which such subjects employ. For this reason the 
descriptivist view of moral words and the discipline-based subjects 
reject moral notions which are not easily definable. However, moral 
notions are altogether richer, more inspiring and more astonishing 
than the understanding with carefully defined moral words. Moral 
notions constitute a broader sense of moral knowing which teachers 
should reveal in education, not for the acquisition of ethical theories 
and meta-ethical attitudes to moral languages but for the full 
development of moral sensitivity with which the pupil can survey the 
`rough ground' which underlies complicated ordinary moral situations 
and the traditions of morality. Discipline-based moral education loses 
a larger part of the primary meaning of moral knowing. 
In the second place, the primal virtue of morality has been rejected 
until now in the course of the disciplinary evolution of ethics. In 
accordance with the Aristotelian classification of virtue, Paul H. Hirst, 
John Wilson and most contemporary philosophers of education 
bifurcate morality, and this view is reflected in the school curriculum. 
As a result, there is appearing, on the school curriculum, the 
dissociation of moral education into separate areas; one for the 
intellectual virtues and the other for 'character training', as Hirst's 
argument suggests.25 Prima facie, Hirst's position may be taken as 
leading to safe curriculum planning, if one considers it desirable that 
the curriculum includes both sides of virtues proportionally. However, 
the principal point is that such a curriculum is based on dualism, 
which always divides a thing into two parts and devalues one of them, 
as the history of dualism displays. Thus, the growing tendency is that 
the meaning of 'moral knowing' in the school curriculum strictly 
confines itself to the intellectual virtue established by the study of 
morality as a discipline. In this way such a tendency excludes other 
qualities of the mind that are more significant in terms of the whole 
25 Paul H. Hirst (1965) Liberal education and the nature of knowledge, in 
R.D. Archambault (ed.) Philosophical- Analysis and Education, p. 136 (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
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context of the 'moral virtue' which should be developed in 
education.26 For instance, direct or existential experience and pre-
theoretical knowledge are segregated and excluded from the leading 
concerns of moral education. 
Though Hirst recognises the pre-theoretical qualities of the mind, 
he actually establishes their place in a domain of moral education 
which is separated from the domain of 'moral judgment and 
awareness' in his favourite forms of knowledge. He gives the separated 
domain a different name, that is, 'character education'. Hence comes 
the fragmented conception of the moral mind as it is considered in 
educational analysis. Indeed, as is revealed in his 'forms of knowledge' 
theory, Hirst's appreciation of the rational part of the mind 
strengthens the intellectual quality of the mind and relatively 
downgrades the other quality, though a very considerable modification 
of his position has been made in his recent paper. 27 Relying heavily on 
epistemology, Hirst in his forms of knowledge theory rejects any 
attempt to develop the mind in terms of moral virtue, and John White 
justly criticises his knowledge-based view of education.28 The two 
dissociated types of moral education — education of moral judgment 
and character education — thus dichotomise the concept of moral 
knowing and consequently lead to the division of the moral mind; this 
is a widely recognised epiphenomenon, appearing in education, which 
is mainly caused by the disciplinary evolution of ethics as a subject of 
study; this is also one of the reductionist fallacies which are resulted in 
relying exclusively on epistemology and in believing the myth of the 
discipline-based curriculum without paying enough attention to the 
quality of mind in general and in terms of how it is affected by 
26 Ibid, p. 114. (Italics mine) 
27 Paul H. Hirst (1974) Statements, language and arts: a comment in reply to 
Mr Peter Scrimshaw, Cambridge journal- of Education, vol. 4, no. 1; Paul H. Hirst 
(1993) Education, knowledge and practice, in Robin Barrow and Patricia White 
(eds.) Beyond Liberal. Educatitm, pp. 184-99 (London: Routledge). 
28 John White (1990) Education and the Good Life, pp. 106-28 (London: 
Kogan Page). 
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education. 
Nonetheless, the discipline-based curriculum theorist maintains that 
the intellectual virtue which underlies all the disciplines is the main 
subject to be taught at school, because he identifies disciplines with the 
subjects on the school curriculum. Moral education, as he conceives it, 
is to teach about moral principles which are structured in the strict 
form of conceptual scheme. The understanding of the nature of moral 
principles through a concentration on the justification of moral beliefs 
and judgments, definition of moral concepts, and the clarification of 
arguments as in Socrates's 'what-is' questions; these are all the subject 
matters of 'morals'. For many educators moral education in this sense 
has been conceived inadequately as something which teaches about 
moral principles or moral judgments, and remote from the education 
of moral virtues. The subject matters of moral education, in this case, 
are supposed to be something 'out there' which is available in an 
established body of moral beliefs presented by the great philosophers 
or schools of thought and constitute a set of moral codes.29 
Splitting the virtues into the moral and the intellectual, and 
disregarding one part of them, the modern theory of moral education 
fragments and disintegrates notoriously the pupil's moral mind. The 
fragmentation of the moral mind begs a substantial question as to the 
authentic meaning of moral knowing, not in the view of ethics as a 
discipline but in its educational implications. Disciplines have 
eliminated the non-rational components in their enquiries for the 
purposes of being rational and scientific. Thus, critical changes in the 
nature of knowing have resulted from discarding the primary type of 
understanding things: the changes from the personal to the impersonal, 
from the non- or less-rational to the rational and finally from the 
ordinary to the disciplinary. Therefore, the changed conception of 
knowing hives itself off from the fabric of our ordinary life. It is 
impossible to suppose that there should be equivalence between the 
29 James M. Giarelli (1982) Primers in ethics: reflections on a changing field, 
Teachers College Record, vol. 83, no. 3, pp. 325-30. 
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goal of disciplines and that of education. School subjects cannot be the 
exact parallels to the disciplines. 'Knowing' in education need not 
necessarily be the 'knowing' of disciplines. Otherwise, if we 
erroneously follow the disciplinary view of the school curriculum and 
Hirst's narrowly defined concept of liberal education, then the nature 
of moral knowing in education would necessarily be confined very 
narrowly to the scope of intellectual virtue. 
Relying too heavily on the disciplinary view of curriculum, the 
curriculum theorist has misunderstood the meaning of 'moral 
knowing', ever since the myth of the discipline-based curriculum has 
bewitched the curriculum theorists and led them to have a commitment 
to school subjects; thus, a vital truth has been lost. However, if we 
examine the matter seriously, not in the context of 'disciplines' but of 
`education', the distorted meaning of moral knowing must be 
corrected, insofar as we appreciate education as a human endeavour 
engaging in the development of the moral mind in its whole context. 
5.3 Towards the redefinition of moral knowing in 
educational perspectives 
Drawing on epistemology, rather than educational values and 
philosophy of mind, philosophers of education segregate the pre-
disciplinary meaning of moral knowing which bases the primary type 
of moral knowing, and in this way reduce the meaning of moral 
knowing. As a result, moral virtue has been abandoned as the main 
concern of moral education, and usually lost in the darkness of 
oblivion in school curriculum policy. 
For the development of moral mind in a fuller sense, there should 
be an attempt to restore to the school curriculum the lost part of the 
meaning of moral knowing and a ground should be prepared on which 
a much broader sense of moral knowing than its narrow disciplinary 
meaning can be thoroughly built. The restoration of the lost part and 
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the enlargement of the scope of the meaning of moral knowing are not 
in any sense logically independent. Rather, the truth is that the 
enlargement of the meaning is the revelation of the significance of the 
pre-disciplinary meaning of moral knowing in education. 
R.K. Elliot confidently suggests the possibility and the authenticity 
of pre-theoretical knowledge that must be taken as an important 
resource in education for 'the development of mind' in its most 
fundamental sense.3° Others, in addition, claim that basis of 
knowledge in certain school subjects like 'art' and 'morals' can be 
acquired more perfectly through direct and existential experiences. 
Moral awareness, amongst other kinds of awareness, is possible 
through pre-theoretical experiences. It is like the imaginative 
awareness of art, because it is synoptic and perhaps synnoetic rather 
than analytic and scientific. Education in morality, if it does not have 
merely the analytic study of morality as its main purpose, needs to 
help the pupil to have some synoptic or synnoetic experience of the 
situations which are morally relevant. 
Socrates deserves to hold the title of the pioneer in the clarification 
of the meaning of moral terms and accordingly in the establishment of 
ethics as a discipline, though Socrates's 'what-is' questions about 
definitions of moral terms usually conclude without giving any 
definite meanings to the general moral notions carried by the words 
his interlocutors use.' However, through the symbolisation and 
3° R.K. Elliot (1975) Education and human being I, in S.C. Brown (ed.) 
Phdosophers Discuss Education, pp. 45-72 (London: Macmillan). 
31 The reason why Socrates did not give any clear definitions of words 
concerned in his dialogues is uncertain. However, two presumptions for this matter 
seem to be possible: One of them might be interpreted in an educational perspective in 
that Socrates ends each dialogue, if he judges that his interlocutor recognises 
sufficiently what is unclear in the argument; the other, though it may seem remote 
from Socrates's explicit idea, might be connected to the main idea of the thesis, in 
assuming that it is possible to give clear meanings to moral words but only to 
perceive the general notions implied by the words. On the one hand, Socrates's 
`what-is' questions contributed to the discipliaary evolution of ethics. However, on 
the other hand, with the questions, he lost the most important meaning of knowing in 
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logical formulation of reasoning, his contribution ironically resulted 
in the loss of broad embryonic part of knowing from which, as is 
conceived, general notions of things bring about; ie. the lost part 
which bases the rough ground of moral notions represented by 
vagueness of meanings, sensitivity to values, ineffability of feelings, 
ordinariness of common understanding, in particular.' 
Moral knowing is not scientific, nor is it something which can be 
neatly abstracted from the stark world of facts. 'Socrates was wrong', 
in this point, 'in supposing the virtues to be sciences', as Aristotle 
states.33 The rough meanings of words in morals are fundamental in 
that they carry and reflect the notions which lie, not on the surface of 
the meaning which may be arbitrarily trimmed for the disciplinary 
purposes of clarity and neatness of concepts, but at the base of our 
moral life. At the root of all moral language lies the vagueness of the 
meanings of moral words which are founded deep in the 'rough 
ground' of our moral notions and which are embedded in our way of 
moral life and also steeped in our social traditions. The vagueness of 
the meanings of moral words constitutes the primary meaning of 
moral knowing and remains unbroken as a huge grey area beneath the 
refined meanings of moral words. 
Language cannot determine in a fuller sense what things are, 
without referring the notions which accompany them and the public 
standards the notions reflect. Language is not a 'replica' of the world. 
It is, therefore, spurious to argue that rigorous definitions, and 
disciplines which stand on such definitions, can delineate most 
perfectly what is real being. Many important attributes of things elude 
the meanings of words defined succinctly according to the usage of the 
disciplines; they are very far from the meanings which the disciplinary 
approach of definition try to define, but very important resources in 
education. 
moral education. 
32 For 'common understanding', see R.K. Elliott (1975) op. cit., pp. 62-6. 
33 Aristotle (1915b) op. cit., 1183b8-18. 
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Pre-theoretical or pre-disciplinary knowing extends beyond the 
rationalist or the scientist conception of the definite meanings of 
words. However, education, if not bewitched by the myth of the 
discipline-based vue de curriculum, needs the conception of words 
which have some undifferentiated and 'blurred edges' in their 
meanings, especially for the purpose of perceiving and understanding 
the 'rough ground' which is the underlying base of the texture of our 
practical life.34 For this reason, 'knowing' in education requires a 
much broader sense of the use of words, necessarily related to the 
pre-disciplinary meaning of knowing, just as that R.K. Elliott's 
`common understanding' enlarges the meaning of knowing to include 
pre-disciplinary knowing. Elliott writes thus: 
Unlike understanding within the disciplines, common understanding does not limit 
itself to any special area of being, but concerns itself with anything which will yield 
to it. It is not necessarily disciplined, for discipline, as the following of rules counter 
to immediate inclination, may be exercised whenever a person's tempted to resort to 
arbitrariness in thinking. Common understanding is largely embodied in practical 
capabilities and mastery of language, both of which are acquired largely pre-reflectively, 
but there is also a considerable truistic common lore concerning human being and the 
world.35  
The most striking feature of pre-disciplinary knowing is that it does 
not limit the scope of knowing; its scope is broader than that of 
disciplinary knowing; it ranges over a wider domain than discipline-
based subjects, and touches more intimately the underlying rationale 
on which human life rests. Blurred edges of concepts, accompanying 
meanings of words and tacitness of understanding are all beyond the 
34 As regards the 'texture of life' in an educational aspect, Israel Scheffler 
writes as follows. 'Human lives thus do not ride on fixed rails; they do not follow 
trajectories already laid down by physics supplemented with biology. Their courses 
are modified by belief and interpretation, fear and hope, recollection and anticipation, 
symbolism and value. The newborn child, considered simply as a biological unit, is 
indeterminate as a human being - the texture of its life is still to be filled out largely by 
human effort, that is to say, by culture, history, education and decision'. Israel 
Scheffler (1985) Of Human Potential, p. 41 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
35 R.K. Elliott (1975) op.cit. p. 62. 
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limited meaning of knowing as defined in the discipline-based 
curriculum, allying it to descriptivism, realism and scientism. 
Therefore, pre-disciplinary knowing deserves to be covered in a 
broader field of study and valued as multiplex level of knowing in 
education. 
The meaning of moral knowing, not in moral philosophy but in 
education, need not be restricted to the limits of the descriptivist 
definition. Adopting not the descriptivist way of definition but the 
conception of wide moral awareness, education helps in a great 
measure the pupil's assimilation of many moral experiences and as a 
result enhances his power of moral perception. Therefore, the 
educational value of the pre-disciplinary meaning of moral knowing 
can be justified, because pre-disciplinary knowledge extends the depth 
and breadth of moral knowledge in spite of the indeterminacy of the 
ordinary use of moral words and the looseness of pre-disciplinary 
discourse. 
`Moral knowing' in this prospect must be redefined to comply with 
the educational conception of knowing, instead of the philosopher's 
limited use of knowing which is based exclusively on epistemological 
requirements and on the rationalist's view. The educational conception 
of moral knowing goes far beyond the significance which the 
disciplinary view upholds, because it admits in its character the 
inexplicable modes of moral experience and understanding which are 
intangible otherwise; it proposes a rather different order of 
knowledge. 
The disciplinary view of knowing is akin to the realist manoeuvre 
in the point that the realist admits the scope of knowing only to the 
extent that language describes world. But the disciplinary view forgets 
that the world includes much more than what language reflects, and 
that attempts to define indefinable words very often loses many 
essential facets of knowing, whether these points are examined in 
educational perspectives or in disciplinary aspects. 
The relationship between language and mind is clarified by 
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considering the meaning of understanding in Frege's theory of 
sense.36 Understanding requires much more wide sense of the 
meaning of word than that of the disciplinary view. Pieces of language 
might have the meanings which are rigorously defined in accordance 
with the disciplinary principles of definition, but they must go beyond 
what are provided by the meanings clearly defined especially when 
they use in art and morality.37 Sentences are determined in the best 
way by the senses of their components; these senses can be grasped 
more perfectly by the mind which has a broad conception of their 
definition; and grasping a sense is understanding the word which 
expresses it. For this reason, an expression might have a sense but lack 
a meaning. 
The pre-disciplinary conception of moral knowing is what the 
refinement of terms which has proceeded during the disciplinary 
evolution of ethics has left out, and thus the pre-disciplinary 
conception became helplessly to be the detached from the concept of 
knowing in the disciplinary view. However, the pre-disciplinary 
meaning of moral knowing is the base of moral understanding, as is 
demanded by the nature of moral education which aims not at the 
establishment of ethical theory, but at the development of moral virtue 
which fabricates the texture of a moral mind. 
The shifting meaning of moral knowing, after Socrates, engendered 
the idea of practical wisdom. Practical wisdom embodied itself in the 
form of moral judgments. The contemporary discipline-based 
curriculum in the same way identifies 'moral knowing' with making 
moral judgments. However, in Aristotelian ethics, practical wisdom is 
conjoined with philosophical wisdom and both are categorised by 
intellectual virtue which is separated from moral virtue.' Aristotle 
' G. Frege (1980) On sense and meaning, in P. Geach & M. Black (eds.) 
Translations from the Phdosophkaf Writings of Gottlob Frege, p. 62 (Oxford: Blackwell). 
37 G. McCulloch (1995) The Mind and Its World, ch. 3 (London: Routledge). 
38 Aristotle classifies the excellence of the intellect into philosophical wisdom 
and practical wisdom. Aristotle (1915a) op. cit., 1140b6-1142a7. 
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characterises practical wisdom as the knowledge of how to secure the 
ends, the knowledge which is 'a reasoned and true state of capacity to 
act with regard to human good'.39 In this conception, a pupil with 
practical wisdom could be understood as a person who is able to 
deliberate rightly about what sort of thing conduces to the good. Thus, 
for those contemporary educators who are predisposed to accept the 
discipline-based curriculum, 'moral knowing' is equivalent to the 
virtue of practical wisdom or moral judgment. 
Aristotle retained from Plato the idea of practical wisdom as an 
indispensable element of morality. As Aristotle maintains, it cannot be 
denied that a factual relationship exists between practical wisdom and 
moral virtue, in that moral virtue ensures that the end is right and 
practical wisdom certifies the means that conduces to the end.4° It is, 
in fact, more helpful for being good, if education equips the pupil with 
the virtue of practical wisdom; moral virtues and practical wisdom are 
yoked together in many cases in the practice of morality. Regarding 
this point, practical wisdom might be nearer than other qualities to the 
essence of morality. However, the crucial point is that a logical 
distinction between moral virtue and practical wisdom is still possible 
and significant, especially in an educational analysis of virtue. A 
practical syllogism, in the view of W.K.C. Guthrie, is the embodiment 
of practical wisdom, though the practical syllogism Aristotle alludes 
appears in a variety of examples.' Nonetheless, the various examples 
share the rational power of knowing how to live well.' They seek to 
define the means for the ends 'according to right reason'.43 Right 
reason in the form of practical syllogism is 'a thought-process 
39 /bid:, 1140b30. 
40 	 1144a6-9. 
41 W.K.C. Guthrie (1981) . History of Greek, Philosophy, vol. vi, p. 349 
(Cambridge University Press). 
'2 Joseph Dunne (1993) Back to the Rough Ground, p. 244 (University of 
Notre Dame Press). 
43 Aristot le (1915a) op. cit., 1138b25. 
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undertaken with a view to discovering the best means to a 
predetermined end', as Guthrie writes 44  It is concerned mainly with 
the selection of means; it does not deal with deliberation about ends. 
Practical wisdom, like TExvi, is about the dimension of means 
rather than that of ends, ie. the intellectual aspect of virtue, not the 
moral aspect. In this condition, a practical syllogism which proceeds 
`according to right reason' can, to adopt Maclntyre's phrase, 
`degenerate[s] into or remain[s] from the outset merely a certain 
cunning capacity for linking means to any end rather than to those 
ends which are genuine goods for man'.45 A practical syllogism is 
valuable only when the right end is aimed at. The power to define the 
means is not the power to obtain the ends. In Aristotle's interpretation 
of 'deliberation' can be found the same point. 
We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a doctor does not deliberate 
whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman 
whether he shall produce law and order, nor does any one else deliberate about his 
end. They assume the end and consider how and by what means it is to be attained; 
46 
For Aristotle, 'the end cannot be a subject of deliberation'; it is 
assumed.`' Therefore, the prudential mind which chooses the ends is 
unable to be assured, in Aristotle's conception, by deliberation about 
means. In Aristotelian ethics moral virtue determines the end and 
practical wisdom makes us do what leads to the end.48 But without the 
former, the latter is feckless; practical syllogistic reasoning is 
instrumental for the attainment of the right ends; it is merely the 
`technical knowledge', spurned by Protagoras, which is not knowing 
44 W.K.C. Guthrie (1981) op. cit., p. 351. 
45 Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) op. cit., p. 145. 
46 Aristotle (1915a) op. cit., 1112b12-16. 
47 ibilj, 1112b36-37. 
48 Mid, 1145a5-6. 
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`what is good for the soul'. 
Nonetheless, the dualist curriculum theorist, who has a disciplinary 
view of the school curriculum, depreciates and forgets the value of the 
prudential mind which understands 'what is the right end', and 
consequently appreciates only the cleverness of the practical syllogism. 
However, moral virtue is more essential and primal than intellectual 
virtue; this is so particularly in terms of moral education which aims 
at the improvement not of the knowledge of ethical theories but of the 
virtues of practical moral life. As Aristotle recognises, this is the very 
question which must necessarily 'be raised as to the utility of these 
qualities of mind'.49 Though there is a factual relationship between the 
two virtues, one of them is sufficient for a good man and the other is 
necessary. Aristotle writes as follows: 
... if we are to say that a man should have practical wisdom not for the sake of 
knowing moral truths but for the sake of becoming good, practical wisdom will be of 
no use to those who are good; but again it is of no use to those who have not virtue; 
for it will make no difference whether they have practical wisdom themselves or obey 
others who have it, and it would be enough for us to do what we do in the case of 
health; though we wish to become healthy, yet we do not learn the art of medicine.50 
These statements both explicate that there exists a logical gulf between 
practical wisdom and moral virtue, and illustrate again that one of 
them is more primary for goodness than the other. In this regard, the 
disciplinary view of moral education, which appreciates most highly 
the intellectual virtue, can hardly be satisfactory; it is in fact 
preposterous. 
A practical syllogism may be useful just when a choice of means is 
necessary, as in the doctor's case of whether he should tell the truth or 
should give comfort first to the patient, even if this means not telling 
the truth. However, even in this case, the practical syllogism is of no 
use if one is not equipped first with moral virtue, because practical 
49 16t1L, 1143b17. 
50 	 1143b27-33. 
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judgment always necessitates the right end. A practical syllogism can 
be used even for the choice of the means with which a wrong purpose 
can be attained; this means that there is not logical relationship 
between moral virtue and practical wisdom. Practical wisdom alone 
does not necessarily and properly constitute the legitimate meaning of 
moral knowing. 'Moral knowing', not pursued solely in a disciplinary 
purpose, should be extended to the full depth and breadth of its 
meaning, especially for the educational development of the power of 
moral virtue. 
Chapter 6 
Towards an Educational Theory 
of Moral Knowing and Doing 
In Plato's dialogue, the Mena, Socrates identifies 'virtue' with 
`knowledge'. The Socratic unity of virtue and knowledge entails that 
knowing and doing are inseparable. For Socrates, moral axpatua 
(incontinence) is thought to be nothing other than the result of the 
absence of moral knowing.' Just in this respect, the Socratic 
conception of 'knowing' is not at all different from the conception of 
'p-knowledge' as it was named and defined in the introductory 
chapter.' However, it is not very clear in what way Socrates assumed 
that moral knowing implies doing moral deeds, if we examine 
carefully his meaning of 'knowledge', which continuously developed 
and shifted in the process of his dialogues with Sophists. What is more, 
in a factual sense, how p-knowledge assures the pupil's moral action is 
still more obscure. In fact, many controversial claims on the 
relationship between moral knowing and doing have been diffused by 
moral philosophers, and especially in theories of moral education, 
since Socrates first launched his thoughts on the subject. 
Plato, Protagoras, 357d-e, 358c. 
= See, Chapter 1: Introduction, p. 4 where the meanings of the coined terms 
`p-knowledge' and 'q-knowledge' are comparatively illustrated; in p-knowledge 
`knowing' implies 'doing', and in q-knowledge 'knowing' does not necessarily 
imply 'doing'. 
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The moral internalist assumes that there must be consistency 
between moral knowing and doing moral deeds; for him 'doing' 
entirely depends on the agent's state of 'knowing'. In contrast, the 
moral externalist does not accept the Socratic internalist assumption of 
moral consistency. The externalist believes instead that there is no 
logical device which fastens the morality of doing and that of knowing 
together; for the externalist moral behaviours are caused largely by 
mind-independent determinants. For this reason, the moral externalist 
bisects morality into two different parts and accordingly divides moral 
education into two different types, as is shown by the modern theorists 
of moral education. These types are education for cognitive morality, 
and moral education for character. Moral externalists see moral 
motivation as being outside the meaning of moral knowing, as they 
take a different position from Socrates; thus, they see moral knowing 
as purely theoretical and remote from the practical characteristics of 
moral doing; 
Many intertwined theoretical perplexities and fallacies are 
implicated in both theories. Attending to the problem of the Socratic 
unity between knowing and doing, and rejecting both epistemological 
internalism and psychological externalism as inadeguate for the 
conception of moral education, this chapter re-interprets the 
possibility of the reunion of knowing and doing by broadening the 
meaning of moral knowing, and establishes a newly contrived theory 
which will underpin moral education that is exempt from the errors 
made in the Socratic dialogues and in the psychological reduction of 
morality. 
3 Cf. David 0. Brink (1989) Externalist moral realism, in idem Moral- Realism 
and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge University Press. For the meanings of 
externalism and internalism in the discussion of the location of mental states, see 
Colin McGinn (1989) Mental Content, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, where internalism is 
defined as the thesis that mental states are 'in the head', borrowing Hilary Putnam's 
phrase, and externalism as the thesis that they are not. For further discussion about 
the relevancies of both internalism and externalism, see also Gregory McCulloch 
(1995) The Mind and Its World, ch. 8 (London: Routledge). 
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6.1 Epistemological internalism and its fallacy 
Rationalist internalism has influenced teachers insofar as they believe 
that there is a positive relationship between knowing moral principles 
and doing. However, it seems that moral internalism has lost the 
ground in which it was first rooted. Socrates assumed that virtue is 
knowledge of what is good for the agent.' And 'good for the agent', 
Socrates explained, implies 'promoting the agent's happiness' in a 
practical sense.' In this regard, the Socratic position might indeed be 
the first example of moral internalism, but his precise meaning is 
obscure because he did not demonstrate his position in detail, in spite 
of the fact that he developed a path to more precisely rational 
thinking. Neither the Kantian motivation of the will, nor the Harean 
alignment between evaluation and the moral emotions appears in 
Socrates's internalism and his conception of knowing.' No 
Aristotelian definition of moral behaviour, and nothing like the 
modern account of psychological dispositions are found in Socrates's 
dialogues on moral internalism.' 
Socratic conception of virtue is simply of a kind of knowledge 
which cannot be clearly distinguishable from the craft knowledge of 
Plato, Charmides, 175-176a. 
5 Plato, Euthigemus, 172a, 278e & 280b. 
Immanuel Kant (1949) Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals 
(trans. Thomas K. Abbot), p. 25, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, where Kant wrote: 
'...common men do not conceive it in such an abstract and universal form, yet they 
always have it really before their eyes and use it as the standard of their decision. 
Here it would be easy to show how, with this compass in hand, men are well able to 
distinguish, in every case that occurs, what is good, what bad, conformably to duty 
or inconsistent with it, if, without in the least teaching them anything new; we only, 
like Socrates, direct their attention to the principle they themselves employ; ...'; R.M. 
Hare (1952) ?he Language of Morals, chs. 7 & 11 (Oxford University Press). 
Cf. Robert Dunn (1987) The Possibility of Weakness of Will (Indianapolis: 
Hackett). 
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the shoemaker.8 Socrates speaks often of virtue and knowledge in 
terms of craft knowledge and praises their rational character.9 The 
rationality of a craft is the central element of knowing that leads, for 
instance, the shoemaker's work to be good. However, by identifying 
moral knowing with craft knowledge, Socrates is obliged to put the 
unique quality of moral knowing aside.1° It would seem that the 
Socratic conception of rationality cannot be interpreted other than 
showing the implication involved in the following conditional 
statement: if a shoemaker knows that doing x is better for his work 
than doing z, then he would prefer x to z. Perhaps, in this process of 
judgment, such rational thinking and action may be sufficient for the 
job in which the shoemaker is engaging. Virtue in this sense is nothing 
more than the knowledge which is helpful for the shoemaker. 
Knowing and doing in the Socratic conception of TEXVil are 
logically conjunctive in their relationship. Therefore, a hypothetical 
statement might be drawn from this conception; if the shoemaker 
knows that doing x is better than doing z for his objective y, then he 
would prefer to do x rather than other alternatives in a given situation: 
knowing determines the way of doing in this restricted sense: they are 
internal in terms of TEXV11. Selecting doing x in this case depends on 
the agent's rational power which follows evidential routes to the 
choice. However, in the subject of morality, it is very unlikely that 
such a way of rational choice satisfies the conditions of moral doing; 
rationality alone does not always lead to moral behaviours, because 
'rational thinking' is not necessarily read as 'making a moral practice'. 
However, the rationalist internalist after Socrates holds the view 
that moral knowing and moral doing are indeed logically separated, 
but that the cognitive force in moral knowing motivates moral 
Plato, Gorgias, 447cd. 
9 Plato, Charmides, 165c-166b; Plato, Apology, 22cd. 
I° Plato, Lathes, 194cd; Plato, Charmides, 165c. 
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doing." This view therefore still assumes a dualism and sees the 
former as leading the latter, as appeared in 'tandem theory' of the 
mind and the body that was first espoused by Descartes in early 
modern times. In this way, the rationalist idea has dominated for long 
the teacher's conception of the relationship between knowing and 
doing in moral education. As a result, the teacher erroneously assumes 
that there is a logical device called 'rationality' which fastens knowing 
and doing together, and thus knowing and doing are consistent for the 
pupil who has a fully developed rational mind. The image of a 'ghost-
machine connection' is the typical model behind this assumption.''` 
However, the mere knowledge of the rational choice of action 
alone does not always move the agent to act in a strict sense, as is 
shown by the witness of Socrates's disciple Alcibiades in the Repudfic 
and the Symposium, though it may provide in some cases the agent with 
a justificatory reason for choosing a moral action than animal one. 
Knowing the reason why one should choose x rather than z does not 
necessarily make one do the action x. In the presence of Socrates, 
Alcibiades clearly knows that Socrates's argument about how best to 
live is right, but, corrupted in nature, whenever he is away from 
Socrates, he loses sight of what he had once known and its particular 
consequences, acting then from appetite and ambition.' 
The most critical hazard that moral internalism confronts seems to 
be caused by its erroneous characterisation of the nature of moral 
knowing. If moral knowing is characterised exclusively by its 
rationality, then the internalist claim would not possibily be justified. 
This is because, first, there is no such characteristically rational moral 
knowledge to be accepted, as is asserted by the classical moral 
11 For the moral internalist and the moral externalist conceptions of moral 
doing, see D. McNaughton (1988) Moral Vision, passim (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 
12 Gilbert Ryle (1949) The Concept of Mine, pp. 12-20 (New York: Barnes & 
Noble). 
1 ' Plato, Republic, 4945; Plato, Symposium, 214e & ff. 
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emotivists like A.J. Ayer.' The more important second reason might 
be that the rationalist assumption is falsified by the result of the 
teacher's observation of his pupil's moral cocpatEta between 
understanding of moral principles and practice. To supplement this 
moral deficiency which resulted from rationalist internalism, the 
modern theorist divides moral education into two categorically 
differing types; education for moral judgments and that for character. 
Gilbert Ryle distinguishes, for the same reason, 'knowing how' from 
`knowing that' and suggests that 'knowing how' to behave morally as a 
point of principle cannot be reducible to 'knowing that'.15 More 
important still, it should be noticed that, in the earlier period of the 
history of moral education, Aristotle recognised that theoretical 
knowledge of morality is distinguishable from the moral virtue by 
which man actually comes to be good: 
... the present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the others, for we 
are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, since 
otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use, ...' 
Guthrie agrees with this Aristotelian view when he states the point as 
follows: 
Even if one were to agree with Socrates that knowledge of the nature of courage or 
justice is a necessary precondition of becoming brave or just, it would be difficult to 
concede that it is a sufficient one.'7 
Socrates failed to grasp the critical point that 'moral knowing' as 
understood in his rationalist view is only a sine qua non of virtue. If 
this is the case, then it would be a Socratic mistake to identify moral 
14 A.J. Ayer (1971) Language, Truth and Logic, ch. 6 (Penguin). 
15 Gilbert Ryle (1949) op. cit., ch. 2. 
16 Aristotle (1915a) Ethica Nicomachea (trans. W.D. Ross), 1103b26 (Oxford 
University Press). 
17 W.K.C. Guthrie (1969) A History of Greek, Philosophy, vol. iii, p. 452 
(Cambridge University Press). 
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virtue in its full sense with the knowledge defined as characteristically 
rational. And from this mistake the corollary must result that 
Socrates's 'moral knowing' must be a quasi-p-knowledge in which 
moral knowing and doing are not necessarily harnessed together, 
though he appeared to assume that it is p-knowledge. In fact, 
rationality in knowing cannot by itself furnish all the sufficient 
elements of moral doing; it is not sufficient for moral motivation. 
For Plato, an action is irrational if it is not caused by rational 
thinking. This view is not startling at all, because Plato appraised 
human knowledge according to its rationality ; thus, in the Republic, he 
chose algebra, geometry, harmonics and dialectics as the most 
worthwhile knowledge, claiming that they would lead to the 'noble-
man's' integrated rational life. In the Platonic tradition, moral 
education has been undertaken the way giving emphasis on the 
`justificatory' knowledge than the 'motivational' one, in other words, 
ex parte of the theoretical or rational quality of morality.18 It was not 
until quite recent times that scepticism concerning rationality in 
education began to re-examine the Platonic epistemology, though 
Roman education had a while been critical of the Platonic tradition. 
Epistemology as a branch of philosophy must be evaluated as 
having contributed notably to the advancement of human knowledge in 
its qualities of accuracy, clarity, coherency and simplicity. The study 
of epistemology has sought the commensurable ground on which the 
value of human thoughts can be testified. However, in this idea of 
knowledge which is generally assumed by epistemologists is hidden a 
dogmatic belief that the ground of commensurability of knowing can 
be established solidly, and this ground finally provides human thinking 
with objectivity. The ground needs, amongst other things, the 
`sameness of meaning' of words for the attainment of objectivity of 
18 Roger Straughan (1999) Weakness, wants and the will, in J. Mark 
Halstead & Terence H. McLaughlin (eds) Education in Morality, p. 264 (London: 
Routledge). 
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thinking.19 Thus, the forms of any statement require the use of 
objectively explanatory concepts. To be rational and to achieve a 
common ground of thinking, it is thought, is to find and to use proper 
terms and to organise them systematically. However, the crucial point 
is that this human aspiration necessarily requires the delimitation of 
the meanings of words by excluding the added or accompanying 
meanings, following example of the Socratic dialogues. 
Western philosophy, fortified by its commitment to keeping and 
extending the accuracy of human thought as far as possible, has seen 
orthodoxy as shaping the form of intellectual enquiries on the ground 
of objectivity and rationality, and as reducing the reckless acceptance 
of convention from human life. Since the period of Descartes, this 
philosophical aspiration has been accentuated repetitively in academic 
enquiries, and has influenced much education in that direction. 
Rational enquiries presuppose narrowly and clearly defined meanings 
of words. With their way of requiring definitions, rationalists have 
paid much attention to the work of seeking objectivity and rationality 
in human thinking; but they did so, deliberately or not, at the expense 
of the inevitable subjective or secondary meanings of language. For 
the rationalist, there is no truth and objectivity, if there is no clear 
expression of thoughts in language. However, the rationalist obliterates 
the very clear point that sentences are expressions of human 
experiences and that languages are human creations for the expression 
of human desires; perhaps he may be successful in seeing the objective 
world which is out there mind-independently, but he would certainly 
fail to allow for the fact that descriptions of human experiences are 
not of something mind-independent.20 Therefore, subjective 
expressions of deep human aspirations and desires are sometimes more 
appreciated than objective expressions. 
' 9 Richard Rorty (1980) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 316 (Oxford: 
Blackwell). 
20 Richard Rorty (1995) The contingency of language, in R.B. Goodman 
(ed.) Pragmatism, p. 109 (London: Routledge). 
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Insofar as the moral terms and morally significant behaviours are 
estimated as humanly created and as accompanying human desires, 
elements of subjectivity must be inevitable characteristics of the terms 
which constitute moral statements. Subjectivity is a striking feature of 
moral words and accordingly of moral knowing.`' Therefore, the 
rationalist view of the meaning of 'knowing' in general is logically 
distinct from the subjectivist view of 'moral knowing'; the former is 
impersonal and the latter personal. To say that a specific kind of 
knowing is impersonal is logically equivalent to saying that to express 
such knowing requires exclusively the use of textual concepts or of 
symbols like those defined in a dictionary, and also the rationality of 
using an algorithm for thinking which uses such symbols. Symbolic 
manipulation of human thoughts make the thought more precise but its 
inferences more impersonal and correspondingly more 'reversible'; 
`every step towards this ideal is achieved by a progressive sacrifice of 
content', as Michael Polanyi pointed out the problem.22 
The more precisely we use words in moral education, the more 
intellectual and impersonal the pupil's moral thinking becomes. This is 
the logical necessity of a mistaken philosophical epistemology and of 
its undue application in moral education. Such education then comes to 
be remote from the personal and humanistic dimensions, because the 
pupil who is trapped in such an epistemological destiny does not have 
any opportunity to develop a personal or practical character based on 
moral virtue and becomes apathetic towards the immense wealth of 
indefinite meanings of words which involve the personal or the 
subjective quality of morality. 
`Knowing' and 'doing' in the field of school subject is logically 
disparate, mainly because such knowing is necessarily impersonal and 
requires rational thinking to be seen as most invaluable. Thus a great 
gulf is existing between disciplinary knowledge and practical 
'Richard Rorty (1980) op. cit., p. 385. 
22 Michael Polanyi (1958) Personal Knowledge, p. 86 (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul). 
Educational- theory of moral Crowing and doing 151 
knowledge.23 The personal and the practical, in relation to knowledge 
are conceptually linked with 'doing', whereas the impersonal and the 
theoretical are thus linked with ratiocination in thinking. In fact, 
theoretical knowledge is impersonal in its character; this is a logical 
result of the belief that derives from the two premises: pursuing 
objectivity needs clarity in the meanings of words, and clarity of 
meaning excludes personal preference in determining them. This 
unwarranted belief inevitably invites moral dogmas and conflicts in 
morality under the guise of rationality, and excludes moral 
`imaginations and sympathies' from the meaning of moral knowing.' 
Avoidance of vague meanings might be necessary as a prerequisite 
in the sphere of theoretical enquiries. However, such enquiries lose the 
personal and dispositional features which are essential in the moral 
sphere, by adopting such a prerequisite and by eliminating arbitrarily 
the secondary meanings which comprise in depth the emotional and 
behavioural bases of the meanings of moral words. In this regard 
`moral knowing' as defined in the rationalist mode vitiates in its 
meaning the motivational elements of morality, through its notorious 
delimitation of the affective meanings of moral words. This is the 
Socratic irony that is involved in the process of pursuing clarity in 
knowing; the Socratic conception of knowing in its first stage of 
development seemed to imply p-knowledge, but it has been shifted into 
q-knowledge by losing the emotional character of knowing. A large 
part of moral education today has inherited such Socratic irony; as a 
result, the moral principles written in texts must be categorised not by 
p-knowledge, in which knowing and doing are implicative and accord 
well together, but by q-knowledge, rather which is purely theoretical 
and does not involve motivational elements. 
23 Aristotle contributes to dividing knowledge into the theoretical and the 
practical in Ethica Nkomachea; he suggested that the theoretical is that of 
contemplation, whereas the practical is that of doing something. 
24 Mary Warnock (1998) An Intelligent Persons's Guide to Ethics, p.119 
(London: Duckworth). 
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6.2 Psychological externalism and the difficulties 
of the dualist conception of moral education 
The 'rationalist legend' deriving from the Socratic conception, that 
knowing leads to doing, is hardly acceptable in education, especially 
because the teacher cannot see in what way there can be 
communication between the 'ghost' and the `machine'; that is to say, he 
does not know how to teach the pupil moral principles so that the 
pupil's behaviour complies with the principles, even if such a 
possibility is granted. Many teachers do not even know whether there 
is any logical link between human knowing and doing in morality; 
they do not believe that the moral principles stated in texts transmute 
naturally into the pupil's moral behaviour, whenever the pupil reads 
them. This would be so particularly when teachers acknowledge the 
rationalist character of moral statements that constitute the form of 
moral education as a school discipline in oriental countries in 
particular. 
The modern theorist of moral education has failed to identify the 
`ghost' and its function, the operation of the 'machine' which 
constitutes the pupil's behaviour. Thus, the theorist recognises that 
there is a big conceptual difference between knowing and doing in the 
rationalist conception. For the modern theorist, knowing moral 
principles discussed in texts on morality is nothing other than 
understanding their theoretical system, as in the case of interpreting, 
analysing, comparing and identifying what are implied in general 
principles and statements. In other words, for the modern theorist, 
knowing what counts as a person, knowing what counts as anger, 
knowing when someone feels anger and knowing that some drugs are 
addictive do not necessarily lead to pupil's action which comply with 
what is implied by such knowing. This is of course not due to the 
personal character of the pupil who engages in such rational knowing, 
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but to the very nature of that kind of knowing. Kierkegaard's 
distinction between knowing what Christianity is and living in 
Christianity reveals indirectly the rationalist's erroneous assumption of 
the relationship between moral knowing and doing.25 
Keeping a distance from the rationalist's camp, the modern theorist 
admits the inadequacy of the rationalist conception of moral knowing 
in that it seriously lacks motivational power. Thus, the modern 
theorist raises the problem of inconsistency between the antecedent and 
the consequent in the rationalist belief that if the pupil knows a certain 
moral principle, then he will behave in compliance with the principle. 
The modern theorist, therefore, takes an alternative view that moral 
motivation does not necessarily exist as a result of the 'moral 
understanding' and, as a result, dichotomises moral education into two 
separated parts; one for 'education of moral judgment' and the other 
for 'education of character', to adopt Paul Hirst's phrases.26 Hence 
the two distinctive forms of moral virtues and the two logically 
different types of moral education, as is proved by the examples of 
Frankena's MEX and MEY, ie. moral education which comprises 
handing down moral principles to the pupil, and that which attempts to 
ensure the pupil's conduct to the principles.'' The former is 
categorised as something which is to do with the cognitive, and the 
latter with the non-cognitive. 
Driving a wedge between the cognitive and the non-cognitive, the 
modern theorist sets up a dualist conception of moral education. For 
example, Hirst detaches his 'character training' from the education for 
moral judgments and puts it outside his strictly defined domain of 
`liberal education'. The same case of dichotomisation can be seen in his 
25 Soren A. Kierkegaard (1990) For Self-examination and yudge for Yourself 
(eds & trans. H. Hong & E. Hong), pp. 116-7 (Princeton University Press). 
26 Paul H. Hirst (1974) The forms of knowledge re-visited, in idem 
Knowledge and the Curriculum, p. 96 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
27 William Frankena (1971) Toward a philosophy of moral education, in John 
Strain (ed.) Modern Philosophy of Education (New York: Random House). 
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theory of religious education, too; he sharply distinguishes cognitive 
religious education from non-cognitive Christian nurture which is 
bound to the primal or traditional concept of religious education.28 
For the modern theorist; therefore, the non-cognitive is conceptually 
external to the cognitive. 
Furthermore, 'character training' is considered, as Hirst mentions, 
to be outside the cognitive domain of morality, if it is simply about 
fostering approved behaviours caused by external sanctions and not by 
the agent's autonomous moral choice. Nonetheless, psychologists 
classify such behaviours as moral actions, though they do not comprise 
all the ingredients of moral knowing. Moral knowing, for the 
psychologists, might seem to be secondary in value to moral doing, as 
it appears in many analyses of moral psychology; amongst them are 
Kohlberg's theory of moral development and Derek Wright's 
psychology of moral behaviour. In this sense, the modern theorist's 
concept of external morality goes back to and relies heavily on this 
psychological view of human behaviours. 
The 'punishment and obedience orientation' at the preconventional 
level, in Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development, 
dominates an early stage of the pupil's moral development.' 
However, behaviour developed as a result of external constraint as 
such is not very different from the psychological mechanism of the 
avoidance of punishment, or that of thoughtless deference to external 
powers such as social conventions. The pupil behaves very often 
according to some ordained laws, without knowing the reason why he 
acts in such a way. Hence comes a serious deficiency in moral 
28 Paul H. Hirst (1965) Liberal education and the nature of knowledge, in 
R.D. Archambault (ed.) Philosophical- Analysis and Education, p. 136 (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul); Paul H. Hirst (1974) op. cit.; Paul H. Hirst (1981) 
Education, catechesis and the church school, British journal of Religious Education, 
pp. 85-93; Paul H. Hirst (1985) Education and diversity of belief, in M.C. Felderhof 
(ed.) Religious Education in a Pluralistic Society, pp. 12-ff. (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton). 
29 Lawrence Kohlberg (1981) 'The Philosophy of Mora! Development (San 
Francisco: Harper & Row). 
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autonomy. Nonetheless, such a psychological theory is widely accepted 
as a 'developmental theory' of morality in education. Throughout all 
the developmental stages of morality, Kohlberg indeed ignores the 
educational requirement for the growth of moral autonomy; thus, his 
theory lacks the integrating notion of the growth of moral goodness 
that is to be aimed at in education. 
The Freudian construct of the 'super-ego' is another example of a 
psychological mechanism developed by the pupil's external constraints. 
Nonetheless, it is used in many cases for the understanding of moral 
behaviours. Such an externally induced determinant of human 
character often restricts the pupil's behaviours in the same way that 
imperialist societies have coerced their subject peoples to live 
according to the values which the imperialists have establish and 
regard highly. The hazard is that such values are unwarranted beliefs 
and the people lose their moral autonomy. Therefore, the characters 
built up by such aid of psychological mechanisms do not belong to the 
educational task of pursuing moral goodness, but to training to follow 
inert conventions and blind habits, as John White convincingly 
asserts.3°  
An analogy can be drawn between those developmental theories of 
character and Derek Wright's theory of the psychological development 
of morality. Wright defines morality in terms of psychological 
dispositions or traits.31 Certain psychological dispositions, like 
humility and compassion, might indeed be accepted as worthy of 
cultivation in moral education.32 They might be central moral 
dispositions to be fostered in education, as Aristotle reminds us. 
" John White (1998) The education of the emotions, in Paul H. Hirst & 
Patricia White (eds) Philosophy of Education, vol. 2, p. 207 (London: Routledge). It 
first appeared in yournal. 
 of Philosophy of Education, vol. 18, no. 2, 1984. 
31 Derek Wright (1983) The Psychology of Moral Behaviour (London: Penguin). 
32 Further moral behaviours to be developed through moral education are 
listed by Derek Wright as follows; tendency of resistance to temptation, self-concept, 
traits of introversion-extroversion, reactions to transgression, altruism, etc. See 
Derek Wright (1983) ibid. 
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However, the blind state of being dominated by psychological 
dispositions does not make the pupil free from the constraint of 
psychological mechanism; it is detrimental to an educational view of 
morality. Psychological dispositions and traits do not always have 
moral adequacy. 
There is similarity between the view that psychological dispositions 
should be cultivated and that the pupil's will should be trained. 
Psychologists ascribe the pupil's moral failures in most cases to 
`weakness of will'; thus, for them the weakness of will is the paragon 
of moral ccporrua. However, following David Carr's distinction of 
its meanings, the 'will' here denotes the case of 'acts of will' or human 
`volitions' which are not activities performed by the pupil for a 
particular reason, and therefore it is used in a different way from 
when referring to something said to be 'voluntary' or of one's own 
`free will'.33 When they assume the idea of 'free will', teachers 
believe that such a will is a 'vehicle' which carries what the 'ghost' 
intends into the 'machine', in another words, it translates mental states 
into bodily movements. They take the view that the pupil's will must 
be strengthened in education enough for the means of perfect moral 
performance. However, an irrelevant belief is implied in the view, 
because the view covers up the psychological reductionist fallacy 
which it assumes by taking the will as a psychological device with 
which the pupil is able to conquer his bad habits. In fact, the will is not 
an element specific to morality; it is common in other areas, as is 
suggested by the proverb 'where there is a will there is a way'. The 
pupil may have a strong will, but he may use it not for moral action; it 
can be used for other purpose than the moral good. In this regard, the 
will is not exactly a logical attribute of morality; for the moral 
psychologist it is therefore conceived as an external means which is 
outside morality and connects the 'ghost' to the 'machine'. The moral 
psychologist conceives moral incontinence as something which is 
33 David Carr (1999) Virtue, akrasia and moral weakness, in David Carr & 
Jan Steutel (eds) 'Virtue Ethics and Mord Education, p. 139 (London: Routledge). 
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caused not entirely by the pupil's morality itself, but rather by the 
weakness of a will that is outside the influence of moral knowing, 
whilst Socrates argues in Protagoras that moral incontinence is a failure 
of moral cognition.34 
Though the psychological conception of the will may influence 
greatly the straightening of the pupil's warped dispositions and the 
overcoming of the separation between knowing and doing, there 
remains yet a more important question about the validity of the 
psychologist's claim, because the claim disregards the point that a rift 
might be opened between the behaviour caused by the strengthened 
will and that represented by moral notions. A strong will which is 
trained through a psychological programme and developing the 
`virtues of will-power' like persistence, endurance and diligence, may 
not always be based on a morality which is rooted in the conception of 
moral knowing or more properly of moral notions. 'Training of will' 
in the modern theories of moral education is a means devised to 
supplement simply what is lacking in moral education today, which is 
the result of concentrating heavily on teaching the process of moral 
judgment and on reading moral lessons from texts proposed by some 
great thinkers. 
Moral education, as advocated by the modern theorist, seeks the 
determinants of moral behaviours erroneously as outside moral 
knowing. Hence comes the moral externalist who dichotomises the aim 
of moral education. Bifurcating morality into logically different parts, 
the theorist proposes a dualist conception of moral education; 
education for 'knowing without moral doing' and that for 'doing 
without moral knowing'. Detaching 'doing' from 'knowing' and vice 
versa, moral externalism eventually creates logical difficulties in 
moral education. Holding the horns of a logical dilemma, the teacher 
confronts the philosophical perplexity of how these two logically 
different objectives can be achieved in one logical sphere of moral 
Plato, Protagoras, 357d-e & 358c; Robert Dunn (1987) 'The Possibility of 
'Weakness of Will, ch. 1 (Indianapolis: Hackett). 
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education. 
Psychological determinants of course motivate greatly and more 
often than not many other kinds of human behaviour as well as the 
moral. Relying on moral psychology, the modern moral theorist 
recommends such determinants to be applied for the improvement of 
the pupil's moral conducts. However, it would be seriously misleading 
to adopt such external determinants in moral education without 
consideration of the nature of moral education itself; because they are 
logically remote in their nature from the distinctive character of 
morality, though some of them may in some cases share moral 
qualities in part. Socrates claims in Plato's Meno that the virtues are 
beneficial when they are learned and trained with intelligence, but 
harmful when they are learned and trained without it.35 Contrary to 
the case of epistemological internalism, psychological externalism, 
which borrows psychological determinants from the external sphere of 
morality and overlooks this psychological reductionist fallacy, 
necessarily raises the problem of failing to support cognitive morality 
or moral autonomy. Thus it distorts the meaning of moral knowing 
and finally makes the relationship between moral knowing and doing 
contingent. 
6.3 Logical internalism of moral knowing and doing 
The psychological theory of moral externalism emerges in its origin 
from the negative view of the relationship between moral knowing and 
doing. But unfortunately it removes moral doing from the territory of 
knowing, and invites external determinants of moral behaviour into 
moral education instead. Thus, moral externalism loses moral 
autonomy and the true nature of moral education. By contrast, 
epistemological moral internalism assumes a positive relationship 
between moral knowing and doing; but without establishing its view of 
3i Plato, Meno, 88b. 
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the logical bond between them. The controversial extravagance of 
these theories results from their different accounts of the nature of 
moral knowing and moral doing. The epistemologist's conception of 
moral doing is seriously deficient in the psychologist's view, and 
conversely the psychological conception of moral doing is deficient in 
the epistemologist's view. However, the most striking thing is that both 
theories commonly misconceive the very nature of moral knowing by 
restricting extremely the meaning of moral knowing. 
The epistemologist's internalism can be traced back to Plato's 
Socratic position on moral knowledge in Protagoras and Men°, where 
the meaning of moral knowing is defined for the specific purpose of 
dialectics. In the Socratic position, virtue is nothing other than 
knowledge; and this knowledge is claimed to have the feature of TEXV11 
or craft knowledge. However, Protagoras dissents from Socrates's 
conception of knowledge.36 Aristotle, too, disagrees with Socrates, 
distinguishing moral knowing from craft knowledge. For Aristotle, 
moral knowing is by its nature concerned with apaxi.g (action), 
whereas craft knowledge is based on theoretical knowledge and aims at 
the work of noilutg (making), as he expounds in detailed in his Ethica 
Nicomachia. For him, apaxt,g is achieved not with TExvri, but with 
cppoveatc (practical wisdom). Aristotle writes thus: 
... practical wisdom cannot be scientific nor art; not science because that which can be 
done is capable of being otherwise, not art because action and making are different 
kinds of thing. The remaining alternative, then, is that it is a true and reasoned state of 
a capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man. For while 
making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end.37 
Nonetheless, moral internalism has dominated the teacher's conception 
of the nature of moral knowing and its presumed effect on the 
morality of doing. Since Socrates and especially Descartes, such 
Plato, Protagoras; Terence Irwin (1995) Plato's Ethics, ch. 6 (Oxford 
University Press). 
3' Aristotle (1915a) op. cit., 1140b3-7. 
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predominance of rationalist internalism in the field of moral education 
has generally shaped the teacher's conception of moral knowing 
according to the form of rationalism. For this reason, the teacher loses 
sight of the behavioural side of morality, engaging mainly in teaching 
cognitive morality in accordance with the rationalist's view. The main 
trend in moral education consequently and unwillingly transformed 
the subject of morality into a theoretical discipline. Kant's ethical 
theory and its application to moral education heightened such an 
educational trend. Kant chooses rather a narrow concept of morality, 
in comparing to the other philosophers who have dealt with the issues 
of the human good. 'Kant deals only with the problems of right or just 
action', according to Habermas.35 Kant's moral philosophy claims to 
explain and understand the normative validity of ethical commands 
and norms of action. 
After Kant's influence on moral philosophy and moral education, 
teaching rational moral understanding has been replaced in part by 
teaching 'discourse ethics', and a leading exponent in recent times is 
Jurgen Habermas.39 Discourse ethics is a form of practical theory. In 
this form of argument, the pupil is expected to transform his privately 
enacted role taking into public affairs and practice; this is, as it were, 
`communicative action', to adopt Habermas's phrase. Paying attention 
to the practical discourse of moral values, Habermas's thesis on 
communicative actions anticipates that someone's communicative 
actions should lead, as the outcomes, to justifiable moral actions justly 
and intersubjectively developed moral opinions. Prima facie, the form 
of discourse on ethics seems to be shifted to a great extent from 
theoretical to practical. However, it is still very uncertain whether 
such practical discourse necessarily implies morality in doing, because 
the primal purpose of practical discourse is to get mutual recognition 
and with this to stabilise the individual participants' insubstantial 
" Jurgen Habermas (1990) Moral. Consciousness and Communicative Action 
(trans. C. Lenhardt & S.W. Nicholsen), p. 1% (Cambridge: Polity Press). 
39 /bid, pp. 116-94. 
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beliefs. It seems therefore that rationalist internalism is reappearing in 
another form in discourse ethics and in its application to moral 
education. 
Discourse ethics aims at shared understanding on values and 
interests through intersubjective public discourse. Communicative 
action in this sense may help as often as not to achieve what moral 
education aims at, through abstracting, generalising and stretching 
extensively the culturally transmitted complexity of values. However, 
practical argument in discourse ethics concentrates mainly on the work 
of conceptualisation of the meanings of words in preparation for 
rational discourses in the same way as is usual in the Socratic 
dialogues, and, at its final stage, it entangles itself greatly with the 
problem of the motivational neutrality. This assumed inevitability of 
neutrality in turn restricts the open ended meanings of words 
employed in the very discourse. Therefore, the defect involved in 
discourse ethics obscures awareness of the rich and multifarious 
meanings of the words that are considered to reflect the morality 
which permeates broadly and deeply our undifferentiated ordinary 
moral life. 
Hare's theory of moral language applies in part the view of the 
open ended meanings of moral language. Hare claims thus: if the pupil 
makes or understands a moral judgment, he would thereby address a 
first-person command to himself, to which he would sincerely assent 
or upon which he would act or try to act.4° Relying on the cognizant 
emotive theory originally developed by Charles Stevenson, Hare's 
theory espouses the view of 'magnetism' of moral language that 
appeals to emotional force in use of the language. For this very point, 
Hare phrases as follows: 
... to guide choices or actions, a moral judgment has to be such that if a person 
assents to it, he must assent to some imperative sentence derivable from it, ... This is 
true by my definition of the word evaluative. But to say this is to say that if [a person] 
Press). " R.M. Hare (1952) The Language of Morals, p. 167 (Oxford University 
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professes to assent to the moral judgments, but does not assent to the imperative, he 
must have misunderstood the moral judgment (by taking it to be non-evaluative, 
though the speaker intended it to be evaluative).`' 
Hare analyses the central moral concept 'good' as having both 
descriptive and the evaluative meanings, and he sees the former as 
secondary and the latter as the primary.42 Basing securely on this 
analysis, Hare claims further that the evaluative meaning bears the 
imperative meaning 'ought'. However, the Harean imperative 
meaning, differing from that of Kant, is derivative. In fact, Hare 
derives the imperative meaning from his theory of evaluative 
meaning; but the evaluative and the imperative in a moral judgment 
are not logically equivalent. Making an evaluative judgment in a speech-
act and representing morality through the pupil's ordinary life are not 
logically identical. In this sense, Harean view of the relationship 
between moral judgment and behaviour is contingent. Thus comes the 
Ayerite cliché; it is not logically absurd at all to say that one evaluates 
doing x is good but he nonetheless does not do x; it is not misleading 
to say that one has the conclusion that he ought to do x but he does not 
do x. Therefore, it would be safer to say that evaluation is a reason-
giving action than that it is an action giving of the reasons which 
motivate moral behaviours.43 Emotivism seems to be nearer to the 
place where knowing and doing meet for the reunion of morality in a 
practical sense in comparing to the rationalist's moral internalism. 
Nonetheless, a big logical gulf exists still between the Harean 
evaluative meaning and his imperative meaning. 
To escape from the theoretical impasse encountered in the above 
discussion, it would be a logical alternative to seek a logically internal 
4' Ibis., pp. 171-2. The words in square brackets are inserted and the Italics 
are preferred. 
az R.M. Hare (1952) op. cit., p. 146. 
43 Bernard Williams (1985) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: 
Fontana Press) where Williams characterises Harean prescriptivism as a reason-giving 
theory. 
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relationship between moral knowing and doing, with a view to the 
careful avoidance of the polemical extremities of both the Socratic or 
epistemologist error and the modern theorist's fallacy or the 
psychological reductionism. However, the keystone of the alternative 
might be not the use of 'moral knowing' in the restricted senses of 
both epistemological moral internalism and psychological moral 
externalism, but understanding it in an extensive way to encompass the 
elements of 'moral doing' in the full sense. This would be to reclaim 
what Socrates and the epistemological rationalists first held and then 
lost; it would also be to renounce the psychological reductionism of 
morality and to restore what the psychologist misses in his 
understanding of the nature of moral knowing. However, for these 
purposes, this logical approach presupposes again the use of moral 
words in their extended meanings, beyond the limit of factual 
describability. 
An examination of the use of moral language might rehabilitate the 
prime function of language, the function which was first thought to be 
logically required in shaping the human soul in ancient Greek 
education before Socrates. Preferring wider meanings of words to 
precisely and narrowly defined meanings, the pre-disciplinary way of 
using language in the humanist view of education was inclined to be so 
extensive as to encompass the whole humanistic strand of morality. In 
accordance with this view, the extended meanings of words in the 
moral domain assimilated moral phenomena more perfectly in their 
breadth and depth, ie. the whole context, and the large areas of actual 
moral life where knowing and doing are inseparable. It is therefore a 
conceptual necessity to synthesise the perniciously analysed meanings 
of 'knowing' in a humanistic view and to rehabilitate the meanings of 
words eliminated since the Socratic dialectics engaged in the 
clarification of meanings, including especially that of the word 
`knowledge'. 
Exhaustively clarified meanings of words may be helpful, for 
instance in mathematics, but in mom! conversations they certainly 
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obstruct the extensive view of 'morality'. In contrast to the Socratic 
ideal of the clarification of the meanings of words, and contrary to the 
restricted use of knowing in the sciences, the use of an extensive 
meaning of 'knowing' would accommodate a larger range of the moral 
world, beyond the territory of morality as delimited by the rationalist. 
The basic idea of this alternative sense of 'knowing' is to dissolve the 
problem of conceptual and behavioural dissonance between moral 
knowing and doing, which is caused by the use of the restricted 
meaning of language. The non-rational and non-realistic conception of 
moral knowing allows the widest human understanding and perception 
of morality. 
The extensive use of 'moral knowing' and the meaning of moral 
notions are logically equivalent. 'Moral notions' are inclusive; the 
meaning of this term is broad and comprehensive; its range embraces 
the cognitive, the conative and the affective. In the use of 'moral 
notions' the cognitive is partly fused with the affective; this is so 
particularly if we consider what is not for the purpose of linguistic 
distinction but for the integrative practice of moral good. Therefore, 
in the conception of moral notions, the cognitive elements of morality 
cannot be taken into account without considering the conative; the 
conative cannot be admitted without first satisfying the prerequisite 
condition of the affective, and the affective cannot be accepted 
legitimately without understanding in advance the cognitive; there are 
logical overlappings and therefore blurred edges between these 
domains. In the conception of moral notions these domains are not 
strictly distinguishable. Under the meanings of morally concerned 
words (or phrases), like rescuing, promise-keeping, and fraternity, are 
laid some indefinable domains of meanings which constitute the 'depth-
strata' of such words. Some of them are certainly the cognitive 
elements; some of them are affective; and still some of them are also 
conative. This is because moral language is multiplex in its nature; it 
involves the cognitive and the conative in a certain varying 
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proportion.' Love and fraternity, for instance, essentially involve 
such multiplicity.45 In this view of the multiplex conceptual contexts 
of morality, moral knowing and doing are not logically separable; 
they have an internal relationship in this logic. 
A logical nebula exists between moral virtues. Between fellow-
feeling and benevolence there is no clear distinguishing line; nor is 
there between benevolence and love of persons, or between love of 
persons and fellow-feeling. The claim that moral words simply name 
certain facts existing in a moral situation is seriously misleading as it 
overlooks the important issues of the inclusive character of moral 
notions and, in addition, of the extensive use of moral words. The 
meanings of words in moral life are not at all mutually exclusive in 
their depth meanings; this is simply because moral words are basically 
all expressions of one and the same reality, ie. moral goodness. 
Moral notions are created by human beings and embedded in their 
lives and culture, in the form of desiring, wishing, valuing, complying 
with customs, rule-following, having fellow-feeling, etc. Therefore, 
living in a culture means performing actions which represent in 
various types of life; knowing and doing, especially in moral life, are 
the characteristic representations of moral notions, no matter whether 
these representations can be described explicitly or implicitly. And 
language is 'an extension of primitive behaviour', as is expounded by 
Wittgenstein.' Moral language and behaviour are not independent; 
they are logically inter-dependent. 
Highly sophisticated language does not necessarily fit the idea of 
moral notions, mainly because such language is improper for the form 
of moral notions. The notional state of moral mind may not be 
44 Justin Oakley (1993) Morality and the Emotions, p. 40 (London: 
Routledge). 
45 ibid., pp. 38-85; Michael Stocker and Elizabeth Hegeman (1996) Valuing 
Emotions, pp. 56-87 (Cambridge University Press). 
46 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1967) Zettel (ed. G.E.M. Anscome & G.H. von 
Wright, trans. G.E.M. Anscome), p. 545 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 
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adequately described by elaborately defined meanings of words, just 
because it is complex, vague and compound in its `darkness'.`' 
Though some notional part of the moral mind appears in an articulated 
form, it is not yet clearly definable; even the articulated notions are 
blurred and nebulous in their meanings so that they usually pass only 
vaguely through the pupil's mind and remain largely in the pupil's 
subconscious. Inaccuracy and vagueness are the critical features of 
moral notions, as in the case of the poetical image. However, the point 
is that, by virtue of this vagueness, moral notions are able to involve 
the multiplicity of morality. 
Contrary to scientific ideas, moral notions are indeterminate in 
their character. Clear definition is in fair detrimental to moral 
notions, because it abandons a large part of the essential moral 
substance which is most valuable in laying down the bed-rock of moral 
notions. Therefore, the more abstract the meanings of moral words 
are, the more detached they are from the content of moral substance. 
Having moral notions is unlikely to be a matter of understanding 
moral statements described in texts; nor is it shown by obeying simply 
what is recommended by the teacher. Having moral notions is possible, 
in part if not exclusively, through 'immersion' in the 'pool' of cultural 
tradition in which, to apply Oakeshott's words, 'a stock of emotions, 
beliefs, images, ideas, manners of thinking, languages, skills, practices 
and manners of activity' is preserved.' 
Acquiring moral notions in the above sense means doing and 
perceiving something morally concerned in a characteristic way; 
`moral knowing' therefore means the wider perception of the public 
sense of morality which is compound in its form and which is 
47 The word 'darkness' comes from Lao-Tzu's Tao Te Ching, ch. 1, where it 
means the undifferentiated or unnamed whole of things which is the primal source of 
conceptualisation. 
48 Michael Oakeshott (1962) Nationalism in Politics and Other Essays, p. 304 
(London: Methuen). 
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fundamental in the culture of a society.49 However, not all perceptions 
can be conceptualised precisely; some of them are not describable, 
definable, or structured in the realist or the rationalist way. In this 
regard, Kant's aphorism, that percepts without concepts are blind and 
concepts without percepts are empty, is inappropriate. The difficulty 
of conceptualisation of moral notions comes from this distinctive 
character of perception. Some part of moral notions may rise to the 
horizon of articulation, but a much larger part of them sinks deeply 
below the level where emotion, passions, dispositions and habit are in 
a state of coalescence. In this sense, 'knowing' in terms of moral 
notions is different from Socrates's TEXVT1 and also from Aristotle's 
ypovicng meaning practical reasoning or 'a reasoned state'.5° Thus, 
the broadened meaning of knowing dissolves the dualist dilemma 
which appeared, for instance, in Richard Peters's view that reason and 
habit are the elements of paradox in moral education.51 The 
distinction between knowing and doing is possible only in linguistic 
analysis, but it is not probable in the qualitative enquiry about moral 
notions. 
In some cases, the pupil's moral behaviours might be the results of 
his ratiocinations, as is maintained by John Wilson.52 However, such 
an interpretation of moral doing is too sophisticated to assure 
substantial moral behaviour. In practice, 'living', whatever it may be, 
cannot be analysed or rationalised in that way, saving for a specific 
purpose of theoretical understanding. Under the conception of moral 
49 Zygmunt Bauman (1999) Culture as Praxis (London: SAGE). 
5° Aristotle (1915a) op. cit., 1140b28-30. 
51 Richard S. Peters (1981) Mora! Development and Moral Education, ch. 3 
(London: George Allen & Unwin). 
52 John Wilson, for instance, explains the process of moral doing, thus; i) 
What S does here is to claim the others' interests rule as his moral principle. ii) What 
S does is to notice, to be relevantly alert. iii) What S does is to think thoroughly. iv) 
What S does is to make a 'proper' decision to act. v) What S does is to take action. 
See John Wilson (1990) A New Introduction to Moral Education, pp. 161-2 (London: 
Cassell Educational). 
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notions, moral doing is not a skill produced by texvi that is 
theoretically designed, nor is it a 'step-child' of the rationalist's use of 
`moral knowing'. Moral knowing and doing are inseparable; they are 
concomitant words in terms of moral behaviour. The form of 
concomitance of knowing and doing under the conception of moral 
notions might have some affinity to the example appearing in Yang-
ming's theory of the consistency between knowing and doing in a 
general sense.53 Thus, knowing in the conception of moral notions is 
categorically different from the Socratic concept of £nucirmixi. More 
important still, it is not TEXV11, nor is it exactly Aristotelian 
cppoviutc. The meaning of wpovicng in Aristotle composed of 
knowing and being disposed to act. However, cppoviotg is after all 
`an excellence of the deliberative part the rational soul' and a cognitive 
capacity to devise means towards ends, as Joseph Dunne recognises this 
Chuang-Tzu, an ancient Chinese philosopher, characterises 
indirectly the meaning of knowing in the following words: 
People are honest, but they do not know that this is 'righteousness'; people are 
humane, but they do not know that this is 'benevolence'; people are truthful, but they 
do not know that this is sincerity'; people keep promises, but they do not know that 
this is 'fidelity'; people help each other, but they do not know that this is 
generosity'.55  
Not know that' in the above quotation does not indeed mean a total 
ignorance of something; it rather means knowing in a way that is 
characteristically different from the knowledge which is theoretical, 
which is written in letters and constructed with clearly defined 
meanings as is favoured by the rationalist and by the scientific realist. 
53 Yang-ming, the Chinese neo-Confucian, claims a positive relationship 
between knowing and doing. One is immediately delighted as soon as one sees a 
beautiful flower, and detests something malodorous as soon as one smells it, to 
epitomise his theory. 
54 Joseph Dunne (1999) Virtue, phronesis and learning, in David Carr and 
Jan Steutel (eds.) 'Virtue Ethics and Moral Education, pp. 54-5 (London: Routledge). 
55 Chuang-Tzu, Heaven and earth, in idem Chuang-Tzu. 
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Chuang-Tzu's conception of what the pupil knows implicitly does not 
require any clearly defined meanings of words or any sentences 
literally expressed manifestly with symbols; it is rather a conception of 
the way of life which is embedded in ordinary human behaviours. 
Knowing may involve the virtue of contemplation of things, in a sense; 
it may mean making something, in another sense, by developing some 
sequential procedure in the sense of craft knowledge; but in the sense 
of morality, knowing is fundamentally different from them. If the 
teacher confines moral knowing arbitrarily to the theoretical, then 
certainly there would be the case that his pupil knows what 'honesty' 
means, but he is not actually honest. The people in Chuang-Tzu's text 
are honest, humane and true; these are qualities of their lives which 
imply both knowing and doing. Their 'knowing' is not exactly the 
same as the disciplinary knowing; they perceive palpably and really 
`know' something about morality which is shown in their honest 
behaviour, and their actions are expressions of profound moral 
notions. They do not know the meanings of such words as 
`righteousness', 'benevolence', 'sincerity', 'fidelity' and 'generosity' 
whose meanings may be precisely defined for a disciplinary purpose; 
their words may point to immediate things, but do not clearly describe 
them. For them, 'knowing' is not sophisticated enough to be sharply 
detached from `doing'; knowing and doing are logically internal to 
each other and therefore not distinctive in these people's moral life. 
Art criticism and drawing a picture are not logically on a par. The 
former is theoretical and the latter practical. Art criticism is not 
necessary for the artist; it is a knowing divorced from the art of 
representing the artist's aesthetic mind. Drawing is not accomplished 
by complying with the 'ghost's' commands expressed in the words of 
texts by art critics; without doubt it is something of the artist's own 
aesthetic mind. In drawing, doing and knowing that has practical 
implication are coalesced. 
`Moral knowing' in Chuang-Tzu's text is not simply rational. 
Comparable to this specific thought, IVI:.-,ncius's passage about the four 
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cardinal moral principles reveals the breadth and depth of moral 
knowing and its secret foundations: 
The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of the principle of benevolence. The 
feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of the principle of righteousness. The 
feeling of modesty and complaisance is the beginning of the principle of propriety. 
The feeling of approving and disapproving is the beginning of the principle of 
prudential .56 
Beneath these articulated four cardinal moral principles are something 
what is not yet articulated and theorised, but which composes the 
foundation of moral notions and from which moral knowing and 
doing come into being and stand together. 
Moral knowing defined in this way expresses itself in variously 
changing modes of practical activity, beyond the limited scope of the 
disciplinary study of morality which is constructed with narrowly 
defined technical terms.57 'Moral knowing' opens its conceptual bound 
into the 'darkness' far beyond the limit of both the epistemologist's 
and the psychologist's formal analysis. In this regard, the newly 
defined meaning of 'moral knowing' rejects Socratic romanticism 
implied in the Socrates's claims that virtue is knowledge and that all 
human actions are the outcomes of more or less the rational 
knowledge.' 
56 Mencius, Kung-sun chau, in idem Mencius. 
57 Israel Scheffler (1991) In Praise of the Cognitive Emotions, p. 119 (London: 
Routledge). 
58 Isaiah Berlin (1999) The Roots of Romanticism (London: Chatto & Windus) 
where Isaiah Berlin sees Socrates's aphorism 'virtue is knowledge' as the root of 
romanticism, which first appeared as a reaction against constraints on human 
behaviours and against scientific enquiries. 
Chapter 7 
Moral Notions 
and the Aesthetics of Moral Education 
Meno, a pupil of Gorgias the famous rhetorician, asks Socrates in 
Meno an ethical question: whether virtue is the result of teaching or of 
practice.' Both 'teaching' and 'practice' are subsumed under the 
activity of education. However, the words are not always used in the 
same way; 'teaching' in education is generally used in relation to 
understanding of knowledge, explanations of theories and acquisition 
of skills, whereas 'practice' is specifically understood to refer to 
activity for the improvement of excellence, or apEtii in Greek; 
`practice' is of doing something for the improvement of its quality. 
These different uses are determined mainly by different objects of 
education. 
The meaning of the phrase 'teaching children to be good', which is 
conspicuous in the discussion of moral education, is not adequately 
expressed by its conceptual sense.' 'Goodness' is not the object of 
teaching, insofar as 'teaching' is used in the way properly mentioned 
above; what the terms 'goodness' implies is not a quality which can be 
explained by teaching. The objects of teaching and those of practice 
are not the same. Morality seems not to be teachable, because moral 
quality does not allow theoretical explanation, nor can it be 
Plato, Meno, 70a. 
Cf. Roger Straughan (1982) Can We Teach Children to be Good?, pp. 9-10 
(London: George Allen & Unwin) where the phrase in inverted commas appears 
remarkably as the main theme of the work. 
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transmitted through instruction. Morality might be an aspect of the 
pupil's mind which is 'to grow' in a certain particular way in the 
situation of moral praxis. Education for developing morality is not 
merely telling the pupil moral principles in words. Moral principles 
may be a subject to be taught in moral education, as is seen in the case 
of the modern theorist's idea of moral education. However, a big 
difference exists between education for developing morality and 
education which teaches moral principles. The former is for the 
growth of moral goodness, whereas the latter aims at the clarification 
of the meaning of moral words and the justification of moral 
principles in accordance with the shift of the meaning of virtue in 
Socrates's thinking. 
Criticising the Socratic view of 'teaching' as education for moral 
virtue and refuting to some extent the Aristotelian position on moral 
`training', this chapter will characterise the meaning of moral growth 
from an educational viewpoint, and will propose a logical link between 
the meaning of moral knowing and education which promotes 
morality in the pupil's practical moral life. 
7.1 Socratic misconception of moral virtue 
and Protagorean misuse of teaching 
The dialogues between Socrates and Meno in Plato's Mena attract the 
teacher who is engaging in moral education. In those dialogues 
Socrates concludes; 'Virtue is knowledge and teachable, if it is 
knowledge'.3 However, 'virtue is knowledge', the first part of the 
Socratic conclusion, is not appropriate to accept as a first principle of 
moral education; this is because 'knowledge' in the Socratic dialogues 
is restrictively defined by the rational system of thinking.` 
' Plato, Mena, passim. 
As is shown in the introductory chapter, the central theme of the study is to 
examine the meanings of virtue and knowing in order to establish a theory of moral 
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Therefore, no difference between knowledge-based rationality and 
virtue is accepted by Socrates in Mena; knowledge as represented by 
`craft-knowledge' and 'virtue' are identical in their character in the 
Socratic conception of knowledge. For Socrates, the rational mind is 
the final purpose of the development of moral virtue and also is a 
sufficient condition for the pupil's performance of moral behaviour; 
he illustrates this viewpoint in Plato's Charmides and Lathes by giving 
some examples of crafts.5 His main idea is that in crafts knowing 
principles is producing something which it is desired to create; hence, 
knowing and producing are necessarily related. If this is the case, then 
the second part of Socrates's conclusion necessarily follows. However, 
the point is that such a teaching is nothing other than that in 
engineering or medicine, and this offers a crucial problem, if the 
teacher applies such a teaching in moral education. For this reason, it 
seems that the second part of Socrates's conclusion could not stand in 
moral education. 
Aristotle views the aim of the Socratic dialectics as seeking 
precisely defined meanings of words and as engaging in inductive 
arguments.' In fact, in the process of dialectics, the Socratic 
conception of knowledge became closer to scientific enquiry. For this 
very reason, Aristotle criticises the Socratic reductionist fallacy of 
identifying the nature of virtue with that of craft or scientific 
knowledge.' Socrates in fact ignores the vital difference between 
craft-knowledge and virtues.8 Nonetheless, many a philosopher has 
supposed that Socratic dialectics and its modern versions contributed 
education, paying much attention to the ambiguous meanings of the words in 
Socrates's proposition 'Virtue is knowledge'. 
5 Plato, Channides, 174b11-175a8; Plato, Lathes, 198d1-199a5. 
Aristotle (1908) Metaphysica (ed. W.D. Ross), 1078b23-30. 
7 Aristotle (1915a) Ethica Nkomachea, 1144b17-30; Aristotle (1915b) Magna 
Morafia, 1198a10-15; Aristotle (1915c) Ethica Eudemia, 1246b32-37. 
8 Aristotle (1915c) ibid., 1216b2-10. 
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to the theory of concept-formation and the clarification of our thought 
as resources for the means of logical thinking and the establishment of 
the rationalist conception of knowledge. But the crucial problem is 
that Socrates reduced all kinds of virtue to the reason-based 
knowledge, and consequently detached moral virtue from non-rational 
part of the mind.' 
Being separate from the non-rational part of the mind, moral 
virtue in the Socratic conception of reason-based knowledge merely 
floats on the surface of the rational level of morality without taking 
root in the non-rational depth of morality. The nature of moral 
'virtue' in Socratic dialectics assumes this reason-based knowledge; it 
defines the aim of moral education to be the development of rational 
judgment on moral facts. Therefore, the rationalist educator sees the 
aim of his moral education as the pursuit of truth, and as critical and 
rational activities in the same way as other rational enquiries about 
truth.' The rationalist view of moral education originates from the 
Socratic conception of 'virtue', whose nature is misleadingly 
formulated; for this reason it obstructs the view of the wider range of 
the meanings of virtue and of moral education. Insofar as Socrates 
defines virtues as scientific knowledge, as in his dialogues with both 
Meno and Protagoras, and identifies virtue with craft knowledge that 
is theoretical in its character, his aim for moral education is seriously 
confined to the development of the clarification of the meanings of 
moral words and of the rational way of moral judgment. 
For instance, 'justice' as a virtue is discussed in Plato's Republic. 
The discussion begins with the examination of the meaning of 'justice' 
defined by Simonides: 'Justice is the re-payment of a debt'. Rejecting 
Aristotle also criticises Socrates in the same point. See Aristotle (1915b), 
op. cit., 1182a15. 
I° Cf. Thomas Green (1968) A topology of the teaching concept, in C. 
Mcmillan & T. Nelson (eds) Concepts of Teaching, p. 33 (Chicago: Rand McNally and 
Co.); B. Paul Komisar (1968) Teaching: act and enterprise, in C. Mcmillan & T. 
Nelson (eds) ibid., p. 66; Israel Scheffler (1960) The Language of Education, p. 57 
(Illinois: Charles C. Thomas). 
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and modifying the Simonides's definition, discussion goes on with 
Thrasymachus's definition; 'Justice is nothing else than the interest of 
the stronger'. Socrates asks again for the meanings of the words 
`stronger' and 'interest'. The long and elaborate process of the 
dialogues about 'justice' concludes, at the end of Republic, in this way; 
`Justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice is the defect of the 
soul'. However, the definition is not yet complete, because its 
justification proceeds further and further with the matters of the 
qualities of guardian who undertakes just activity for his people and 
with the problems related to the conditions of a state in which such a 
virtue as justice is applied." Under the spells of scientific knowledge 
and rational procedures for thinking, Socrates drastically restricts the 
scope of moral knowing and as a result puts its non-rational aspects 
outside his conception of 'knowing'. 
Socrates's dialectics is a specific kind of teaching that Socrates 
himself devised, seemingly by accident, through his dialogues with 
Sophists, to whom he was opposed, because of their conception of 
knowledge and their way of teaching in particular. According to 
Jurgen Mittelstrass, Socratic dialectics is philosophical; it aims at the 
examination of knowledge through the rational or logical clarification 
of meanings of words and justification of arguments.'' For this 
reason, the Socratic dialectics is entitled by philosophers `elenchus' 
(EkEyxog). This is a way of refutation which rebuts the moral 
opinions claimed by one's interlocutor through confirming mutual 
understanding and justification of opinions along with reason-based 
conceptualisations and argumentations. Elenchus seems to begin the 
construction of logical order in human thought, because its goal is to 
seek rationality in homology of different opinions or value claims. 
" Plato (1888) Republic (trans. B. Jowett) (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
12 Jurgen Mittelstrass (1988) On Socratic dialogue, in Charles L. Griswold 
(ed.) Platonic Writings and Platonic Readings, p. 126 (London: Routledge). The 
original appears in Jurgen Mittelstrass (1982) Wissenchaft ais Lebensform: Reden oder 
Phdosophi,sche Orientierungen in WLssenschaft and flniversitiit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp). 
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Therefore, elenchus, which seeks homology became the earliest 
example of 'teaching' which characterises itself as the means of logical 
compromise.'3 As Friedrich Nietzsche interprets, Socrates considered 
moral accomplishments to be ultimately derived from the dialectic of 
knowledge and therefore teachable.'' 
The Socratic elenchus does not simply aim at the destruction of the 
interlocutor's false beliefs, but rather provides rational grounds for 
agreements on moral opinions. Such a philosophical way of argument 
on moral values results in the model of teaching often found in 
contemporary moral education, and in the modern theories of moral 
education which concentrate on teaching the pupils a way to clarify the 
vague meanings of moral words and to justify moral judgments. Most 
recently, David Carr's statement on moral education seems to be 
another example of this kind of modern theory; his statements prove 
this point. 
I believe that the very possibility of moral education depends upon making sense of 
the idea of moral enquiry; that moral enquiry depends on making sense of moral 
knowledge; that moral knowledge is dependent upon the possibility of moral truth; 
and that this, in turn, requires a substantial account of the objectivity of moral 
values:5  
Such a modern version of Socratic teaching might be invaluable for 
the education of ethical or moral language at the level of metaethics, 
even if it does not necessarily satisfy other standards of examination. 
" A form of elenchus might be exemplified as follows: i) the interlocutor 
asserts p, which Socrates considers as having a problem and attempts to refute it; ii) 
Socrates suggests other premises q and r which are logically independent of p, and 
Socrates obtains agreement that there are q and r; iii) Socrates argues for q and r 
which entail not-p, and the interlocutor agrees; iv) thereupon, Socrates claims that p 
has been proved false. Cf. Gregory Vlastos (1982) The Socratic elenchus, qfze 
Journal of Philosophy, p. 712. 
14 Friedrich Nietzsche (1966) The birth of tragedy, in Walter Kaufmann 
(trans. & ed.) Basic Writings of Nietzsche, p. 97 (New York: Modern Library). 
' 5 David Carr (1998) Moral education and the objectivity of values, in idem 
(ed.) Education, Knowledge and Truth, p. 114 (London: Routledge). 
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More clear concepts in moral principles or statements evidently appear 
to be a necessary condition for any form of moral discourse and to be 
valuable in themselves:6 
However, elenchus as a kind of teaching by no means satisfies the 
multiplex aim of moral education. In fact, the Socratic model of 
teaching is more relevant to the academic enquiry of morality or, in a 
less intensified form, the cognitive approach to understanding moral 
principles and making moral judgments. However, the critical point is 
that a big difference exists between the teaching of ethics which 
concentrates on the way of narration with ethical or moral language 
and teaching which aims at the development of a wider range of 
morality that comprises the behavioural and the dispositional. 
Narration with moral language at a disciplinary level might be 
significant for a specific and partial purpose of moral education. 
However, the development of morality at school cannot be satisfied 
with such a limited conception of teaching. Moral education must 
attentively look into the deep stratum of the whole context of morality 
which is beyond the reach of the Socratic way of teaching. 
The problem in Socratic 'teaching' arises from Socrates's narrowly 
defined meanings of the terms in his proposition 'Virtue is 
knowledge'. For this reason, a great difficulty appears in applying his 
view and teaching to the practice of moral education. Such a restricted 
practice of teaching frustrates moral education, because moral 
education must not be restricted in its scope to the pursuit of truth by a 
method which produces for its first purpose trained academics or 
research specialists. For this reason, if the teacher uses 'teaching' in 
moral education only according to Socrates's formulation, without 
making any differentiation, then there might wrongly be only one type 
of moral education which is limited to the explaining of theories in 
general or to the justification of moral judgments in particular. The 
This type of moral education has been developed into the form of 
`discourse ethics' discussed in the previous chapter, and it also has some affinity with 
the higher stages of moral development in Lawrence Kohlberg's theory. 
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undifferentiated meaning of knowing in any subject leads, in a vicious 
circle, to the indiscriminate application of a method of teaching . 
Socratic dialectics excessively concentrates on the meanings of 
[moral] words and the rules of ratiocination. The result is teaching 
which limits itself to the rationalisation of human thought and excludes 
the edification of the whole human mind. Socratic dialectics is indeed 
highly suitable for theoretical work, as is shown by the use of the 
cognitive approach in modern theories of moral education. However, 
education in general aims not only at the disciplinary development of 
the pupil, but also, more emphatically, at the development of the 
person, including dispositional, spiritual and also especially moral 
growth. Therefore, concerning a single moral statement like 'Honesty 
is the best policy', the teacher must engage in the work of making his 
pupil understand the meaning of 'honesty', have a tendency to pursue 
the policy in his own conduct, and live honestly. Some part of the 
teacher's work concerning the statement may be for an academic 
purpose, but some other part of the work must be devoted to ensuring 
that the pupil is honest. Being honest is, however, not achieved simply 
by understanding the meanings of words in the statement; it is to do 
with the quality of being honest. Morality is a quality in its 
categorisation. Such quality is not transmitted from one person to 
another through the way of teaching. Education in morality is not 
always possible through teaching exclusively with language." Socrates 
failed to see this impropriety of assuming the teaching of moral 
quality. Teaching is not always effective in every subject; it is 
improper especially for work which requires a higher degree of 
sensitivity and a long period of experience. 
Moral virtues are the outcome of mental quality which evolves 
steadily and successively  within a tradition. Alasdair Maclntyre defines 
1 7 This might be analogous to the crafts-man's wisdom in Chuang-Tzu, who 
lived in the country of Che in the early history of China. He said, when passing Sir 
Hwan who was reading a saint's book: 'I have devoted my life to the work of 
barrows and I am now too old to do the job. I tried in foolishness to transmit the skill 
to my son, but I found that with language it is impossible to teach the art'. 
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virtue by quality, but he writes about the various conceptions of virtue 
as follows. 
We thus have at least three very different conceptions of a virtue to confront: a virtue 
is a quality which enables an individual to discharge his or her social role (Homer); a 
virtue is a quality which enables an individual to move towards the achievement of the 
specifically human telos, whether natural or supernatural (Aristotle, the New 
Testament and Aquinas); a virtue is a quality which has utility in achieving earthly and 
heavenly success (Franklin).18 
Two points of view at least can be drawn from this quotation in 
respect of the education of moral virtues. In the first place, Maclntyre 
characterises the object to be developed in moral education as the 
qualitative in its category. As is mentioned by Maclntyre above, moral 
virtues are the qualities which enable the pupil to discharge his social 
roles, to move towards the achievement of human telos, and to have 
utility in actual moral life. These qualities are not observable, nor 
countable, nor mechanistic because they are not functions which are 
skilfully operated by applying skills. Moral virtues are, therefore, not 
objects of teaching in the same way as in other cases where certain 
`sciences' are thought to be capable of being taught through 
observation and explanation. Morality should not be seen as either 
technique or expertise; it must be seen as mental quality.'9 Therefore, 
education for morality must be distinctive, in compliance with the 
qualitative character of morality. In this regard, it seems that Aristotle 
appears to be very careful with the word 'teaching' in the matter of 
the development of moral behaviour, when he claims that; `... 
intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to 
teaching, while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, ...'.20 
' 8 Alasdair Maclntyre (1981) After Virtue, p. 173 (London: Duckworth). 
19 Christopher Winch (1998) The Philosophy of Human Learning, P. 164 
(London: Routledge). 
20 Aristotle (1915a) op. cit., 1103a15. (Italics mine) As a reason why Aristotle 
says that moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, he indicates here the point that 
the Greek `nOticir is derived from the word `E0og' which means 'habit'. 
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In the second place, the sentences quoted above continue with the 
assertion that 'there is no single, central, core conception of the virtues 
which might make a claim for universal allegiance'.'' This assertion 
conspicuously conflicts with Socratic and the rationalist attempts to 
establish simply and narrowly a scientific or cognitive approach to 
moral education. By contrast, intellectual virtues may be acquired 
through teaching, as is claimed by Aristotle.22 And the potentiality of 
this type of teaching does not go much beyond syllogistic ratiocination 
in a strict sense, since it is confined by the logic of practical judgment. 
However, as Aristotle implied, not all moral virtues are intellectual so 
as to be taught in this way. For instance, the virtues of character are 
too esoteric to be an object of teaching; the Apollonian Greek called 
such virtues ooxppoouvi, which means 'temperance' and therefore 
the possibility of teaching is excluded. 
Two big educational misreadings are therefore engraved in the 
history of education. One of them is the misconception that all moral 
virtues are something can be clearly conceptualised and rationalised 
enough to be taught. As a result, education has come to neglect other 
dimensions of moral virtues like the non-rational level. The other is 
the misuse of 'teaching', not only in every school subject but especially 
in the educational development of moral virtues; the error comes from 
ignorance of the conceptual complexity of moral words. 
The distinction between 'learning' and 'having' is very important 
for the prospect of moral education. 'Learning' is comparatively the 
most proper term, in its use, for the work of understanding knowledge 
such as scientific, while 'having' is used for being in a certain state of 
quality; therefore, unlike 'learning', 'having' does not essentially 
require the acts of teaching such as explanation, demonstration and 
justification.23 These acts are not always necessary, nor sufficient, nor 
21 ibid. 
22 /bid 
23 Cf. Tasos Kazepides (1986) Wittgenstein and the rationalists on learning 
and teaching, Philosophy of Education, pp. 328-9. Kazepides makes a distinction 
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even possible to ensure 'having' moral virtue. 'Learning' means 'an 
activity possible only to an intelligence capable of choice and self-
direction in relation to one's own impulses and to the world around 
him'.24 Therefore, it is tied very closely with teaching, which is a 
deliberate and intentional activity and it has a component of instruction 
which conveys information from one person to another.25 On the 
standard use of the term 'teaching', Scheffler writes as follows. 
To teach, in the standard sense, is at some points at least to submit oneself to the 
understanding and independent judgment of the pupil, to his demand for reasons, to 
his sense of what constitutes an adequate explanation. To teach someone that such 
and such is the case is not merely to try to get him to believe it: deception, for 
example, is not a method or a mode of teaching. Teaching involves further that, if we 
try to get the student to believe that such and such is the case, we try also to get him 
to believe it for reasons that within the limits of his capacity to grasp, are our reasons. 
Teaching, in this way, requires us to reveal our reasons to the student and, by so 
doing, to submit them to his evaluation and criticism.' 
`Teaching' seems to be possible in moral education exclusively for the 
purposes of the pupil's learning of the concepts of moral words and 
the method of ratiocination about moral judgments, because it 
accompanies, as the sentences quoted above imply, understanding, 
judgment, and explanation. For instance, the meaning of 
'commiseration' and its proper use in linguistic expressions may be 
`taught' just for that purpose, even though the word has much 
conceptual laxity; 'teaching' may be only partly effective even in such 
a context. But teaching linguistic expressions is not a final purpose of 
moral education; it cannot achieve the development of the moral 
between 'acquisition' and 'learning' with reference to Wittgenstein's On Certainty. 
See, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1979) On Certainty, § 729 & 449 (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell). 
'4 Michael Oakeshott (1989) op. cit., p. 43. 
25 Ibid., pp. 46-7. 
Israel Scheffler (1960) op. cit., p. 57 (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas). 
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quality which is fundamental in the whole context of morality. More 
importantly, linguistic meanings are not immutable and may not 
correspond with the moralities to which they refer; the meanings of 
moral words develop and therefore are varied. Teaching in moral 
education may be possible only if there are some moral concepts 
which are sharply defined and some arguments which are logically 
coherent. However, moral words and statements do not satisfy such 
conditions of definition and logical coherency. Moral language is not 
logical, in addition to not being definable.27 
`Quality' is a term that is used to evaluate the state of things. If the 
term is used for human beings, then it usually concerns the 'quality of 
being human'. Having the qualities that distinguish human beings from 
animals is acquiring the mental characters of moral quality. However, 
this quality is not static, or native; it is always becoming either better 
or worse, unlike the quality of things like whiteness and blackness 
which are physical in their essence.28 Becoming, referring to mental 
state, means possessing something of the quality of the mind. Moral 
sympathy, for instance, is something which is possessed by the pupil in 
one way or another. 
However, possessing sympathy, for instance, is different in its 
essence, from understanding the lexical meaning of 'sympathy', though 
understanding the meaning may be helpful sometimes in possessing the 
quality of sympathy. Many differences exist between possessing the 
quality of commiseration and understanding the principle of 
benevolence, between being able to feel the emotion of shame and 
understanding the principle of righteousness, between possessing the 
quality of complaisance and understanding the principle of propriety, 
between possessing the attitudes of valuing wisdom and understanding 
the principle of wisdom. For the latter, 'teaching' may be helpful, but 
27 John Searle (1998) Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World 
(Weidenfield & Nicolson). 
28 For the categorisation of quality, see Aristotle (1928) Categoriae (ed. E.M. 
Edghill), ch. 8 (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
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for the former it would be logically inappropriate; the former do not 
rely exclusively on language or concepts in which teaching may be 
helpful, whereas the latter are matters of understanding language and 
concepts. Becoming just, courageous, temperate and charitable are 
matters of possessing qualities which are necessarily far beyond 
conceptual understanding and sociological debates on their values. 
Becoming sympathetic is one thing; understanding the principle of 
benevolence is quite another. Having the quality of commiseration and 
understanding the principle of benevolence are far from the same 
thing in moral education. Becoming sympathetic is a matter of 
possessing a quality, whereas understanding the principle of 
benevolence is a matter of cognition of a value system. The final 
purpose of moral education is the edification of the pupil's moral 
character which includes the qualities of commiseration, shame and 
dislike, modesty and complaisance, approving and disapproving. 
Having such qualities are beyond what the Socratic dialectics can 
contribute to. 'Teaching' in the second part of Socratic conclusion 
cannot stand in moral education. 
Contrary to Socrates, Protagoras acknowledges accurately the 
importance of the non-rational part of morality, that is to say, the 
nature of moral quality, and for this reason denies, in his dialogues 
with Socrates in Protagoras, Socrates's argument 'Virtue is 
knowledge'.' If this is the position which Protagoras adopts, then he 
must negate accordingly the use 'teaching' in the development of 
moral virtue. Nonetheless, Protagoras still uses the word 'teaching' 
incoherently.' In fact, Protagoras claims that he can teach all 
Athenian virtues like justice, piety, shame and courage.31 
However, Protagoras's use of 'teaching' is regarded in many 
29 Plato, Protagoras, 361a7-c2. 
3° Ibid., 361a-c; Samuel Scolnicov (1988) Plato's Metaphysics. of Education, p. 
N& p. 29 (London: Routledge). 
31 Plato, op. cit., 322b6-332c4; Terrence Irwin (1995) Plato's Ethics, p. 79 
(Oxford University Press). 
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respects as not the same as Socrates's, in that it goes beyond Socrates's 
limitation of its objects by admitting the existence and relevancy of the 
non-rational base of moral quality. For the non-rational part of 
morality, it seems, the use of 'teaching' by Protagoras goes beyond the 
usual meaning of teaching; thus, persuasion about moral opinions and 
also inculcation of moral beliefs are the distinguishing feature of 
Protagorean teaching in moral education. Protagoras insists that the 
development of moral virtue is a matter of habituation and it consists 
in the shaping of the pupil's mode of behaviour. Therefore, the 
teaching in Protagorean education may be assessed as value-neutral, 
and is thus very close to training in a technical skill rather than an 
education emphasising profound ethical consideration of its process. 
Protagoras's value-free conception of 'teaching' reappears in Gorgias's 
conception. Gorgias develops the theory and practice of persuasive 
speech and uses them in his teaching.32 The meaning of 'teaching' 
defined by both Protagoras and Gorgias in this way does not satisfy 
the ethical conditions which the word 'education' today implies; the 
Protagorean use of 'teaching' does not reflect the values and the moral 
demands on which every educational activity should stand; it is so to 
speak apathetic in relation to the demand for moral interference in 
education, and we see such a similar tendency in some educational 
theories proposed in educational psychology and technology. 
In any case, whether it is of Socrates or of Protagoras, 'teaching', 
defined by the two extremes of its meaning, is inappropriate to use in 
the development of moral virtues. Teaching cannot be done in any case 
without considering its objects seriously and rigorously in advance. 
The same type of teaching is not available for everything in education. 
What is more, there are some things which are teachable and some 
other things which are impossible to achieve with teaching. 
Of course, 'teaching' may be used in a various ways. Israel 
Scheffler derives the various meanings of teaching from the everyday 
32 Samuel Scolnicov (1988) op. cit., p. 30. 
Moral notions and the aesthetics of moral education 185 
use of it.33. For him, 'teaching' is rational engagement as a mode of 
cultural renewal.34 Paul Komisar sees 'teaching' as an intellectual act 
providing for the pupil's accommodation of new ideas about things.35 
Thomas Green's analysis of the concept of 'teaching' is equally 
rationalist, seeing it as giving reasons and evidence for the activity of 
the pursuit of truth.36 Though Michael Oakeshott's use of 'teaching' is 
vague to some degree, it is in its final sense the deliberate and 
intentional initiation of the pupil into the world of human rational 
achievement." 
All these ideas of 'teaching' may be used consistently for the 
educational enterprise of explaining theories and of showing evidence 
in the pursuit of truth. However, not all these common usages of 
`teaching' can be entirely used as proper methods of the development 
of moral virtue, since virtue cannot be measured legitimately by the 
standard of the rationalist conception of morality nor by the 
persuasion or inculcation which Protagoras adopted as a way of 
teaching.38 It is certain that for both Socrates and Protagoras, who 
were rivals at the time of the birth of Western culture, the use of 
`teaching' was driven to opposing extremes, losing its golden mean. 
" The family of 'teaching' in Scheffler's defintion includes training, 
conditioning, preaching, persuading, indoctrinating, propagandising, inculcating, 
haranguing, inspiring, insinuating, etc. Israel Scheffler (1960) op. cit., pp. 79-80. 
34 Israel Scheffler (1960) op. cit., pp. 58-9. 
35 B. Paul Komisar (1968) op. cit., pp. 70-88. 
36 Thomas F. Green (1968) op. cit. 
37 Michael Oakeshott (1989) Learning and teaching, in Timothy Fuller (ed.) 
the 'Voice of Liberal- Learning, p. 57 (Yale University Press). 
38 Plato, Protagoras, 334c. 
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7.2 Education of morality: beyond the letter 
Meno's question to Socrates in Meno must be re-examined thoroughly 
for the purpose of education in morality. Meno asks: Tan you tell me, 
Socrates, whether excellence [virtue] can be taught? Or can it not be 
taught, but acquired through practice? Or can it neither be acquired 
through practice or learned, but is something which men possess by 
nature or in some other way?'39 Moral quality is categorically 
different from the nature of subjects in education. 
Different contents of education yield in logic different ways of 
education. Education for 'commiseration' and that of understanding 
the term 'bachelor' are not the same in their logic. 'Commiseration' 
does not allow a clear-cut circumscription of attributes in the same 
way as in the case of 'bachelor'. This point shows explicitly the 
inadequacy of teaching meanings of notional words and ratiocination 
about moral inference from such words, because drawing a clear 
distinguishing line between the inclusions and the exclusions of the 
word 'commiseration' is impossible in comparison with the case of 
`bachelor' or other terms in natural sciences and mathematics. They 
are different contents of education. However, the difficulty of teaching 
does not exist merely in the deficiency of clarity of the meanings of 
the moral words, but rather in the fact that teaching itself is not fit for 
the development of morality. 
Moral qualities in the making by the pupil in moral education are 
unlikely to be the object of 'teaching'. Most moral qualities cannot be 
told and defined by the teacher, nor are they developed by 
ratiocination with logical rules; this is because of their qualitative 
characteristics. In this regard, Hirst's argument that 'understanding a 
form of thought necessarily involves mastering the use of the 
appropriate language game' may be not plausible for all subjects in 
39 Plato, Mena, 70. 
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education.4° His point may be applied restrictively to the rationalist 
view of education. Not all contents and aims of education are 
concerned with understanding, nor do they necessarily involve 
mastering the use of an appropriate language game. In fact, the 
education of moral qualities does not necessarily require precisely 
defined concepts to be employed.' 
`Benevolence', for instance, may be definable at the level of lexical 
meaning. However, the teacher faces a difficulty when he is asked to 
tell the pupil the morality of benevolence. What is more, he would be 
driven into a hopeless impasse, if he is asked to teach the pupil to be 
benevolent or to be in a state of benevolence. 'Teaching' is not proper 
for the development of such states of moral qualities. Some sorts of 
content in school subjects can be taught, but some other kinds cannot. 
Oakeshott explains an instance as follows. 
Technical knowledge can be learned from a book; it can be learned in a 
correspondence course. Moreover, much of it can be learned by heart, repeated by 
rote, and applied mechanically: the logic of the syllogism is a technique of this kind. 
Technical knowledge, in short, can be both taught and learned in the simplest 
meanings of these words. On the other hand, practical knowledge can neither be 
taught nor learned, but only imparted and acquired. It exists only in practice, and the 
only way acquire it is by apprenticeship to a master - not because the master can teach 
it (he cannot), but because it can be acquired only by continuous contact with one 
who is perpetually practising it.42 
Moral qualities cannot easily be conveyed by telling in teaching of one 
person by another. In this matter, John Dewey settles his position thus; 
when a moral precept is told by the teacher, it is, to the pupil to whom 
40 Paul H. Hirst (1974) Language and thought, in idem Knowledge and the 
Curriculum, p. 83 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
'I Cf. Paul H. Hirst (1974) Realms of meaning and forms of knowledge, in 
idem ibid., p. 58, where Hirst writes: 'To have an experience at all is surely for some 
concepts to be employed under which one becomes aware of the occurrence'. 
42 Michael Oakeshott (1962) Rationalism in Politics. and Other Essays, pp. 10-11 
(London: Methuen). (Italics mine) 
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it is told, a given fact which is told, not a moral example embodied by 
the pupil.' Nonetheless, moral education has been until now engaging 
in telling principles to the pupil and persuading them to do something 
morally relevant; it seems to be a revival both of the Socratic and of 
the Protagorean conceptions of teaching. It is indeed the Socratic 
routine in his dialogues with Meno: 'Before we try to find out in what 
way men come to possess excellence, we first try to enquire into what 
excellence is in itself'.` However, in this process, the teacher usually 
encounters a logical impasse in the way of defining the meanings of 
words in his dialogues with his pupil, as is the case of Socrates. 
Though Socratic dialectics may be taken as necessary in part for 
the development of logical argument, it remains as something which 
falls short in the case of the development of morality, because of its 
confinement to telling principles and its loss of the sense of the moral 
aim. The dialectical way of teaching in moral education involves the 
most crucial problem related to the aim of moral education, as Jane 
Austin depicts the issue which greatly concerned her novel Mansfield 
Part, 
... they had never been properly taught to govern their inclinations and tempers, by 
that sense of duty which can alone suffice. They had been instructed theoretically in 
their religion, but never required to bring it into daily practice... had meant them to be 
good, but ... cares had been directed to the understanding..., not the disposition ... 
Moral inclinations, tempers, practice, cares and dispositions are all 
outside the reign of Socratic dialectics. However, without 'having' 
these states of mind, the pupil could not became just, sympathetic and 
fair. Becoming just is not the object of teaching about words; it cannot 
be captured by clearly defined concepts, like the scientific changes 
which are described and understood and can be the object of 
ratiocination with words. Becoming virtuous is not a matter of purely 
Quoted from John Dewey and modified in part for the textual coherence. 
John Dewey (1916) Democracy and Education, p. 159 (New York: The Free Press). 
Plato, Meno, 100b5. 
Moral notions and the aesthetics of moral education 189 
reflective thought, contrary to the claims of the rationalist and the 
realist; it is not a matter of the 'verbal expressions'; in this regard, 
Oakeshott's argument is not valid when he says that 'what the poet says 
and what he wants to say are not two things'.45 What the poet says and 
what he wants to say are not the same thing. Becoming virtuous is 
something which is formed through the complex experience in moral 
praxis, in which moral reflection may or may not be given 
subsequently and partially. 
The primary growth of moral qualities cannot be achieved without 
first entering into the existing cultural inheritance of moral praxis, 
where, according to Oakeshott's exemplification, feelings, emotions, 
images, visions, thoughts, beliefs, ideas, understandings, intellectual 
and practical enterprises, languages, relationships, organisations, 
moral canons and maxims of conduct, procedures, rituals, even music, 
which Dilthey called a `geistige Welt' are furnishing.' Reverence for 
life, humane beliefs, feelings of sympathy and fraternity, moral 
disposition, moral sentiment, desiring, deciding and intending are 
more subtle examples. Many of them are in a primary state, and the 
rest only in the abstract or institutionalised form of symbols. The 
primary existence of moral qualities is more important and basic than 
their abstract presence in the education of morality. 
This feature, of the primary presence of moral qualities, is not best 
understood as having a cognitive quality; it is rather something 
dispositional and emotional.47 In this dispositional view, moral feeling 
and emotion are closely related; emotion is a species of feeling, though 
not all feelings are emotional; a certain emotion such as envy is 
distinguishable from a feeling such as pain, precisely by the fact that 
the former involves some kind of understanding and lasts more longer 
than the latter. Emotions are something dispositional that is formed 
4.5 
 Michael Oakeshott (1962) op. cit., p. 72. 
46 Michael Oakeshott (1989) op. cit., p. 45. 
47 Bernard Williams (1987) The primacy of disposition, in Graham Haydon 
(ed.) Education and Values (Institute of Education, University of London). 
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through feeling; however, the most important point here is that such 
emotions involve a wider range of moral elements.' Therefore, the 
feeling of admiration for a certain person or a historical event remains 
more often than not at the 'heart' of the pupil's mind as a permanent 
moral quality and canalises itself into his actual moral life. 
Mencius's four beginnings of moral virtues are not very different 
from emotional states; compassion and commiseration (the beginning 
of benevolence), shame and dislike (the beginning of justice), modesty 
and complaisance (the beginning of propriety), approving and 
disapproving (the beginning of wisdom) are all expressive modes of 
emotional states. However, the basic emotions of morality are shared, 
for instance, by Chu-tze's seven feelings; joy, anger, sorrow, fear, 
love, wickedness and desire. With these feelings, the mythical heroes 
in the classics express moral goodness and the wickedness, and 
enlighten the cultural and spiritual values of a certain period of time in 
history, whether they are Oriental or Western. Mythical literature 
expresses mutatis mutandis prime moral ideals implied in the tragedies 
in myths and legends. For instance, in the depth of 'shame', the 
primitive meanings of moralities are retained, as the people feel fear 
of one's misdeed. Various kinds of shame are deeply and broadly 
expressed in the tragedies in myths. 
Tragedy is a form of art. Arts manifest various primitive 
emotions; they manifest them with the feelings like joy, anger, sorrow, 
fear, love, wickedness and desire. Emotions in tragedies are not 
something which heroes and heroines simply want, nor are they a 
result simply of avoiding fears. They reflect the morality, for 
instance, of the ancient Greeks. In the Oedipus story are expressed the 
feelings of guilt and shame which manifest a certain type of moral 
complex. In this way, tragic heroes and heroines show moral 
responsibilities and condemnations; they are expressions of moral 
48 Richard S. Peters (1972) The education of the emotions, in R.F. Dearden, 
Paul H. Hirst and R.S. Peters (eds) Education and the Development of Reason (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
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necessity and fear, insofar as humanitarian outcomes are part of the 
events constructing the tragedy; such a model is to be found in Homer, 
above all in Achilles in the Mai. Like the gods, men desire honour. 
Therefore, the chief word for shame (aLocog) often means regard for 
the honour or the respect due to another. 
Between shame and guilt there is not gulf, in their moral contexts. 
Guilt is often felt when one offends against one's inner judging voice; 
it reflects in this respect the moral sentiment.49 As Friedrich 
Nietzsche claims, shame and guilt are the emotional bases of morality, 
which is formed through cultural transition from one period to 
another in a society.5° Such emotions underly the moral notions which 
are spread deeply beneath legends and tragedies as particular elements 
of culture and value. Such elements of legends and tragedies are also 
addressed in the form of arts rather than by systematic disciplinary 
theories. For this reason, many philosophers like Iris Murdoch and 
Martha Nussbaum turned their interests to literature for moral 
guidance.51 A large part of a tradition is composed of such moral 
emotions; it grounds the moral necessities of the pupil and also sustains 
the cultural traditions of a society and its change. 
Acquiring an inherited morality means coming to possess moral 
qualities. Moral education hardly suffices by itself without putting the 
pupil into the complexity of tradition in which he appreciates the 
dynamics of its rules, obligations, rights, and demands in a 
community, as Scheffler points out.52 Immersion in a moral tradition 
means contact with the moral elements that are spread broadly in the 
Bernard Williams (1993) Shame and Necessity, ch. 4 (University of 
California Press). 
5° Friedrich Nietzsche (1998) 'fie genealogy of Morals (trans. M. Clark & A.J. 
Swensen) (Cambridge: Kackett). 
51 Amelie 0. Rorty (1999) Morality as an educational institution, in J. Mark 
Halstead and Terence H. McLaughlin (eds) Education in Morality, p. 19 (London: 
Routledge). 
52 Israel Scheffler (1991) In Praise of Cognitive Emotions, p. 99 (New York: 
Routledge). 
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depths of culture and the human ethos composed of moral notions. 
David Carr emphasises this point.53 He and Jan Steutel recommend 
education in virtue, comprising training, example and narrative, 
restating the time-honoured view 'that the literary heritage of human 
culture has an important part to play in the development of moral 
sensibilities, and it is surely significant that virtue ethicists have 
recently made much of the importance of narrative in general for the 
formation of personal and cultural moral identity'.54 Christopher 
Winch accepts the point and writes as follows. 
Membership of a community is an inescapable requirement for moral learning... As a 
child grows and becomes an active member of a wider community, the members of 
that community also assume importance in his moral education. Of particular 
importance are teachers during the years of schooling and workmates and 
companions in the early years of employment and homemaking. School and 
workplace, as well as family, form the practical context in which moral learning takes 
place in a variety of situations of increasing complexity and moral depth. It is 
therefore of great importance that teachers are both moral exemplars and that they 
possess the practical moral wisdom to promote the moral learning of children.' 
Human beings share the depth of morality, though it does not arise on 
the horizon of lingual expression. Therefore, the non-verbal base of 
moral traditions logically requires a specific mode of experience 
which surpasses the range of moral language. Such experience 
mediates between the role of language and that of non-language.56 The 
mediatorial role of experience enriches the effect of moral education; 
it oscillates between the morality which may be expressible in the 
53 David Carr (1991) Educating the Virtues, ch. 12 (London: Routledge). 
54 David Can and Jan Steutel (1999) Virtue ethics and the virtue approach to 
moral education, in David Carr and Jan Steutel (eds.) Virtue Ethics and Mora! 
Education, pp. 3-18 (London: Routledge): David Can and Jan Steutel (1999) The 
virtue approach to moral education, in David Can and Jan Steutel (eds.) ibid, p. 253. 
55 Christopher Winch (1998) op. cit., pp. 164-5. 
56 Peter Gilroy (1996) Meaning Without Words, p. 143 (Aldershot: Avebury). 
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literal form and the depth of morality which is beyond the letter. The 
mediatorial role of experience is basic in Cicero's De Oratore and in 
Isocrates's rhetoric. Contrary to Socrates and Plato, Isocrates, in his 
basic idea of rhetoric, argues that the practical and the theoretical or 
13Log OEcopEtucog and r3tog affix-rum; are not separable. This view 
is recapitulated in Martianus Capella's De Nuptiis Phiforogiae et Mercurii 
which addresses the marriage between dialectics and rhetoric, or the 
theoretical and the practical, or thinking and doing. The all-comprising 
experience of morality demolishes the barrier of language erected 
between the two worlds of extremity; ie. the world of arbitrarily 
defined concepts and the world of depth of moral emotions. But the 
final purpose of such experience as part of moral education is to make 
the pupil perceive the meanings of moral words, which extend far into 
the depth of morality beyond the lexical meanings. 
Experiencing this moral depth is having the feelings, emotions and 
perceptions of things around the pupil's moral life; it gives therefore 
beyond reading moral principles registered in texts and the technique 
of ratiocination about moral judgment. Moral experience, at its initial 
stage, is emotional; it is, as Sartre suggests, a particular way of 
apprehending the moral world.57 Therefore, it is rather an aesthetic 
awareness of what underlies the texts and moral conversations; 
Oakeshott and Habermas both emphasise this point of view.58 Instead 
of 'curriculum as fact', 'curriculum as practice' is appropriate for this 
model of moral education.59 In fact, experience of moral goodness is 
more complex than the experience of learning the language game of 
57 J-P. Sartre (1962) Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions (trans. P. Mairet) 
(London: Methuen). 
58 Cf. Michael Oakeshott (1962) op. cit.; Jurgen Habermas (1990) Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action (trans. C. Lenhardt & S.W. Nicholsen), pp. 
116-94 (Cambridge: Polity Press). 
59 For the distinction between 'curriculum as fact' and 'curriculum as 
practice', see Michael Young (1998) gfze Curriculum of the Future, pp. 25-7 (London: 
Falmer Press). 
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`yellow'.60 Seeing moral goodness is different from seeing a flower. 
This is the difference between the notional experience and the colour-
experience.61 The colour can be seen through the eye that is physical, 
but the former cannot be seen in the same way; the colour has a 
`simple property', but moral goodness does not. Therefore, the 
experience of the latter can occur with physical perceptions, but the 
former requires 'notional perceptions' which need the help of 
Rousseau's 'sixth sense' in his Eaiule.62 Much of these 'notional 
perceptions', if not all, might be in the world of Wittgenstein's 
`silence' which appears in the last part of his Tractatus. 
Notional perception does not merely aim to acquire the realist 
meanings of words which refer to the objects of physical seeing; it is 
rather a particular way of perceiving things which transcends such a 
realistic idea of seeing things, simply because the objects of notional 
perception are the non-physical; morality does not depend on any 
concrete sense datum. Notional experience is not of the world which 
the pupil sees directly; it may be an example of those entities Colin 
McGinn defines, as to be distinguished from the purely external things 
which are perceptible simply by the sensory organs.63  
As Dewey writes, the 'experience like notional perception is 
primarily a process of undergoing: a process of standing something, of 
suffering and passion, of affection, in the literal sense of these 
words'.64 Therefore, the experience is primarily non-lingual or non- 
60 Iris Murdoch (1992) Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, p. 45 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press). 
6 ' For the colour-experience, see Galen Strawson (1989) Red and 'red', 
Synthese 78. 
62 Rousseau's sixth sense, added to the other five senses of the external and 
physical things, is the perception of the non-external; thus, it has no special sense 
organ. J.J. Rousseau (1911) ` Emile, p. 122 (London: Dent). Buddhist's sixth sense in 
the Diamond Sutra might also be to this sort of sense. 
Press). 
63 Colin McGinn (1982) 'fie Character of Mine, p. 37 (Oxford University 
64 John Dewey (1917) Creative intelligence, in John Dewey & et al. (eds) 
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rational, because of the tacit character of the objects of such 
experience.65 The nature of this moral experience is not a matter of 
how things are, but of how things seem to the pupil. Thus, if the pupil 
has enough moral sensibility and sees a creature, for instance, which is 
in a miserable plight, the creature would not remain in the pupil's 
mind as just a realist's picture; the pupil would instead in this specific 
case create a moral image in the light of his own or public notion of 
moral goodness. The pupil first imagines and finally possesses his own 
mental images of the moral world. 'Sympathy is a function of 
imagination'.66 On the procedure of imagination, John Kekes writes as 
follows: 
Imagination is a general label for a wide variety of human activities, among which the 
following are particularly important: the formation of images, like the face of an 
absent friend; resourceful problem solving, exemplified, for instance, by non-linear 
thinking; ... and the mental exploration of what it would be like to realise particular 
possibilities, ... 67 
Just as a picture is drawn by an artist, moral images are formulated by 
the pupil as a mental activity. Things in themselves are not 'right' or 
`wrong', nor 'good' or 'bad'. In this specific case the pupil sees things 
and draws moral images of them in the light of his own moral notions. 
Therefore, moral images drawn by the pupil are notional. And the 
power of the pupil's moral imagination is not restricted to the work of 
drawing moral images in his mind; rather it leads his bodily behaviour 
in accordance with the images he draws. 
Creative Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude, p. 10 (New York: Henry Holt & 
Co). 
Press). 
'John Dewey (1916) Democracy and Education, p. 140 (New York: The Free 
66 mary Warnock (1994) Imagination and Time, p. 19 (Oxford: Blackwell). 
67 John Kekes (1999) Pluralism, moral imagination and moral education, in 
J. Mark Halstead & Terence McLaughlin (eds) Education in Morality, pp. 172-3 
(London: Routledge). 
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However, moral imagination has two conditions as prerequisite. In 
the first place, it must not be confined by the meanings of words that 
are arbitrarily defined. The meanings of words must be vague enough 
to empower moral imagination. Vagueness in meaning opens widely 
onto the limitless horizon of imagination. Therefore, the pre-linguistic 
mode of experience allows much capacity for the moral imagination, 
not confined by the fixed or static meanings of words. 
In the second place, moral imagination needs in a factual sense a 
specific situation which offers the pupil personal experience that 
brings affective responses to the facts he encounters, such as the 
processes of standing something, of suffering and passion, of affection, 
and of ordering things disordered. Such a personal experience is 
beyond the world of language; it is therefore quite different from 
reading, for instance, a Kantian moral principle stated in the texts 
about morality. According to Dewey, 'the world in which we 
immediately live, that in which we strive, succeed, and are defeated, is 
pre-eminently a qualitative and undifferentiated world'.` Such a 
world is 'a complex existence that is held together, in spite of its 
internal complexity'.' The internal complexity cannot be understood 
solely by linguistic analysis; it is rather pre-linguistic. 
Thus, in the world of experience aforementioned, the quality is 
more than the sum of its constituents, because what the pupil perceives 
is what it is, as is explained by Husser1.7° Such a world is not available 
thing clearly defined words, nor pure sensory perception. It is 
composed of qualities in their immediate appearance; it is 'an anoetic 
occurrence; it occurs apart from the existence and employment of 
" John Dewey (1930) Qualitative thought, in J.A. Boydston (ed.) john 
Dewey: The Later Works, vol. 5, p. 243 (Southern Illinois University Press). 
` 9 Ibid., p. 246. 
7() Edmund Husserl (1970) The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy (Trans. David Carr), pp. 
48-9 (Northwestern University Press). 
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signs, or independently of communication; meaning does not exise.71 
Therefore, the world of experience is qualitative, and the qualitative 
experience of morality is something felt, rather than scientific or 
analytic.'' Consciousness of morality in experience implies what the 
pupil actually perceives.73 Perception of moral qualities is final; it 
does not require afterwards any logical ratiocination or scientific 
examination. These points all mean that moral qualities are part of the 
immediacy of experience. The immediacy of moral apprehension is 
possible largely because of feelings that are sensitive to the thing 
morally relevant. Therefore, moral suppleness is the logical 
presupposition of the immediacy of moral experience. 
Moral sensation and imagination are the central function of moral 
experience. It seemed to some that rhetoric might be the specific 
means to animate the pupil's exuberant moral sensation and 
imagination in the classroom. Isocrates, amongst other rhetorical 
educators, acknowledged this point and took his newly characterised 
rhetoric, not the Protagorean, as the most important subject which 
proffers an indirect experience for the empowerment of moral 
sensitivity and imagination. Thus, he preferred rhetoric, for the 
purpose of more exact and perfect perceptions of morality, to the 
Socratic dialectics which depended exclusively on the rigorous use of 
language and logic. St. Augustine too denied the Socratic educational 
belief that the teacher could transmit knowledge by using precisely 
defined words.74 For him words are no more than the means of 
looking at things. Both Isocrates and St. Augustine seem to recognise 
the particular power of words, which goes beyond what the lexical 
meanings of words could provide. They see the other side of the 
71 John Dewey (1925) Experience and Nature, p. 298 (London: Open Court). 
72 John Dewey (1938) Logic: The gheory of Inquiry, p. 68 (New York: Henry 
Holt & CO). 
73 John Dewey (1925) op. cit., p. 303. 
74 St. Augustine (1962) The teacher, in Kingsley Price (ed.) Education and 
Phifosphicaf Thought, p. 154 (Boston: Allyn & Bacon). 
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factual and logical meanings of words which was ignored, or rejected 
intentionally, by both Socrates and Plato, and later by the realists and 
the rationalists. In this ignored dimension of words Isocrates, amongst 
others, it seems, perceived the unrestricted field of moral sensibility. 
Rhetoric, as Isocrates maintains when he defines his new type of 
rhetoric, opens infinitely the humanist and emotional experience of 
moral world, like exemples in the world of compassionate imagination 
in literary works. Rhetoric does not aim at the pursuit of truth, unlike 
dialectics; it seeks the edification of human character. Rhetoric is a 
kind of teaching, as dialectics is, but much broader and more 
comprehensive. According to Olivier Reboul, rhetoric pursues 
noubeta, which comprises ethos and pathos.75 Therefore, rhetoric 
does not confine human reason to the narrow limits of logos, nor does 
it distinguish the emotional from the cognitive, contrary to the case of 
dialectics. Rhetoric develops a human way of thinking free from the 
impasse of logicism and positivism, which are confined by formal 
arguments.76 
In literary works, such as the ancient Greek tragedies, resides a 
broad range of moral imagination, as Martha Nussbaum maintains.77 
The poetic and visual resources in the literary works, as in the cases 
which the rhetorical way of experience carries, represent moral 
conflicts in which the pupil feels righteousness against injustice and 
sympathy against indifference. However, this can be done, not by the 
logical analysis of literature, but by appreciation of the literary 
resources, with humanistic conceptions of things inherited through the 
process of cultural evolution. In fact, many of humanistic notions are 
contained beyond the clearly defined meanings of words, of the 
75 Olivier Reboul (1989) La Rhitorique, ch. 4 (Presses Universitaires de 
France) where Reboul maintains that rhetoric is implied in all processes of education 
and therefore it is essentially a theory of education.. 
76 Perelman, C. (1977)L 'Empire Rhetorique (Vrin). 
77 Martha C. Nussbaum (1997) Cultivating Humanity, pp. 85-112 (Harvard 
University Press). 
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descriptive sentences, and of the logical and grammatical statements. 
As Rousseau grasped, the pupil often fails to see the hidden 
meanings in moral discourse conducted with his teacher or in reading 
texts.78 Thus, the moralities carried by the words as the additional 
meanings 'cunning' and 'flattery', for instance, in the fable The J. exam( 
The Crow could not be recognised and felt by the pupil as indicating 
something morally wrong. The pupil tends to see only the [non-moral] 
facts of the fable, contrary to the teacher's expectation. Such a 
tendency predominates in a society where some official or distorted 
value is prevailing, like an orthodox religious dogma, and in a society 
where value-free and factual views of things are influential. Losing 
any moral base, such a dogmatic view of things obscures the pupil's 
moral vision and also obstructs the development of the humanist 
approach in moral education. 
7.3 Having moral experience 
and the meaning of moral knowing 
In Philosophical Investigations , Wittgenstein mentions that we talk, utter 
words, and only later get a picture of life.79 A picture of a moral 
world, for instance, can be drawn while 'talking' and 'uttering words' 
in an ordinary life. But such a possibility can be seen not in the 
situation where the pupil uses words which are stripped of all vague 
meanings so as to convey only sharply and technically refined 
concepts, but in the case where the pupil perceives and acquires words 
which carry the depth of a social and cultural ethos. All human 
activities involve in fact such moral depth in practical life. David Carr 
addresses this point clearly in his conception of 'education', when he 
writes; `... education is at heart a moral practice which is deeply 
78 J.J. Rousseau (1911) op. cit. 
79 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) Philosophical- Investigations, 209e (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell). 
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implicated in values and conflicts of value...'80 What the pupil 
understands as the meaning of 'flower' is different from the emotional 
and complex sensum which he perceives as he sees a flower. 
Wittgenstein's argument above suggests a very important point: 
that without having experience the pupil cannot have his own moral 
mind. In fact, moral imagination, as drawing a picture of the moral 
world in the pupil's mind, requires the situation of moral experience. 
This can be attested by the fact that the poet first feels, for instance, 
the scenic beauty of moonlight above the spires of Merton College at 
Oxford; only then he can have in mind the image of the scenery; and 
he finally may or may not represent it in a poetic form. Without first 
having such feelings and imaginations, the poet could not write a poem 
at all. 
Having such perceptions and imaginations means experiencing the 
depth of the cultural traditions in which moral qualities are enshrined. 
Such experience constitutes the educational cultivation of moral 
sensibilities and qualities. After and only after recognising such 
qualities, the pupil may reconstruct or invent his own or public moral 
world. In the depth of traditions exists the 'darkness' which underlies 
the moral world that does not allow both the realist and the rationalist 
approaches.81 Reading the darkness is experiencing the moral world 
of sentience or that of inarticulate intelligence.82 The extensive 
imprecision of language is at the base of the depth of moral traditions. 
Experience of this moral depth might be very analogous to the 
claim which Isocrates emphasised concerning education in rhetoric. 
For Isocrates and the orators, the rhetorical expression of moral 
80 David Carr (2000) Professionalism and Ethics in Teaching, p. 76 (London: 
Routledge). 
81 The word 'darkness', Lao-Tzu uses it in his Tao Te Ching, means there the 
undifferentiated world from which all things are beginning to exist in a particular 
way, perhaps by language and logical rules. The nearest expression of the word in 
Greek might be xaoc which means what is indefinite and extended infinitely. 
82 Michael Polanyi (1958) Persona! Knowke, pp. 71-7 (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul). 
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culture is much more profound for moral education than what the 
rationalist approach contributes.'° For Isocrates, the broader 
conception of human knowledge of things is more effective for 
edification of the pupil's character than the intellectual mastery of 
concepts and theories. Using refined meanings of words is hazardous 
to the expression of complex moral praxis. 
Without denial, the humanist view of language in moral education 
values the less precise meanings of words and for this reason, it 
accommodates more personal and affective experience; thus, it admits 
the inaccuracy and ambiguity of language, as in the case of Isocrates's 
line of rhetoricians and poets admitting the experience of the 
subconscious layers of the moral mind. In this prime mode of 
experience, the pupil perceives a moral ethos or embodies the basic, 
primitive moral behaviour implied in that ethos. This is the experience 
of the moral elements represented by less precisely defined words and 
symbols; but language is an extension of 'primitive behaviour';84 it is 
not the behaviour itself. 
For the pupil it is very uncertain where the moral ethos originates. 
But it is certain that he lives within that ethos, though its process 
cannot be easily and clearly theorised. The power of the social ethos 
forms an order or climate in which the pupil takes an individual part, 
as Emile Durkheim suggests.85 The social climate extends infinitely 
beyond the school's culture. Therefore, living in this culture means 
that the individual pupil has a share in the social order and loses 
himself within the infinity of morality. 
Engaging one's moral life means being within one's social climate. 
83 Werner Jaeger (1944) Paideia (trans. Gilbert Highet), vol. 3, p. 90 (Oxford 
University Press). 
84 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1970) Zettel, p. 545 (University of California 
Press); Ludwig Wittgenstein (1979) On Certainty, 475 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell); 
Tasos Kazepides (1991) On the prerequisites of moral education: a Wittgensteinean 
perspectives,yournar of Philosophy of Education, vol. 25, no. 2, p. 268. 
85 Emile Durkheim (1995) The teaching of morality in primary schools, 
_Puma( of Moral Education, vol. 24, no. 1, p. 30. 
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If the pupil is not apathetic, lacking moral sensitivity, than he will not 
fail to perceive the moral elements which are implied intensely and 
infinitely in his culture. Thus, the mode of the pupil's moral 
experience must be opened broadly for the perception of what is 
profound and amorphous in the form of moral culture. This suggests 
that moral experience in school must not be restricted by a fixed 
programme, like reading texts or discussions aimed at clarifying 
values. A big difference exists indeed between what is read in texts and 
what is grasped in various forms of life. 'Printed words' in texts are 
abstractions and distillations of such experience.86 Anthony O'Hear, it 
seems, acknowledges this very point, when he asserts that 'school is 
not the right place for moral education'; he claims indirectly that the 
place of moral education must be in the informal circumstances in 
which moral practice is not restricted by the limits of texts.87 
Having moral feelings in such amorphous forms of experience 
means having the mind opened for the imagination of the world of 
moral life and, as a result, for building that very world. Thus, having 
moral experience is not merely a result of telling the pupil that doing 
`x' is4good. Transmission of information and experience of moral 
value are different; the words of the former are much more clear-cut 
in their meanings and thereupon appropriate for transmission, but 
those of the latter are certainly not like that. The model of 
transmission of values through reading texts is inadequate in moral 
education.88 Transmission of values in the same way as that of 
information might result in the type q which falls outside the pupil's 
moral consciousness or moral autonomy. What is more, it is 
86 G.H. Bantock (1%7) Education, Culture and the Emotions, ch. 5 (Indiana 
University Press). 
87 Anthony O'Hear (1998) Moral education, in Paul H. Hirst and Patricia 
White (eds) Philosophy of Education, vol. 4, p. 11 (London: Routledge). The first 
appearance of this article is in his work (1981) Education, Society and Human Nature, 
ch. 5 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
88 Graham Haydon (1997) Teaching about 'Values: A New Approach, p. 123 
(London: Cassell). 
Moral notions and the aesthetics of moral education 203 
inadequate for the development of the power of creation of one's 
moral world through imagination. 
The imaginative power of the moral mind is an essential element of 
`moral knowing', with which the pupil attempts to recreate morally 
ideal world. According to John Kekes, moral imagination has the 
power of both the exploratory and the corrective; the power of the 
exploratory as trying to open a new image of moral life and that of the 
corrective as redirecting one's life towards a more perfect one, 
through reflecting on the morally problematic issues around one's 
life.' Therefore, the power of moral imagination implies 'moral 
doing'. All these characters of moral perceptions and imaginations are 
subsumed under the meaning of moral knowing. In this regard, 'moral 
knowing' and 'moral doing' are logically linked concepts. 
Doing in a moral situation is in its logic not altogether different 
from moral knowing; they are logically on a par; they happen pari 
passu. The meaning of 'moral doing' interpreted thus far and that of 
`knowing moral way of life' are logically identical. Moral knowing in 
this sense is personal experience, but it becomes intersubjective 
through the continuous experience in moral praxis.9° Therefore, there 
should not be any confusion between reflection based on rational 
thinking about the meaning of virtue, constructed by Socrates, and that 
of the notional, which is less ordered, abstrusely articulated and 
roughly defined. Having moral experience thus means establishing in 
one's mind a certain type of order in the state of such notional chaos in 
morality. 
89 John Kekes (1999) op. cit. 
90 Cf. Paul H. Hirst (1998) Philosophy of education: The evolution of a 
discipline, in Graham Haydon (ed.) 50 Years of Philosophy of Education, pp. 18-9 
(London: Institute of Education, Bedford Way Papers) where Hirst still favours the 
words 'practical reason' rather than 'practical wisdom', and also his old convictions 
of 'rational development' of practical reason. 
Chapter 8 
Conclusion: 
Knowing, Doing and the Moral Notions 
Criticising and re-creating the meaning of 'moral knowing' implied in 
the Socratic proposition 'Virtue is knowledge', the philosophical 
approach to the re-formulation of the theories of moral education has 
explored a much broader field of ideas in education and philosophy 
which are related negatively or positively to the development of 
morality in education. Amongst them, the realist conception of 
knowledge and the rationalist's assertion of the objectivity of thoughts 
have been seriously examined. 
The results of the research will be manifested in this concluding 
chapter. In the first section there are general considerations of the 
main theme of the study, which concentrated on the formulation of 
logical relationships between the three key concepts, 'knowing', 
`doing' and 'moral mind', as suggested by the title of the study; these 
considerations will be epitomised and systematically arranged. 
The specific positive position about the nature of morality and 
moral education developed in the study will be revealed in the second 
section. In this final section, certain practical questions that are related 
to the position will be raised and examined with reference to their 
implications for moral education. Examination of such questions will 
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be concentrated on the following themes: the nature of moral 
knowing, the distinctiveness of the forms of moral education, and 
ideas on the relations between moral education, cultural difference and 
value diversity. With these themes, the conclusion will elucidate the 
precise character of moral education which is seen as emerging from 
the argument developed in the thesis. 
8.1 The relationship 
between knowing, doing and moral mind 
The Socratic proposition, 'Virtue is knowledge', has so far contributed 
to moral education in two ways. On the positive side, it has greatly 
clarified the meaning of virtue, devised ways to develop the virtues in 
various fields of discipline, and finally characterised more specifically 
the nature of 'knowledge'. On the negative side, it has caused many 
difficult questions about education. Plato's Socrates finds no difference 
between 'virtue' and 'knowledge', as his proposition tells us of the 
identity between virtue and knowledge. 'Virtue' is a species of 
'knowledge'. However, the critical point is that he defines the meaning 
of knowledge very narrowly by reducing it to the scientific. Thus, the 
logical problem concluded is the very fact that doing elements of 
virtue are removed from his defined meaning of knowing. This is how 
Socrates's meanings of 'knowledge' and 'virtue' were transient. From 
this process follows the invalid conclusion: 'virtue is a species of 
knowledge' which is defined as scientific. Hence comes the reductio ad 
absurdum; and from this erroneous reduction follows again the 
burning point: the meaning of virtue is spuriously simplified by losing 
its doing elements in terms of morality. 
If we replace 'virtue' in the Socratic proposition by a specific 
virtue, like 'moral virtue', then a big logical clash in the Socratic 
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proposition would necessarily result. This is so particularly if we 
examine the proposition with the meaning of 'virtue' which is 
engraved in Socratic belief: `If the pupil knows what a moral statement 
means, then the pupil would necessarily comply with the meaning 
implied by the moral statement'. Socrates's theory of knowledge and 
virtue seems to imply the positive relationship between moral 
knowledge and doing. However, the positive relationship between 
knowing and doing is refuted by the model of the Socratic reduction 
of the meaning of 'knowledge'. In fact, in education the Socratic 
conditional argument of the relationship between knowledge and doing 
does not stand safely; 'knowing' and 'doing' are not always 
correspondent; they are contingent. This fact indirectly reveals that the 
'knowing' which Socrates defined narrowly does not necessarily imply 
`doing'. This is the logical labyrinth which, ironically, is invited by the 
reduction of the meaning of knowledge. 
As the Socratic proposition in moral education is contingent, as is 
suggested above, 'knowing' in the proposition does not logically imply 
`doing'. Nonetheless, Socrates appears to be a paragon of the 
rationalist and necessarily of the moral internalist; he believes that 
there must be 'clear and distinct ideas' and 'the correspondence 
between one's rational mind and behaviour'. However, Socrates 
confines the meaning of knowledge to the scientific, defines 'virtue', in 
his dialogues with Sophists very narrowly, and identifies it with 
`knowledge'. And in this process, Socrates loses ironically the 
behavioural attributes in the meanings of both knowledge and virtue. 
Much later, Cartesian doctrines affirmed the rationalist conviction by 
saying that 'mind and body are harnessed together'. In this sense, the 
intellectualist legend seems to originate from Socrates's paradoxical 
assumption of the unity of virtue and knowledge defended by his 
theoretical artifice. 
Narrowing the meanings of virtue and knowledge and identifying 
them, Socrates committed himself to the rationalist fallacy. Thus, 
Socrates's conception of moral knowing that is assumed to involve 
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moral doing, no longer sustains itself; on the contrary it has 
transmuted in knowing which is only theoretical and therefore nothing 
to do with moral doing. The historic Socrates, it seems, paid great 
attention to the clarity of the meanings of words, in order to avoid 
ambivalent meanings of terms in arguments. As a result, the Socrates's 
dialectics has contributed greatly to the development of logical and 
scientific thinking which bases on rationality. However, the newly 
born conception of knowledge in the development of Socratic 
dialectics became scarcely associated with the 'knowing' (p-knowledge) 
which comprises in its concept 'moral doing'. Ironically indeed, 
Socrates's p-knowledge has lost its embryonic conception and shifted 
into theoretical knowledge (q-knowledge) which is not logically 
associated with moral doing. 
The realist conception of the meanings of words confines them to 
clarity of description. Descriptivism may be possible for certain 
disciplinary fields where some measurements of real things are 
necessary, where the referents are simple in their structure and 
concrete in their appearance without having many compound elements 
and attributes, and where no human interests interfere, as is the case in 
the fields of mathematics and natural sciences where terms are 
established by arbitrariness. Nonetheless, the q-knowledge deviated 
from p-knowledge which has dominated in theories of education, 
including curriculum theory, and the theories of moral education in 
particular. All school subjects, including morals, became knowledge-
based, without reference to the implication of p-knowledge. This 
unexpected result has been generated by Socratic dialectics, which 
were developed in the process of arguments with Sophists about the 
use of words. 
Relying exclusively on the faculty of reason within the distorted 
conception of knowledge, Socrates and his disciples turned away from 
the faculty of human affections and passions. The newly developed 
conception of knowledge took advantage of the deep and broad 
meaning of knowledge. This means that the precisely defined meanings 
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of words, in comparison with their ordinary use, lost the richness of 
the meanings which words convey. The 'knowledge' defined by 
Socrates is too narrow to cover the meaning of virtue, which involves 
moral action. 
In moral education, there must be language which is less precise 
than the usual or even vague compared to scientific language, as 
Isocrates explained, for the sake of expression and appreciation of the 
subtlety of moral phenomena. Therefore, this position must reject the 
Socratic attempt which claims to keep the clarity of meanings of words 
and the coherency of rational discourse. Reducing all kinds of 
knowing to the rational is inadequate, especially in education, where 
central activities are concerned with the art of living. Socratic irony 
and tragedy originated from very Socrates's redundant interpretation 
of his proposition 'Virtue is knowledge', and thereupon was destined 
to provoke the educational confusion in theory and practice and in 
planing curriculum. 
By common consent, conceptual clarity and unbreakable and 
infallible logical conclusions are 'hallmarks' of Socratic thought about 
knowing. Both Socrates and Plato place a great and excessive emphasis 
on the rationality of human thoughts at the expense of affective or 
non-rational meanings of knowing. Therefore, they seem to take the 
wrong way in considering that they could organise human life in terms 
of this kind of rationality; they presumed that such assumed absolute 
knowledge, based on the rational order of thought and on the precisely 
and narrowly defined use of words, can avoid human miseries by the 
help of logically reasoned conclusions. 
The Socratic idea of the clarity of meanings developed into realism 
and rationalism. Realism in general involves great difficulties in 
application to educational practice, when one evaluates the referential 
theory which is basic in realism. The realist supposes that words must 
have clear meanings which correspond with referents. However, in 
education, not all words in school texts need to have such clarity in 
their referents. Many words, even in school texts, are beyond such 
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realist limitations. In fact, the referents of some words are not clearly 
seen, contrary to what realist principles demand. 
Certain subjects are beyond the realist's limitations; amongst these 
are remarkably the subjects of arts and morality. Moral education, 
differing from other subjects, deals with a deep and broad extent of 
content, which ranges across the whole spectrum of human perception 
and understanding, ie. from the pre-linguistic to the highly abstract. 
However, the distinctive part of the whole gamut of morality is the 
pre-linguistic and pre-theoretical. This is what the pupil knows, but 
cannot do with language, contrary to the realist's view of knowing. 
Moral language in the texts could not describe this part of morality 
explicitly; it is the area of 'darkness' which is tacit but from which 
moral order originates. It is therefore the ground on which the 
compound and complex structure of morality is based. Though the 
deepest level of morality is conceived as the ineffable, it is not at all 
the same as what Wittgensteinian 'silence' means. Such morality 
appears and expresses itself in various ways, in addition to formal 
language, like the forms of life, non-linguistic cultural heritages, and 
something fused in the whole range of extensive literature and arts; 
without these, morality could not be expressible and perceptible. This 
is a world that is far from the realist conception of reality; it is the 
world which the realist could not suppose to be. It exists far beyond 
the horizon of the realist conception of reality. 
Even the part of morality which is coextensive with words is still 
too vague to be described meaningfully, because the moralities are too 
vague to describe. In this regard, moralities do not allow of their 
nature the realist belief in the describability of reality. For this reason, 
the words used in moral representations have been employed for long 
periods in which there has been change in their meanings. However, 
the striking point is that, during this period, something is added to the 
lexical meanings. As such, the words convey additional meanings 
which are the most prominent feature of moral language and which 
form the ground of moral notions. Without recognising and using 
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these added meanings, the manipulation of moral words is futile and 
insignificant in the domain of moral knowing. 
The idea of moral notions rejects the realist's view of the rigidity 
of the meanings of moral words and of the statements constructed with 
the words. It denies, inevitably, the highest form of certainty of 
human thoughts which the realist tries to establish. The idea of moral 
notions, on the contrary, appreciates greatly the openness of the 
meanings of words, which allows thus the additional meanings, the 
vagueness of definition and the inclusion of emotions; it goes, 
therefore, in part, beyond the world of letters or language, and of 
conceptualisation. Moral notions are characterisable as implying a 
certain level of knowing which is constituted mainly by the images of 
moral goodness which guide the creation of moral worlds; they are the 
notions of 'right.  and 'ought' with which human actions must comply. 
The idea of additional meanings opens the possibility and 
significance of personal knowing, and it also rejects the overspreading 
view of the scientific use of words and the impersonal view of 
knowing things, especially including that of having a morality. By 
virtue of this kind of view, it seems, the pupil concretely perceives 
humanity in general, and moral quality in particular, through 
accommodating and appreciating moral notions accompanied by the 
use of words in moral utterances and in other forms of moral 
conversations. The effects of this sort of perception can be derived in 
most cases from literature and arts. The acceptance of accompanying 
meanings might be the prerequisite of the relief of subjective and 
personal understanding from its drowning in the extremity of 
objective and scientific thought which originates from the 'Socratic 
tragedy'. This objectivism would be quite out of place, if the teacher 
applies it in the education of morality without giving deep 
consideration to the nature of the moral quality of the mind; this is 
true for other school subjects. The idea of additional meanings lessens 
the impact of the extremity of objectivism and scientism. and 
rehabilitates the forgotten part of the mind which is non-rational and 
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subjective. This view was once praised by Isocrates, especially in his 
modified view of rhetoric which manifests humanity as based deeply 
in the darkness of the human mind. 
An increased conceptional clarification is not impossible in the 
development of the moral quality. Mencius's four names of cardinal 
virtues, 'benevolence', 'righteousness', 'propriety' and 'prudence', 
might be examples of words which express roughly their meanings 
and are usable in disciplinary discourses on morality. However, what 
they express is still not very clear and fails to manifest the abundant 
meanings which usually accompany them when they are used properly 
in each specific tradition. Symbolising morality in the written word is 
possible in part; it seems that from the depth of informal moral 
notions some formalised thoughts arise, which may be represented in 
letters. Thus, moral knowing is of its nature unique and spans the 
whole gamut of human knowing, from the pre-linguistic to the 
symbolic, from the concrete to the abstract. 
Nonetheless, the oversimplified symbolisation of moral notions 
would hinder the moral quality of the mind, seriously damage moral 
depth and consequently undermine the base of moral education. 
Scientific representation of issues in moral education neglects the 
extended meanings of moral words and disregards the blurred edge of 
the defined meanings with which the pupil sees things from a moral 
point of view. Hence comes the abandonment of the edification of 
moral character and the loss of the light that shines on things with the 
light of morality. The realist view of moral education thus eliminates 
the quality of humanity and leads the teacher to the wrong place, 
where the prospect for the edification of the moral mind is hopelessly 
barren, as Kierkegaard anxiously noted. Excessively refining the 
meanings of words, moral education loses the depth of morality which 
is conveyed by the accompanying meanings; Socrates committed this 
error. To see an issue according to refined concepts only is to lose the 
`thing per se'. 
Moral virtues have specific qualities. For this reason. the realist 
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attempt to deserve the complex quality of morality is futile. Moral 
virtues cannot be given names in the strict sense; once one names a 
moral quality, he loses many elements of the moral system that are 
associated with the name given; language is always too vague to name 
such things. Morality avoids language. Therefore, symbolisation of the 
moral quality is logically hazardous. The more pre-linguistic the 
moral quality is, the closer it is to the practical and the humanistic 
rather than the theoretical and the scientific. 
Moral statements are pseudo-factual; they consist not in words 
whose meanings are factual but in words whose meanings are 
accompanied by moral notions. In this respect, moral education must 
not fail to recognise this feature of moral statements and to give much 
attention to the area of accompanying meanings rather than to what is 
defined by factual attributes. 'X is good' can be taken as something 
other than a moral statement; if the pupil could not understand the 
meanings which accompany the factual meaning of the subject 'x', then 
the statement can be seen otherwise, for instance, as merely 
sociological. Insofar as moral notions are of their nature coextensive 
with the factual meanings of words in moral statements, the statements 
must have extensive meanings. Such statements are not confined by the 
meaning of knowledge as specifically defined by the rationalist, and do 
not allow the realist criteria of testing for truth. To preserve the 
character of knowledge that does not imply the logical gulf between 
moral knowing and doing, the breadth of meaning of knowing must be 
extended much wider than the realist and the rationalist views of the 
meaning of knowing. 
The extended view of the meaning of 'knowledge' rejects not only 
the intellectualist's idea, but also the modern theorist's belief on moral 
education. Broadening the meaning of knowledge, beyond the Socratic 
restriction, offers a logical condition in which the distorted meaning 
of 'moral knowing' is overcome and such knowing stands more safely. 
As a result, the scope of 'knowing' in education accommodates the 
whole stratum of moral life that is textured crisscross with feelings, 
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emotions and beliefs. To embrace all elements of morality, in depth 
and breadth, it would be a logical necessity that the meaning of 'moral 
knowing' should not be restricted by the realist and rationalist 
conception of knowledge. For this reason, a newly defined 
`educational epistemology' must be introduced in the place where 
philosophical epistemology has dominated until now. 
The scope of moral knowing must be beyond the world of textual 
abstractions, because with this extended scope of moral knowing moral 
statements can really extend far beyond even Aristotle's conception of 
`practical wisdom' which is still confined by the logical form of 
reason. The extended meaning of 'moral knowing' logically opens 
itself to the whole inter-context of literature, philosophy, history and 
other areas of humane study. This is because these arts include the 
limitless field of moral notions and imaginations. 
Moral statements are of their nature not sociological and the 
anthropological, nor are they the psychological projection of moral 
emotions. Therefore, it would be much safer to state that they are 
expressions of one's undetermined moral notions. For this reason, the 
statement 'X is good' is far from being a rationalised and objectified 
sentence; it is not an example of Socrates's 'science', nor Aristotle's 
`episteme', nor his `techne', nor his `phronesis', precisely because of 
its emotional quality and its indeterminacy. It is a particular form of 
human expression that is distinct from any theorised type of rational 
thought. The theoretical, contrary to the notional, is limited to 
understanding things; it is developed with precisely and arbitrarily 
defined words. 
In the form of moral statements, doing and knowing are 
inseparable if they are examined in terms of moral notions; this is 
because 'moral notions' involve the emotions which motivate actual 
moral behaviours; moral knowing and moral doing are therefore 
logically tied together in this conceptual sense. Both 'moral knowing' 
and 'moral doing' are components of 'moral notions', and therefore 
they are not separable in this logic; they are logically consistent. 
Conclusion: knowing, doing, and the moral notions 214 
Since the realist and rationalist attitudes have dominated the 
teachers' ideas of teaching and learning, school curriculum policy has 
been governed by the scientific view of knowledge. Thus, the 
statements in school texts are confidently restricted to those which are 
justifiable according to both the realist and the rationalist principles. 
Constantly, the non-rational, the pre-disciplinary and the pre-linguistic 
understandings of things which belong to the primordial form of 
knowing are unfortunately excluded from the concern of school 
learning. Thus, the place of education in virtue has been replaced by 
discourse about ethics, as is observed plainly in the form of ethics 
developed by Socrates and by all the rationalists who succeeded him. 
Discourse about ethics as an approach to moral education goes far 
away from practical effects on the pupil's moral life, mainly because it 
has no connection with morality in practice. The more one tries to 
refine the meanings of words for rational moral discourse, the further 
this comes from practical moral life. The rationalist myth of the 
curriculum must therefore be abandoned. For this purpose, moral 
education and education in the other humanities, amongst others, need 
to appreciate the extensive meaning of knowledge, accommodate the 
vague meanings of the words which they employ, and avoid the tight 
logical operation of thinking with carefully defined words. Instead of 
rejecting any practical quality of the school curriculum, education 
must bring it back into praxis which is rooted in the pre-disciplinary 
level of knowing. This can be guided by an educational philosophy 
which proposes a new and broad conception of knowledge. 
Knowing and doing, in moral education, share moral notions as 
coefficients in their character. Therefore, 'knowing' without 'doing' is 
meaningless in moral education and vice versa, according to the view 
of moral notions. In this regard, the development of moral notions is 
at the heart of moral education. However, 'teaching' is not a proper 
word in relation to the development of moral quality, because the 
content of teaching in education has been conceived as something 
purely rational which is proper for the work of explanation and 
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understanding. The development of moral quality requires the 
perception of morality, which is possible not through the activity of 
teaching but through the experience of the moral culture which is 
widely spread in moral praxis and accompanied by the words used in 
moral dialogues. 
Developing moral notions requires very comprehensive ways of 
education: the attainment of the moral meanings involved in moral 
praxis, in which the pupil engages his life and which are added to the 
language which the pupil uses. Without perceiving the moralities built 
into the practical moral situation and the words used in moral 
colloquies, moral knowing would be meaningless and sterile, and 
moral motivation must decline. A broad conception of moral 
experience is therefore necessary, especially for the full perception of 
the moral dimension which is all around the pupil. Such a conception 
of moral experience values the moral imagination in the existential 
experience of the world. Such an imagination 'aims to construct the 
world as it should be out of the world as it is', instead of inculcating 
blindly the moral ideas encapsulated in texts. 
The debate between the rationalist and the non-rationalist or the 
realist and the non-realist involves the difficulty of educational 
understanding of the meaning of knowing. It would be absurd to 
suppose that there is an ordered body of moral knowledge to which 
education must submit itself. On the contrary, moral knowing is 
notional, and therefore less ordered than scientific knowledge. Moral 
education makes the pupil have his own view of the moral world and 
build it from the chaotic or disorderly moral world. About this 
characteristic, Isaiah Berlin wrote suggestively: 
You create values, you create goals, you create ends, and in the end you create your 
own vision of the universe, exactly as artists create works of art - and before the 
artist has created a work of art, it does not exist, it is not anywhere.' 
Isaiah Berlin (1999) The Roots of Ronuinticisrn (London: Chatto &Windus) 
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The Socratic proposition, 'Virtue is knowledge' must be redefined and 
re-incorporated in accordance with the non-rationalist and non-realist 
meanings of 'knowledge'. Prima facie the proposition appears not to 
raise any educational problem. However, the words constituting the 
proposition are too narrowly defined by the realist and the rationalist, 
neglecting the specific features which moral words imply in their 
specific use. Therefore, the proposition must be misleading, if the 
words 'virtue' and 'knowledge' in the proposition are tested against the 
non-rational and the non-realist views on the nature of moral 
knowledge. 
As the title of the study suggests, the relationship between 
`knowing', 'doing' and 'moral mind' must be re-formulated in a 
positive way as this philosophical examination contributes by 
disclosing the logical labyrinth between the three concepts. Education 
must go beyond the scientific myth which believes that all school 
subjects must be taught in accordance with the logic of rationalism and 
realism. The realist conception of 'virtue' and the rationalist definition 
of 'knowledge' should be re-examined in view of the uniqueness of 
moral education, in order to recover the forgotten part of morality 
implied in the vagueness of language, to achieve the educational aim of 
edifying the human mind rather than to develop the power of 
mechanical rationalisation, and finally to rehabilitate the humanist 
pedagogics after the 'educational tragedy' which originated from the 
philosophical era of Socrates. 
8.2 The meaning of moral knowing 
and its implications for moral education 
The varying contexts of moral education and their problems 
The development of moral mind in education is logically related to 
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how schools prepare the environment in which the pupils experience 
the moralities involved in the environment, how school teachers 
understand the meaning of 'moral knowing', and how the teachers 
perform their educational activities for the development of their pupils 
moral mind in accordance with the meaning of moral knowing. 
The moral environment of schools should be seen as the culture in 
which school children's moral mind can be grown. Such a school 
environment is usually constituted by all the practical curriculum 
activities. The study of the moral environment must include, amongst 
other areas, the practical curriculum activities of moral education, 
because it seems that there exist varying contexts in regard to the 
practical moral curriculum in different societies. For instance, in 
Oriental societies, understanding of the meanings of moral principles 
is claimed as an aim of moral education. Therefore, moral principles, 
considered as knowledge, constitute moral subjects for study in such 
societies, including China, Japan and Korea, whether the principles are 
quoted from Confucian classics or Kantian maxims. The demands of 
moral education in Oriental societies might be different from those of 
other societies. However, it seems that teaching moral principles 
involved in Confucian classics and Kantian maxims does not improve 
pupils' practical moralities as much as has been expected by the 
advocates of such education, except for the development of the learned 
man's scholastic virtue, ie. 'the learned ignorant'. 
Value clarification might be another distinguishing context of the 
moral education which is carried on in Oriental societies. Value 
clarification is necessary for the resolution of value conflicts and for 
the clarification of the meanings of words that are used in value 
statements. For value clarification, the teachers use the model of 
Socratic dialectics; and in this model teachers and their pupils first 
seek agreed meanings of words they use, as is shown by the case of 
Socrates with his interlocutors in Plato's Dialogues. 
However, the point is that education for understanding the 
meanings of moral principles and for value clarification necessarily 
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deals with the form of moral statement 'X is good', and that the 
meanings of X-words in this form of moral judgment are necessarily 
the objects of clarification. 'X is good' statements appear not only in 
the Confucian classics and Kantian maxims, but also they are used in 
every moral conversation whether it is carried on in our ordinary life 
or in education. Hence the examples of 'X is good' statements like 
`rescuing from drowning is good', 'helping elderly people is good', 
`the murder in the cathedral was wrong' appear in our moral 
conversations, which are mainly constituted by moral judgments. In 
this respect, it seems, no strikingly different feature can be found in 
different societies. 
Thus, education for understanding the meanings of moral 
principles and that for value clarification are inevitable in moral 
education. However, the problem in the case is that clarification of the 
meanings of X-words sometimes loses the moral notions or normative 
meanings which are accompanied by X-words. And the problem 
bifurcates into several crucial problems which need to be resolved in 
education. One of the problems is the defect that understanding the 
meanings of X-words is usually confined to the clarification of their 
literal meanings, losing the moral meanings which are below the 
surface meanings of X-words, the meanings which are usually 
accompanied by X-words. Therefore, the result of the lesson might be 
that the pupil only knows the lexical meaning of 'murder' in the given 
X-statement; for instance, in the example of the moral judgment 'the 
murder in the cathedral was wrong' he knows that the terms 'murder' 
applies to the historical event which happened at Canterbury. 
Another problem is that many controversial meanings are found as 
the surface meanings of X-words, because on the surface different 
values, political whims, social and political ideologies, religious beliefs 
and individual interests collect and float. Thus, in many cases and in 
theoretical perspectives, the task of clarification of the meanings of 
X-words often ends unsatisfactorily with the encounter with this 
problem, as is seen in Socrates's dialogues. 
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Yet another problem is that clarification of meanings of X-words 
may transform the pupil's mind towards adopting a rationalist or 
theoretical inclination. This is because clarification of meanings of 
words in moral education transforms at its final stage into an 
education in analytic thinking, which is far from education for the 
development of moral activity. This transformation is seen both in the 
developmental process of Socrates's dialogues and in moral education 
in Oriental societies. 
The nature of moral knowing 
The problems of moral education, as examined in the analysis of their 
varying contexts, have distorted moral education itself and the 
meaning of moral knowing. Therefore, the problems necessarily 
require examination of the meaning of 'moral knowing', which needs 
to re-define the purpose of the development of the pupil's morality in 
an effective way. This is because the meanings of the statements 'X is 
good' obscure the sight of the pupil so that he will not see the moral 
meanings hidden in the statements. In fact, many a different meaning 
may be muddled in confusion over the statements of the form 'X is 
good'; as a result, there are many disagreements on the surface 
meanings. For example, the judgment, 'the murder in the cathedral 
was wrong' may be made from various perspectives, such as the 
political, the religious, and the moral. Many different and 
controversial views - political ideologies, religious claims, and 
sectional interests - may be intermingled in the form of an 'X is good' 
statement; therefore, such a statement does not truly open the eye of 
morality. The deeper moral meanings that accompany the A-words' 
of the statements do not float on the surface, and are not superior to 
others in power. 
In this regard, the essential nature of moral knowing must be 
sought in the deep stratum of the meanings of the statement 'X is 
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good', that is to say, in the accompanying or additional meanings of 
`X-words'. If this is accepted, it might be the clue to finding how the 
meaning of moral knowing can be re-defined in moral education. This 
is the reason why the present study has examined the depth stratum of 
the statement 'X is good', and endeavours to re-define the meaning of 
moral knowing in specific contexts. 
The logic of the clue entails that 'moral knowing' must be 
characterised by the power with which the pupil can see things or 
understand the meanings of the statement 'X is good'. The metaphor of 
the 'power' with which the pupil sees things is equivalent in its 
meaning to 'moral mind' or 'moral notions', in other words. 
Therefore, the meaning of 'moral knowing' might be defined as the 
power of seeing things with moral notions, and the meaning should be 
extended in this way; this is due to the nature of the objects of notional 
seeing, which are in actuality not only pre-theoretical in their form, 
but also tacit in their character. However, from this claim of the 
tacitness of moral notions it does not necessarily follow that we must 
deny the existence of moral notions that are articulated. In this respect, 
the nature of moral knowing is distinct from the meanings of knowing 
in the sciences. 
Moral notions have to be developed in a very distinctive way, 
compared to other domains of education. This is because 'moral 
knowing' requires the pupil to perceive the pre-theoretical domain and 
the tacit elements of morality. Necessarily the pre-theoretical and the 
tacit, as facets of moral notions, are composed of emotions, images, 
and perceptions. Thus, the logic of human development dictates that 
education in early and developing moral knowing must be sought in 
the arts and the aesthetic domain, because these domains are 
characteristically composed of emotions, images, and perceptions. 
Therefore, the teacher must first initiate the pupil into the arts and the 
aesthetic domain. 
The role of the arts and the aesthetic domain can be explored for 
the development of the pupil's moral notions. De facto, the 
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experiences of commiseration, shame and dislike, complaisance, and 
right and wrong, which constitute the moral notions, are fundamental 
in literature; they exist in a state of emotion. Such experiences also 
extend further into the depths of literature; they communicate feelings 
like joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, wickedness and desire. Literature, 
whether it is prose or poetry, aims at the expressions of human 
emotions and feelings which are hidden in deep levels of the human 
mind. And these emotions and feelings are understood as the basic 
notions of morality, as Mencius explains; moralities are based in 
literature, as Iris Murdoch advocates and Dostoevsky's and Tolstoy's 
works reveal. 
However, such emotions and feelings are not the objects of 
teaching, they are objects of experience; the teacher is unable to teach 
joy and sorrow, shame and dislike. Through literature, the pupil may 
have such existential experiences, though they are indirect in form, 
and many of them are of 'what cannot be said'. Giving the 
opportunities to experience 'what cannot be said', the teacher is able to 
magnify the pupil's imaginative power of understanding morality; this 
is the distinctive character of 'moral knowing', because with this 
power the pupil sees and creates his own moral world. Moral 
imagination has the exploratory power to open a new image of the 
public or individual moral world. 
However, moral imagination in literature or in other places 
depends on moral sensations, as was suggested by Rousseau; 
imagination does not arise in a vacuum. And literature and the 
aesthetic domain are the most proper field in which the pupil's moral 
sensitivity can be cultivated, because such worlds are to be perceived 
in an epistemological sense; 'aesthetic' means perceiving, in its 
etymological origin. Through this process of experiencing, the pupil 
finally acquires his own moral emotions, and much of their quality can 
be articulated through notional words like 'human dignity' and 
'justice'. However, much of their quality may still evade articulation. 
Indeed, there are innumerable resources to be taken for materials 
Conclusion: knowing, doing, and the moral notions 222 
for moral education. The pupil can feel the moral goodness and 
wickedness expressed by certain mythical heroes, for instance. 
Mythical literature can therefore be recommended for this purpose; it 
expresses directly or indirectly and explicitly or implicitly, the prime 
moral ideals implied in its tragedies and legends. In the depth of 
`shame', the primitive meanings of moralities are retained. The pupil 
who engages with such literature may express his feeling in speech or 
writing. However, such expressions of the pupil's feelings are not 
always important or possible. 
The materials for moral experiences are not confined to tragedies 
or legends in the classics; they can be extended into the humanities 
generally, if the teacher chooses the resources carefully in terms of 
morality. Subjects in the humanities, amongst other school subjects, 
manifest emotions which are available for the development of the 
pupil's moral notions. Rhetoric, as in classical schooling, is another 
illustration of subjects which have a humanitarian predilection. This is 
the reason why Isocrates takes rhetoric as the most important subject 
for inspiring the humanitarian spirit of the pupil. Thus, Isocrates's 
rhetoric is comparable, in this regard, to the Socratic dialectics which 
takes the rigorous logical use of language as its hallmark. Rhetoric is 
far from the exclusive pursuit of logical necessity; it comprises also 
ethos and pathos; in this regard, it can be taken in education as an 
example for the edification of human character. Poetry and drama can 
be seen as the modern representatives of rhetoric and they carry in 
themselves a grand view of humanism. Rhetoric was the prologue to 
all human studies in ancient Greece. To initiate the pupil into such 
subjects is to build the pupil's mind in a humanistic direction. 
Moral responsibilities and condemnations are widespread in 
historical study; so are shame and guilt. From history the young 
student may learn to form noble moral notions, like 'fraternity' and 
`human dignity' which are basic for humanitarian moralities. In fact, 
history, if the pupil listens to what history tells him, is not a series of 
events, but the record of human spirits; knowing 'what is history' is in 
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its final sense 'to be moral'. Such spiritual experiences of the pupil in 
such subjects are invaluable, because the teacher cannot otherwise 
teach his pupil 'to be just' and 'to be fair'. In such experiences, the 
pupil feels for example the shame and guilt in historical events; such 
experiences extend to the extreme of synoptic and synnoetic 
awareness. 
In this regard, a certain kind of school environment must be 
prepared in order to achieve such purposes. First, it must be allowed 
that the teacher selects the contents of subjects with a consideration of 
moral perspectives; this must be the principle of curriculum selection. 
Secondly, the teacher must lead the pupil into the depth of the moral 
world which is based in his subject, without confining his teaching to 
the objectives which are established for each unit of the subject. 
Thirdly, the teacher must prepare practical curriculum activities in 
which the pupil participates; for this a certain kind of rhetorical 
experience and performance of drama are advocated. 
The distinctiveness of the form of moral education 
The distinctive form of moral education which is advocated here can 
be ensured in accordance with the meaning of moral knowing defined 
by the study. Every subject on the school timetable requires a 
particular type of teaching, as conveyed by the distinctive nature of 
knowledge characterising the subject. Moral education might 
formulate its distinctive type in the same way as other school subjects, 
though morality cannot be an independent subject to be taught at 
school. However, the distinctiveness of the form of moral education 
which has been developed in this study might be phrased in three 
subdivisions; the aim, the contents and the method of moral education. 
In the first place, the newly defined meaning of 'moral knowing' 
suggests an aim of moral education which is broadened to 
accommodate a very broad field of objectives. Thus, such education 
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prepares a locus in which both the internalist and the externalist 
conceptions of moral education are reconciled; the need for this is 
implied by the logical intertwining of the three key concepts 
`knowing', 'doing' and 'moral mind'. 
Moral internalism has been dominant in moral education and has 
shaped the teacher's conception of the nature of moral knowing. Thus, 
some teachers believe that moral education is to help the pupils to 
understand theoretically formulated moral principles or thoughts, as 
can be seen in several Oriental countries; thus, their moral education 
has been transformed into a form of theoretical enquiry about 
morality, that is to say, 'ethics' or 'discourse ethics', as Habermas 
advocates in his theory of communicative action. However, education 
through discussion about moralities raises the problem of motivational 
neutrality. On the contrary, moral externalism mitigates the cognitive 
side of morality and emphasises, accordingly, the systematic training 
of moral behaviour, ie. habit formation or character building. 
Differing from those two forms of moral education, this study 
suggests a form of moral education in which the two aims - knowing 
and doing - coalesce. 
In the second place, the enlarged meaning of 'moral knowing' must 
be distinguishable from other forms of knowing, in that it opens much 
broader contents of morality, inasmuch as the meaning of moral 
knowing is extended. 'Moral knowing' encompasses 'moral doing', 
both being integral qualities of morality; they are fastened together. 
And the internal relationship between moral knowing and doing 
extends its scope to the whole context of morality which includes the 
large areas of actual human moral life where moral knowing and 
doing coalesce. This integration probably means the moral virtue that 
Socrates first assumed to have the inclusive meaning of knowing, ie. 
croxppocruvii. 
For the purpose of including the broadest domain as its contents, 
the moral education allows even the undifferentiated meanings of 
words with which a great part of human practical moral life is 
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textured. Thus, this idea blazes a trail to the enlarged contents of 
moral knowing; ie. to the common-sense or pre-theoretical world. For 
instance, moral knowing as common sense is characteristically 
embodied in all the practical capabilities of ordinary language and it 
opens on the vast pre-theoretical world; thus it does not limit the scope 
of knowing to disciplinary knowing; it ranges over a wider domain 
and thereby touches more widely and deeply the underlying grounds 
on which human moral life rests. Therefore, pre-theoretical knowing 
must be taken as important content for moral education; this is so, in 
particular, for 'the development of moral mind' in its most 
fundamental sense. This kind of content can be found in the arts and 
the aesthetic domain in particular; they provide indirect but existential 
experiences for the pupil. Such existential experiences as moral 
contents are articulated in some cases, but ineffable in other cases, 
because existential experience includes perceiving rather than 
exclusively rational thinking where language and symbols are 
necessary. Moral awareness thus extends to the extreme of pre-theoretical 
experiences where sensations, imagination, and synoptic or synnoetic 
awareness are combined. The form of moral education is thus 
characterisable by its broadened contents. 
The most striking feature of the form of moral education, as far as 
its contents are concerned, might be the requirement for the 
sovereignty of moral goodness over all school subjects which are 
morally relevant. This is because most subjects share certain common 
moralities in their depth, as is seen in the humanities, for instance. It 
seems valid to say that education implies living, living implies moral 
life and therefore school subjects are the contents of life. All these 
contents which are derived by the extended meaning of moral knowing 
characterise the form of moral education. 
In the third place, the form of moral education is characterised by 
the teacher's distinctive role in initiating his pupil into the world 
defined by the meaning of moral knowing or moral notions, in 
particular. As is suggested by the meaning of moral notions, the 
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contents of moral education range from the affective to the cognitive 
and from the ineffable to the articulated. However, the distinctive type 
of moral education can be found in the teacher's role in illuminating 
the tacitness and inarticulability of the moral domain. But, it is 
logically impossible to 'teach' the moralities in the domain of tacitness 
and inarticulability, just because 'teaching' is nothing to do with the 
tacit and with the moral character. 'Practicing' relates rather to the 
activity for the improvement of excellence, whereas 'teaching' is 
mainly used in relation to understanding of knowledge, explanations of 
theories and acquisition of skills. For instance, 'to be good' is not the 
object of teaching; this is because 'becoming good' is not something to 
be acquired by the pupil's understanding of the meaning of 'goodness' 
or by the teacher's perspicuous explanation of the meaning. Such an 
object, if it is not simply a matter of ethical or philosophical enquiry 
into its meaning, must be something which is to be developed through 
the pupil's moral practice. Therefore, the role of the teacher must be 
sought in the pupil's practicing activities in the morally relevant 
subjects or in other planned activities. 
In the arts and aesthetic education, the teacher must help his pupil 
to feel something of moralities which are based in a piece of literature 
or in an event of history. Through the teacher's educational planning 
and his direct guidance of practice, the pupil can perceive moral 
realities which are accompanied by literature. With this practice the 
pupil's power of moral imagination can be developed and, as a result, 
he could create his moral life. The teacher may tell his pupil historical 
stories so that the pupil may feel hidden moral elements in those 
stories, which he could not feel without the teacher's help. Many tacit 
elements are hidden in the depth of humanities subjects. Planning an 
educational programme in relation to the practice of moral sensations 
and imagination and guiding such a practice must be one of the most 
precious educational activities the teacher should prepare. Such a 
practice can be extended to the extra-curricular activities in which the 
pupil actually participates as a figure in a drama and crudely 
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experiences naive human tragedies which are unable to be taught by 
the teacher. In fact, many educational resources for the practice of 
moral perceptions and imagination can be found in the arts. 
Imagination usually arises in the situation of 'what cannot be said'. 
Therefore, the teacher must conceive that the pre-linguistic mode of 
experience allows more capacity for moral imagination than other 
modes of experience. In this regard, there is a laborious responsibility 
on the teacher: for the understanding of the meanings of X-words in a 
moral sense, not for the sake of clarity in meaning, but as part of the 
experience of the basic moralities, the teacher must help his pupil to 
see the meanings which exist in a state of emotion. 
The role of culture in moral education 
Culture is the resource of the school curriculum. Education is carried 
on within culture. Moral education is not an exception. In fact, moral 
education is the cultural experiences prepared for the pupil; the pupil's 
cultural experiences consist of feelings, emotions, images, visions, 
thoughts, beliefs, ideas, understandings, languages, relationships, 
organisations, moral canons and maxims of conduct, procedures, 
rituals. These cultural ingredients are available for educational 
resources, if they are chosen in the right way by educational criteria. 
With these experiences the pupil acquires the mind of reverence for 
life, humane beliefs, feelings of sympathy and fraternity, moral 
disposition and moral sentiment. Therefore, the pupil's moral mind 
cannot be formed without experiencing moralities which are 
embedded in the existing cultural inheritance. This is so particularly 
for the primal moralities which are hidden beneath the culture. 
The pupil grows in his culture; therefore, he must first be able to 
perceive the cultural components which are based in depth in his 
culture. However, the teacher must initiate his pupil into other cultures 
and value diversity where he can see cultural controversiality. This is 
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for the purposes of seeking common understanding across cultural 
contexts and of creating new common culture. Education in 
multicultural contexts might be helpful for this purpose. 
A good deal of cultural differences and value diversities are 
expressed in the moral statement 'X is good'. Thus, such differences 
and diversities blur and confuse the eye of the pupil who is seeking the 
moral meaning of the statement. This is not exceptional for the 
statement 'the murder in the cathedral was wrong'. As indicated 
above, the statement can be seen in different ways by different people. 
In fact, the meanings of all X-words in statements of the form 'X is 
good' are coloured by different cultural differences and value 
diversities; as a result such statements are conflicting and understood 
in many different ways. 
Cultural differences are floating on the surface of the statement 'X 
is good'. Therefore, some conflicts always appear between different 
cultural differences on the surface of the statement and the moral 
notions in the depth of the statement. It is therefore necessary in moral 
education to enter into the depth stratum of the statement where the 
pupil can touch and examine the common ground of moral values. 
Reading moral notions in depth is the way to having common moral 
ground on which the pupil sees the world through his moral eyes, ie. 
through moral notions. Moral education is to help the pupil to see the 
surface from the depth. 
Moral notions are human creations, but they are examined 
commonly through human intellectual history, though there are still 
many notions which are in the process of examination. Moral 
education in general deals with the surface meanings of the statement 
`X is good'; however, this must be frustrating for the pupil who has 
not acquired the moral notions, because he could not differentiate one 
value from another in the surface meanings of the statements 'X is 
good', where cultural differences and value diversities are multiplex. 
However, 'moral notions' are agreed moral values formed through 
long human traditions, as in the cases of 'human dignity', 'fairness', 
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and 'respect for persons'. From this consideration, the study derives a 
logical conclusion that moral education is the initiation into the world 
of moral notions. Therefore, moral education should be arranged so 
that the pupil sees the depth stratum of culture rather than that 
appearing on the surface, because only in the depth stratum can many 
different opinions and value conflicts be brought into consonance. 
However, some moral notions are 'what can be said' and others are 
`what cannot be said'. 'What can be said' and 'what cannot be said' are 
decided not by the deficiency of language, but by the complexity of the 
meaning which is to be articulated. This character might be similar to 
the images of a poet; certain images can be phrased in poetry, others 
are difficult, and still others impossible. Normative ethics and 
morality are struggling to articulate certain moralities; hence many 
words for moral notions appear. And in this process there emerges a 
tension between 'what is to be said' and 'what is difficult to be said', 
because many meanings elude articulation. 
Nonetheless, a degree of articulation of morality is demanded in 
ethics and moral education. The demand for articulation of tacit 
morality can be realised in three ways in developmental contexts; the 
first case is that some moralities are articulated as is proved by the 
words 'commiseration' and `benevolence'; the second case is that some 
moralities are understandable through experiences, though they are 
still in a tacit state; the third case is that some moralities are 
expressible indirectly in the arts, that is to say, in literature. The 
teacher may plan his moral education with the view these 
developmental contexts provide. In these ways, there could certainly 
be a degree of reconciliation between the demand for the articulation 
of morality and its tacitness. Therefore, an integrated theory of moral 
education is possible, to avoid the education which creates 'the learned 
ignorant', by virtue of the re-established extended meaning of moral 
knowing. This meaning was presumed to be present in ancient Greece 
but lost in the developmental process of Socratic dialectics. 
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